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Intelligent Systems are being deployed increasingly in safety and mission critical
applications. This thesis bas synthesized a novel engineering methodology for developing
highly reliable sensor fusion systems (SFS) of multi-sensori intelligent systems for the
applications in the safety and mission critical environments. This methodology includes
both the avoidance of faults during the development phase and the tolerance of sensor
failures during the operation phase. Petri net based novel discrete event framework has
been proposed to model SFS as discrete event dynamic system. This intuitive
mathematical framework abstracts the SFS as a hierarchically finite state machine. The
intuitive graphical nature of this framework has the potential to enhance the
communication between the developer and the client to capture sensing requirements
resulting in avoidance of requirement errors. The mathematical attribute enables the
developer to analyze different attributes of the modeled SFS to ensure logical and
temporal correctness of the performance of the system. This proposed discrete event
framework has been verified by simulating the design of an example sensor fusion
system. The reasoning basis of the architecture of the underlying computing system from
this Petri net model of the SFS has also been developed 10 ensure the temporal
correctness during the operation phase. The use of redundancy to tolerate failure of
sensors has been experimentally verified. Overheads have been identified to incorporate
hardware fault-tolerance in this proposed SFS framework to tolerate sensor faults during
the operation phase. A novel scheme has been developed to manage these overheads in a
predictable manner. A fault-tree based novel scheme has been proposed to measure the
probability of failure ofdifferent levels of fusion due to the failure ofdifferent sensors. A
computationally simple scheme to detect transients present on the sensor data stream has
been proposed with extensive simulation results to enhance system performance in
operation phase. The loss of time sensitive data during the fault clearance intervals
compromises the effectiveness of fault-tolerance in the SFS. A parallel sensing based
novel scheme has been proposed to restore sensor data lost during the fault clearance
intervals. The effectiveness ';If this proposed scheme has been experimentally verified by
restoring data lost during fault clearance intervals of a triple modular redundant optical sensor.
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Chapter 1
_IIntrodUCtiOn
1.1 The Overview of Intelligent Systems
P=ei..",
(of",m,";OII
action must be executed within the time
An intelligent system (IS) perceives, reasons, and acts through the dynamic interaction of
a set of discrete events within the specified time windows. A Petri net [1] based closed
loop system model as shown in the Fig.I.1 represents this scenario of dynamic
interaction. The processes Prp. Prr, and Pra
corresponding to perception, reasoning, and
windows rep. Ten and Tea respectively. This
type of system is being used increasingly in
safety and mission critical operations in space,
medicine, manufacturing, mining, undersea, and
harsh envirorunents. Some of these operations
require unsupervised, autonomous functions.
High reliability and fail safe characteristics are
critical operational requirements of these systems.
To achieve these requirements, faults must be avoided during both the development and
operation phases of product life cycle. During the development phase, through the
practice of appropriate formal methods, it is possible partially to' realize this objective. To
achieve these objectives in the operation phase, the system must have the ability to detect
the failure of the constituting components and, if possible, to replace the failed
component with a fault-free one. [f there is no spare component for replacement, the
system should take necessary steps to avoid malfunctioning. The incorporation of these
attributes in the different phases of the product life cycle will result in a highly reliable
IS.
Perception by an IS is partially accomplished through fusing information from a set of
complementary andlor redundant sensors [2}. TIlis fusion of sensor data is performed in
the Sensor Fusion Sub-system (SFS). The SFS acquires data from different sensors, fuses
them to extract necessary information and sends them to the Reasoning Sub-system (RS).
The RS sends appropriate commands to the Action Sub-system (AS) (1]. The data flow
among different sub-systems in an intelligent system is shown in Fig. 1.2. The SFS is the
subject of this present work, which addresses the system engineering aspect of the
development of a highly reliable sensor fusion system. It is expected that the results of
this work will equip the developers with necessary quantitative reasoning tools to develop
reliable SFS. This scientific knowledge to engineer reliable SFS will partially realize the
broader requirements of engineering highly reliable intelligent systems for safety and
mission critical operations.
A set of
sensors
Asetof
Figure 1.2 The block diagram representation of an intelligent system to show data flow
(without feedback signals) among different sub-systems.
Figure 1.3: A block diagram model ofa sensor
fusion system.
1.1.1 The Overview of Sensor Fusion
Sensor fusion techniques integrate ,...-----------,
information from multiple sensors in
order to make an inference about a
physical event, activity, or situation as
shown in Fig. 1.3. The basic objective
of multi-sensori data fusion is to
achieve improved accuracies and more
specific information than could be
achieved by the use ofa single sensor '------------....
alone [2,3]. This refers to the
synergistic use of the information
provided by multiple sensory devices to assist in the accomplishment of a task by a
system. The data integration from senses - sights. sounds, smells, tastes, and touch. ~ by
the ongoing cognitive process in the human's body is a common example of sensor fusion
[4}. The timeliness, accuracy, and precision are salient attributes of such fusion process.
A typical sensor fusion process consists of four activities: acquisition, processing,
integration, and analysis as shown in Fig. 104. In the process of multi-sensori data
integration. sensors can provide temporally related competitive, complementary, and
independent information [6}.
From the perspective of input/output (VO) characteristics, sensor fusion has been
described in a three-level hierarchy: data, feature, and decision. This three-level
hierarchical fusion is performed in five fusion processes as shown in Fig. 1.5 (7]. The
hierarchical fusion of data from eight data sources is shown in Fig. 1.6 [6]. [0 this
example system, data 0 , and 0 1 are combined in the data integration step into feature F,l .
In the similar way, OJ and 0 •• Os and 0 6, and 0, and O. are integrated to produce features
F..., Fj6, and Fn respectively. In the next step, the features F'1 and Fl. are integrated into
decision De,.., The integration of features FSIl and Fn produces the decision Oe~. In the
Physical variable
Data acquisition
New data
Processing or
allignmenl
Scaled data
Inlegration
Integrated data
Analysis
De<:lsion
~atain-o~~~tData input data outfusion
~atain- ~~a::Data input fcalurcoutfusion
~"=Feanu-eln- outputFeature Input feanm:oulfusion
Figure 1.4: Data processing
activities in atypical sensor
fusion system.
Figure 1.5: The fusion process
from the perspective of
input/output characteristics [7].
final stage, the local decisions are combined to produce the final decision about the
sensing environment as Del.,' The number of data integration steps is a function of the
requirements of a particular sensing task. The example shown here is a generic
representation ofdifferent data integration steps.
The sensor fusion process can be defined as the reunification of fragmented information
in order to represent the information originally present in the environment. The
fragmentation OCCtIn; due to inescapable fission that takes place during sensing due to the
physical constraints of sensors (e.g., resolution, spatial coverage). In essence, this
reunification of infonnation is the main objective of sensor fusion and an ideal sensor
The problem environments
requiring the applications of
from the data sensed by the
multi-sensori suite [7].
design and develop a sensor
fusion system to integrate data
F"""
decision
D<,.
Figure 1.6: A hierarchical representation ofdata
integration steps [6}.
systemsmulti-sensori
generate a large volume of
data with differing spatial
and temporal resolution, and
often conupted by noise and
clutter. It is a formidable
challenge for an engineer to
fusion system will be able to
restore all information of
interest in the environment
from multiple sensors in such environments, especially given the real-time constraints
that are often imposed by the real-world needs [5]. The applications of sensor fusion are
widespread; some typical application areas discussed in the literarure are summarized in
Table 1.1 [2].
The goals of sensor fusion are different for different application environments. The fusion
objectives of a specific application typically include one or more of the following
functions:
Detection of the presence of an object or environmental condition.
Identification ofan object or event.
Classification ofdetected objects or events.
Tracking ofan object or continued monitoring of an event.
Algorithms to fuse data from different sensors use techniques from several disciplines:
signal processing, statistics, artificial intelligence, pattern recognition, cognitive
psychology, and information theory. The rapid evolution of computer hardware
technology (e.g., microprocessors and memory), advanced sensors and new techniques
have led to new capabilities to combine data from multiple sensors for improved
inferences. Implementation of such systems requires an understanding of basic
terminology, data fusion processing models, and architectures. This work focuses on
generic architectural aspect ofSFS from the system engineering point of view.
Table 1.1: The potential applications ofmulti-sensori systems reproduced from [2].
Specific Iofereoce sought Primary obser- Spatial coverage Seosor platform
ApplicatiODs by SFS vable data
Location, identifi- _ Optical sigoab Microscopic to tens _ Robol: body
Robotics cationofobslade, _Acoustic signals of feel about the
andobjeclStobe -EM;adiation robot.
manipulaled. _X_rays
Location, _X_rays
Medical identification of _Acoustic signals
diagnostics tumors, _ Optical signals Human body
abnormalities, and _ MRI
disease. _Chemicaldata
-LaboralOry
IdeotificatiOl\, _ SAR, Optical
Eovironmental location of natural _ Seismic
monitoring and manmade _ EM radiation
phenomena. - Chemical
_Satellites
Hundredsofmiles _Aircraft
_Ground_based
_Underground
_Satellites
Hundredsofnautical_Ships,Aircraft
miles _ Submarines
-Ground-based
~lectionand _Oplicalsignals
Preventive characterization of _ EM radiation Microscopic
maintenance systemincipiel\t _Acoustic, vibration inspection to
faults _ElectriC,magnetic hundredsoffeet
_X_rays
~tection, tracking,
identification 0 _SAR
Ocean vessels, offshore_Opticalsignals
surveillance struclUrcs,bioiogicai_EMradiacion
&. chemical const!- - Acoustic signals Air/surface/sub-
tuents iccbergs, sea surface
iceandflShslOClcs.
-Ships.
_Aircraft
_Ground_based
systems (e.g.,factory
equipments)
_Hundrcdsofmiles
roglobal _Salellites
(strategic). -Aircrafis
_Ships
_Ground_based
Detection of indica.
tions ofirnpending
Stratetic strategic actions. _ SAR
warning and Detection and _ Optical signals
defense tracking of missiles, - EMradiatioo's
aircraft, ground-_Aoousticsignals _Miles(Tactical)
basedwgcts.
Measurements and - Optical signals Micromclers 10 few Factory floor
Manufacturin& inspections. -Acousticsignals fecI
_Laser
unique issues related 10 the design of multi-
1.2 Tbe Sensor Fnsion Sub-System (SFS)
An SFS can be developed either as a rr.i--;;;;;;;====::::;;=1
cooperating multi-node based system or a I~::~M~~2:"'
single node based system (centralized sensing ,. _ : ASPU "DC QSPU~
system of mobile robots). In this thesis, the ~ - Sa
focus is on the engineering design ~""':=======---.J
methodology of single node based SFS. The Figure 1.7: High level block diagram of
the sensor fusion sub-system
node based sensor fusion systems are beyond the scope of this thesis. The block diagram
of a single node based SFS is shown in Fig.l.7. The SFS consists of four major hardware
components: sensor arrays (SA), analog signal processing unit (ASPU), Analog to digital
conversion unit (ADCU), and digital signal processing unit (DSPU).
It should be stated that SFS could be abstracted as a finite state machine; the occurrence
ofan event (e.g., the detection ofchange of the envirorunent) makes state transition of the
SFS. To show real time behavior, the system must serve the events by executing
appropriate processes within specified time windows. An event, E, can be defined as
four-tuple vector,
E= {E, t, Te, Pr } (1.1)
Here, E stands for identification, t for the time of occurrence, Te for the event service
time, and Pr for the corresponding process. From temporal point of view, events are of
two types: periodic and aperiodic events.
Periodic events are generated at regular time intervals Ti"",,".~~;ng•
and time is the forcing factor for their occurrence. For periodic .~.nl< pr.
example, the periodic checking of the status of a E~<tI'$'p<C"
process parameter (e.g., temperature, pressure) can L. "_''''''_~ _--'
generate events PEj to run specific process Prj at time Figure 1.8: Petn net model of
periodic event generation.
period LJli and can be represented by the equation
PEi= {Ii, to+:t6Ji , Tei. Pri}; to. starting time
J~
(1.2)
A Petri net model of periodic event generation is shown as in Fig. 1.8. [n this periodic
event generation scheme, it has been considered that event generation period is larger
than the event execution time.
Aperiodic events generated with the fulfillment of r--:--:--~c::----,
certain conditions fall into this category. These~c?:~- •
conditions depend upon the dynamic behavior of the Pc, Pr
environment. Failure of a component of the SFS (e.g, •
sensor) also generates aperiodic event. A Petri net P,,-
model of aperiodic event generation is shown by '-;::='-;-;=====,-J
Fig. 1.9. In this model, process Pr, an aperiodic event Figure 1.9. Petn net model of
aperiodic event generation.
specific process, will be executed when all of the input
conditions, Pc" ..,Pcn, are satisfied. The fulfillment of the ith condition (e.g., Pc!) will be
represented by placing a token in the ith place. Therefore, the occurrences of these events
are aperiodic in naNre and can be represented by the following equation
AE={I, t. Te. Pr} (1.3)
The interaction of these events inside the SFS results in a discrete event dynamic system
(DES). These are real-time systems. The reliable operation of these systems requires that
their functions maintain logical and temporal correctness. This work covers the following
aspects of the development of the SFS:
I. Discrete event requirements (DEVR)
2. Discrete event specifications (DEVS)
3. Reasoning about the DSPU architecture (RDA)
4. Fault-tolerance (Ff)
1.2.1 Importance of Discrete Event Requirements
The development ofa SFS starts with the generation of the requirements document. This
is also the time at which the most costly errors are introduced in terms of being the last
and most difficult to find [8]. The requirements document, which corresponds to the
behavioral specification of the system's activities, describes the system's discrete states
of operation and the events that cause the system to change states [9]. This must reflect
the required properties of the controlled physical process. To ensure high reliability, these
requirements must be explicit and fonn the basis for the design. Therefore, the developer
must be provided with mathematical tools to record such system properties (10]. These
tools enable verification of the correctness and completeness of the requirements
documents. Moreover, these mathematical tools should be natural, simple, and intuitive,
so that the developer can use them as a communication media with the domain expert
(i.e.• the client).
The job of the SFS is to serve the dynamic interaction of a set of discrete events (both
periodic and aperiodic) to satisfy the client's sensing requirements. Therefore, the
requirements document of the SFS can be modele<! as a DES. Petri nets are simple,
natural, graphical, and mathematical 100Is, which can be used to model this requirement
document as DES. Petri net models can be analyzed to veritY the correcmess and
completeness of the modeled phenomena [1]. Petri nets. as a graphical tool, provide a
powerful communication medium between the developer, typically requirement
engineers, and the client. Due to the dynamic nature of Petri nets, SFS models can be
treated as a virtual machine. The analysis of these models will help develop better
insights into the client's sensing requirements. This fonnalism in the early stage of the
development will help capture the system requirements more correctly. The subsequent
development phases of the SFS win use tillS DEVR as a reference.
1.2.2 Importance of Discrete Event Specifications (DEVS)
The DEVR, the virtual dynamic machine, describes the system specifications from the
user's perspective [9]. The SFS serves the RS through the service of discrete events. In
this control paradigm, the RS expects to receive sensor responses to its requests within
definite time windows. Each
event is served through the
dynamic interaction of a set of
computing components known as
processes as shown in Fig. t.l O.
The requirements docwnent
defines the time windows for the
C.-{1,2,3•...,n} is selofeornputingeomponents
Service
orE,
c/-'/ C4.14 C2.12 C).I)
1-0-+0+0+O
relationship of En. Te with the
allowable execution times of the
service of the set of events,
Service
En={J.2.3•...•n}, where n is a orE,
positive integer. Therefore, the L..",...-....,-':":"'":-,...--....,.....,--,...-....,-----l
FIgure 1.10. Pem net models ofservJces ofevents
through the dynamic interaction among serial
computing components.
components can be defined by the following equations:
E,.Te 5' (1/+t3+t))
E2.Te 5' (1/+t4+1j)
E).Te 5' (1/+/4+12+13)
(1.4)
(1.5)
(1.6)
Usually sensor fusion algorithms have different levels of computational complexity. The
selection of a particular level of complexities of those computing components (sensor
fusion algorithms) may satisfy one of those equations, but may not satisfy others.
Therefore, there is a need to develop optimum algorithms within the DEVS fonnalism to
decompose the event service time (i.e., corresponding process service time) into the
constituent component execution times.
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Using this model, simulation may be used to configure the computing components so that
the SFS satisfies the DEVS model of the sensor filsion system. This event level
specification will form the basis for the different phases of system development including
design, fabrication, integration, testing, and updating. A guideline of the optimwn
component level research can be derived from this DEVS model.
1.2.3 Importance of Reasoning about tbe DSPU Arcbitecture
Events queue
foHowing condition should be satisfied
The DEVS model of the SFS will be realized
through the sequence of interactions among
computing components. The operational scenario
can be abstracted as a queuing system shown in 1;:,--:-7':--:--""""""""""'-"'"
Fig. 1.11. Now to serve an event properly, the Figure 1.11; A model ofservices of
events by the DSPU.
Wq+Ts:f Te (1.7)
Here, Wq is the expected waiting time of an event in the queue; Ts is the execution time
of the corresponding process; Te is the event service lime. Some of these events are
periodic and Sottle of them are aperiodic. The waiting time is a function ofarrival rate. To
handle this operation, it is necessary to have the DSPU with the following questions
answered:
Computing nodes:
Nwnber
Specification of each node
Inter-node communication architecture
II
Stability in response time
Due to the random execution time delay of one or more components to serve
random events (e.g., events generated due to failure of components), !he event
service time should not increase cumulatively.
1.2.4 Importance of Fault-Tolerauce
Applications in safety and mission critical operations require highly reliable intelligent
systems, which are fault-tolerant. In this operational scenario, the quality of data and the
effective utilization of time are very critical factors. The following features can satisfy
these objectives:
high reliability (high probability of continuous proper function),
high availability (relatively low down time associated with repairs),
minimum time to recover from a detected fault.
extremely low failure rates for short time periods,
extremely high probability of transition to a safe state after occurrence of a
malfunction,
easy and timely on-line diagnosis and repair of faults.
Faults in both hardware and software contribute to system failure. Therefore, in order to
develop a reliable SFS, both hardware and software fault-tolerance must be addressed.
1.2.4.1 Hardware Fault-tolerance
The fault tree in Fig.1.l2 illustrates the impact of fault-
tolerance of the SFS on system reliability. Here As. Ar. and
Ap are the tenninal events of the SFS, RS, and AS
respectively. From a qualitative analysis of the fault tree, it
is evident that failure of any sub-system (e.g. failure ofSFS,
As~O) will result in system failure since tenninal events
(sub-system failure) are cormected by an 'AND' gate to the
failure of the system.
Figure 1.t2: High level fault
tree ofan intelligent system.
1.2.4.1.1 The Reliability and Availability of the SFS
In thi,p"limimuymotl,lofth,SFS th''',,",no~I
"d=d~t ,omponoo". Und", thi, condition, tho R
R,,(l) R_(t ..,(1 ~(l
reliability model of the SFS is illustrated in
Fig.I.13. Here, Rsa(t). Raspu(t). Radcu(t) and Figure 1.13: The reliability model of the
Rdspu(t) represent the reliabilities of SA, ASPU, sensor fusion SUb-system
ADCU and DSPU respectively. The overall reliability of the SFS is given by Eq.(1.8).
(1.8)
The availability, As(t). of the SFS is calculated using Eq.(1.9).
(1.9)
Here, As(t). Asa(t). Aaspu(t) AadclI(t). and Adspu(t) represent the availabilities of the
SFS. the sensor array, the analog signal processing unit, the analog to digital conversion
unit, and the digital signal processing unit respectively.
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1.2.4.1.2 The Fault Tree of the SFS
The fault tree of the SFS depicts how component.level failures propagate through the
system to cause a system-level failure (system-level undesired events). The component-
level failures are called the terminal events. In tllis work, failures of SA, ASPU, ADCU
and DSPU are considered terminal events. The fault tree of the SFS is shown in Fig. 1.14.
Here, Asa, Aaspu> Aadcu and Adspu represent terminal events of the SA, ASPU. ADCU
and DSPU respectively. The terminal event, Z, represents the failure of the SFS.
1.2.4.1.3 Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis
In this reliability analysis of the SFS, the SFS is considered to be a nonrepairable system.
In this system, as all the events are statistically independent, the probability of Z at time t
is given by the equation
P[Z] '" P[A... )P(A"'... )P[A...... )P(A"""'l (t.lO)
Here, P[AsaJ, P[AaspuJ, P[AadcuJ, and P[Adspul
are the probabilities of Asa. AasplI, Aadcu, and
Adspu respectively at time t.
This analysis of the fl'.ult tree reveals that the
failure of each component (probabilities of these
components need not to be equal) of the SFS is
equally responsible for the failure of the system.
Therefore, there is a need. to enhance the L -.J
reliability of every unit to develop a reliable Figure 1.l4: Fault tree of the sensor
sensor fusion system. fusion sub-system.
1.2.4.2 Software Fault-tolerance
The requirement ofhigb reliability of the SFS can be dealt with in two fundamental ways:
fault avoidance and fault tolerance [11]. The different fault tolerance techniques are
based on the premise that a complex system, no matter how carefully designed and
validated, wilt encounter unpreventable operational faults and will contain residual design
faults [II]. Due to success in hardware fault-tolerance using redundancy, some
researchers have proposed the use of similar approaches to address this problem (i.e.,
software fault tolerance) [I2]. These are well known recovery block (RB) and N-version
programming approaches. It has been reported that these approaches are capable of
increasing the reliability of the system [13]; but, it has also been argued that it is certainLy
not the case that when a fault appears, the systcm dynamically generates new corrected
code [14]. A detailed slUdy of fault tolerance indicated that the differences between
software and hardware severely Limit the application of hardware fault tolerance
techniques to software [14]. This study also indicates that the current software fault
tolerance techniques can be described as delayed debugging [14]. Most of the techniques
used to achieve hardware fault tolerance enable systems to tolerate physical rather than
design faults. The software is error prone due to design faults, certainly not due to aging
of software components (i.e., code). There is no evidence that the level of reliability
required in the safety critical software can be achieved using redundancy or N-version
programming approaches [IS}. Therefore, this thesis does not address the problem of
software reliability emulating the concept of hardware fault tolerance or using N-version
programming approach. It has been reported that the failure to use the system level
approach to develop software systems for safety and mission critical operations appears
to be the main problem in achieving the required level of reliability [IS]. Therefore, it is
believed that the use of system level approach based on DES fonnalism in the different
phases of development of the SFS will help the designer to realize the required level of
reliability for safety and mission critical operations. Moreover, this is beyond the scope of
this thesis to address the software fault-tolerance aspect in a comprehensive manner.
IS
1.3 Literature Review
The architecture of sensor fusion system in the block diagram level as shown in
Fig.1.15(a) and Fig 1.15(b) has been reported [2]. Due to the lack of a mathematical
formalism, this architecture cannot be simulated to verify logical and temporal
correctness. Moreover, this architecture does not provide the framework for different
modes ofdata integration in the same sensor fusion system.
A. Centralized Fusion
SensOl'5conlrols
Figure 1.15(a): The architecture of centralized and autonomous sensor fusion [2].
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C. Hybrid Fusion
Figure t. t5(b): The architecture of the hybrid sensor fusion [2J.
A network structure as shown in Fig.Lt6 has been proposed as a framework for sensor
management (16). This framework is not supported with mathematical fonnalism.
T,
T..,
ACT}----_
ACf : pathway size
aBs : Sensor observation
STA :SCllSOTstatus
, ............•"c , ACC:sensoraccuracy
I-V: fean= in field.
ACC
Logical pathway scnsor2
Figure t.l6: A network structure based sensor fusion framework [t6].
Cectralized
Hierarchical with feedback
Hierarchicalwithoutfec:dback
Distributed
0SenSCrfdalasource C9 Information consumer ~ Fusion node
Figure 1.17: An infonnation flow graph based sensor fusion architecture [17].
An architecture based on infonnation graph for modeling the infonnation flow in
distributed fusion environment has been reported as shown in Fig.I.17 [t 7]. Despite the
use of graph theory approach to represent different scenarios of sensor data integration,
this architecture does not provide a mathematical fonnalism to define different modes of
sensor data integration (e.g., independent, complementary, redundant).
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An architecture for self-improving multisensory fusion system has been reported [5} as
shown in Fig. 1.18. This is an adhoc graphical representation ofa concept.
F=d
Decision
Decision in· ~cisionoul
fusionproce5!ior.
Decision"
Fttdback to subsystem for sclfimprovemenl
Figure U8: A self-improving multisensory fusion system architecture [5].
Cenlrill-Icvel
1--'=;==;="-==--+-+1 track update
with sensor-
level tracks and
using track
correlation
matnces
A sensor-level tracking .....--------------,
approach with directed lines to
indicate the flow of
information has been used to
combine data from multiple
sensors for surveillance and
tracking problems that arise in I ~S.""M",,"-"N}-----,c---.,-------'='+---I
aerospace and defense as
shown in Fig. 1.l9 (18]. This
sensor data combination lacks
in mathematical formalism to ~===:==-::-::::::,="::::::::::=:::7"":'
model the data
integration scheme. It has been reported that the design and implementation of automated
systems requiring fusion of data from multiple sensors are not well understood [18}. A
general pattern of mullisensor data integration using directed lines without the support of
mathematical tools to simulate the system performance has been reported (19]. This
general architecture of sensor fusion in intelligent systems is shown in Fig. 1.20.
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The uses of ad hoc approaches to
integrate data from multiple sensors
have been reported (20]-[27]. These
approaches are mainly based on
informal drawings and textual
descriptions without the support of
mathematical fonnalisms to model the
data integration scheme. Despite the
increasing dependence of our society
on multi-sensori sensing system based
intelligent systems, it has been
mentioned that the development of
sensing systems comprising different
types of multiple sensors is still more L.;,~::;:;;;;::~~=:::~~~~=~
ofan art than a science [28J. Figure 1.20: A generic pattem ofmulti-sensori
integration and fusion system [19].
A mathematical framework called geometric feature relation graph (GFRG) has been
proposed to integrate features sensed by different sensors [29]. This GFRG graph deals
with algorithmic aspects of sensor fusion. The computational framework proposed in [30]
deals with the formal descriptions of static nature of spatially distributed sensor networks.
The schemes reported in [29] and [30] have deficiency in the use of system approach.
From the literature it appears that present state-of-the-art for engineering a sensor fusion
system is deficient in using mathematical formalism. The architectures reported in the
public domain as reviewed here are simple graphical representations of concepts for the
integration ofmulti-sensori data. None of these architectures can accommodate different
modes of sensor data integration: competitive, complementary, independent, and
temporal in the same SFS. These architectures are not supported with mathematical
formalism so that the different attributes of the system can be verified through simulation
(e.g., logical and temporal correctness). These reported works do not provide the
framework for seamless implementation of these high level architectures. Although safety
and mission critical applications have a high demand for multi-sensori systems, none of
these architectures include fault-tolerance. The reliability profiles of different levels of
fusion (e.g., data, features, decision) have not been addressed by any of these
architectures. Therefore, based on the state-of-the-art review, there is a need to develop a
comprehensive framework to address these issues for the development of highly reliable
sensor fusion system.
Knowledge relating to this problem is available in the public domain and may be applied
in searching for a solution to this problem. However, this knowledge is not directly
usable as solution. As a matter of fact, some of the unique aspects of this problem have
not been addressed by those developments. Some existing knowledge has helped to
comprehend this problem, while some has been used as a tool to formulate the solution.
The relationship of existing knowledge to the comprehension and formation of the
solution proposed in this thesis is outlined in the following sub-sections. It is important to
note that the objective of this literature review is not to give an exhaustive account of
developments of related fields, but rather to describe how those developments can be
used as aids to address this problem.
1.3.1 Sensor Fusion Sub-System and Petri nets
An SFS can be abstracted as a finite state machine. The discrete events, both periodic and
aperiodic (stochastic), cause the SFS to change its state. As SFS is a real-time system, the
state changes must satisfY stringent timing constraints. That is, one must guarantee that
required computations be completed before specified deadline [31]. The dynamic
interactions of those events go beyond the intuitive capability of the developer. It is
required to equip the developer with a mathematical tool that is simple, intuitive and
quantitative, so that the dynamic nature of the system can be readily represented
graphically and through mathematical analysis. The developer will be able to perform a
check of the properties related to the behavior of the SFS (e.g., precedence relations
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amongst events, freedom from deadlock. repetitive activities. time required to serve a
particular event). The simulation-based model validation should produce only a limited
set of states of the modeled SFS. and thus should show the presence of errors in the
model.
Petri nets are being developed in a search for natural. simple. and quantitative methods
for modeling the behavior of the DES [I]. (32). Petri nels are system engineering tools.
The analysis of the modeled system using Petri nets reveals important information about
the structure and dynamic behavior of the modeled system [33]. [n this modeling
paradigm. the system is decomposed into interacting components (in an SFS. these are
computing components). The modeled system changes its states through the generation of
discrete events. These events are served through the interaction of corresponding
computing components. This Petri net model of the system can be analyzed to check the
precedence relations among events (for periodic events). deadlock. sequence of
interaction of components to serve events. required time to serve an event. The
randomness of aperiodic events can be addressed using stochastic Petri nets [34]. Petri
nets have been used to design the simulator for flexible manufacturing systems (FMSs)
and to verify the presence/absence of deadlock of the logic used to design the
hardware/software forthe controllers used in the FMSs [35]. The modeling ofa real·time
system specification to determine whether the specification is schedulable with respect to
the imposed timing constraints has been performed with Petri net models [36]. The ability
of Petri nets to evaluate the performance of real-time systems has been demonstrated in
the literature [37]-[39]. From the study of the literature. it appears thaI Petri nel can be a
useful tool to engineer an SFS.
1.3.2 Discrete Event Requirements (DEVR)
The perfonnance models evolve from descriptions of the system performance at the lotal
system level to component properties in the lale design cycles. The use of same
mathematical formalism at different levels of system development including the
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requirements pnase nas been outlined in [40). This work nas not proposed any
quantitative method in this aspect. Time constraint discrete event fonnalism has been
used to ensure end-to-end requirements of real-time systems [41]. This work nas
structured the system under development as a set of process components connected by
asynch.ronous cnannels, in whicn the end points are the system's external inputs and
outputs. Altnough this work includes a mathematical fonnalism. it lacks simplicity. A
grapnical tool with textual descriptions has been used for requirement specification for
process control system [8]. Although this method has tried to represent tne discrete event
interaction of a process control system in graphical fonnat. due to the lack of
mathematical fonnalism this technique does not provide the means to analyze the model
to verify its correctness and completeness. A process algebraic approach nas been used to
model the requirements of resource-bound and real-time systems [42]. Due to a
complicated mathematical fonnalism and the lack of a graphical representation, this
method may result in poor communication between the developer and the client.
It has been reported that it is a challenge to find suitable mathematical theories and
notations that allow a designer to record the deep insight in the properties of the
controlled physical process (to}. Ambiguous textual descriptions or mathematical
notations that the clients find difficult to understand will impede the development process
of SFS. The requirement model should be simple, natural and must have mathematical
fonnalism for analysis. The requirements of the SFS can be abstracted as DES. Therefore,
Petri nets based virtual machine modeling of the requirements of the SFS will be an
effective solution to this problem. The developer will be able to analyze this model to
ensure that the system requirement model satisfies required system functional goals and
temporal constraints. Having a natural graphical property, this Petri net model will enable
the requirement engineer to communicate with the customer easily. Moreover, this
requirement model can be decomposed into subsequent phases of the development to
model the interaction of discrete components. Therefore, use of the same mathematical
model of the system at different levels of development will minimize the flow of errors
from one level to the next.
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1.3.3 Discrete Event Specifications (DEVS)
Recent developments in the paradigm ofadvanced robotics and intelligent automation has
shown how systems may be advantageously represented as discrete event models by
employing techniques based on the DEVS formalism [43]. This DEV$ formalism is a
means of formal representation of discrete event systems capable of mathematical
manipulation, just as differential equations serve this role for continuous systems. The
DEVS formalism is a set of models together with operators that combine models to form
other models in ways in which real systems are COIlllected [44]. The use of DEVS
formalism to measure the performance of DES has been demonstrated [45].
There have been developments in the field of discrete event real-time system
specifications using approaches other than DEVS formalism [42],[46],[47J. Usually thcse
developments use either complex mathematical notations or textual descriptions. As a
result, they are deficient either in simplicity of representation or analytical ability.
Therefore, these developments will not be very useful for the specification oftbe SFS.
Petri nets being graphical and mathematical DEVS formalism provide a suitable
environment for modeling and analysis of the specification of the SFS. Moreover, since
Petri net formalism has been selected for modeling the requirements of the SFS, there
w111 be a uniform transition of the development from requirements to specification phase.
The importance of the use of the development process as the stepwise reduction of
abstraction has been reported [40]. Petri net has been used for modeling the automation
system in hierarchical and modular fashion [48],[491.
1.3.4 Reasoning About the DSPU Architecture (RDA)
The development effort in avionics has resulted in an integrated modeling approach in
embedded computing system developmenl [40]. The goal of this approach is to abstract
the system under development at different levels of complexity. The top most level is the
model of system requirements from user poinl of view. The subsequent levels steadily
reduce the abstraction from conception (system requirements) to implementation
(physical system). The DSPU architecture will implement the DEVS model of the
system. Therefore, the reasoning about the architecture of the DSPU should be based on
the DEVS model. The use of a system level approach has been reconunended to address
this problem [15]. This work [15] has reported that the lack ofsyslem level viewpoints
and approach of developing embedded computing systems are the greatest cause of the
problems experienced when computers are used to control complex processes.
According to the DEVS model, the DSPU is supposed to respond to both periodic and
aperiodic events within specified time windows. Scheduling of real-time systems has
addressed to be the problem of periodic events[50],[51]. There is a need to develop a
stochastic process model 10 address the aperiodic events. Then this process model should
be used to reason about Ihe underlying architecture of the DSPU. The reasoning of the
architecture should be based on the quantitative analysis of the DEVS model and the
performance of the processing modules, so that the temporal specifications of the events
can be satisfied. To facilitate the development process the Petri nel can be used as a
mathematical tool to model this reasoning process.
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1.3.5 Fault-Tolerance of the SFS
To show high reliability, the acceptable probability of failure of the SFS is very small,
typically in the range of to-l to 10"°, depending on the consequences of the failure [52].
For a SFS to be adequately reliable for safety and mission critical operations, it must be
capable of surviving a specified number of random component faults with a probability
approaching unity. The use ofcomponent level redundancy has been suggested to achieve
this objective [53]. Due to the stringent real-time requirements and costs, the redundancy
management is an important issue to consider. It has been suggested that the overhead
associated with managing redundancy must be quantified precisely so that certain
guarantees about the real-time behavior of the system can be made [54]. The failure of
components generates aperiodic events. Therefore, a stochastic Petri net model will help
to address this problem [55].
The fault-tolerance techniques available in the public domain suspend the operation of the
system during the fault clearance time. If this type of technique is used to address the
fault tolerance of the SFS, data from the sensor during the fault clearance time will be lost
(56]. Therefore, there is need to look at this problem to adopt fault-tolerance in the
development of the SFS.
If a sensor fails or partially malfunctions and its effect is not considered in the fusion of
sensor data, the dependability of the fused infonnation will suffer. While one of the
solutions may be to use redundant sensor system [57], such a sensor system carmot detect
all types of faults (e.g., transient faults). Moreover, in the operation of unsupervised
intelligent systems in mission critical operation (e.g., autonomous deployment of
scientific experiment in space) redundant fault-free sensors may not be available to detect
and replace a faulty sensor. In such an operational scenario, even a partially faulty sensor
may be required to continue functioning. Therefore, there is a need to develop a scheme
to address this problem. The solution should be simple and adaptable.
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1.4 Approach of This Thesis Work
The SFS is an embedded real-time compuling system. The importance of the use of
system level approach to develop this type of system has been reported [IS]. The tools
supporting system level approach should be simple and mathematical. The simplicity will
enable the developer to comprehend the system [0 avoid errors in different phases of
development. The mathematical attributes of the tool will equip the developer to verify
the confonnity of the functions of the system under development with the customer's
requirements.
The adopted approach should be a stepwise reduction of abstraction to simplify the
complexity of development process [40]. This should produce a smoothly evolving set of
designs at different levels of abstraction. The design approach should proceed from
conception to implementation in a cyclic manner.
The simplicity and the mathematical nature of Petri nets have already been mentioned.
Using the Petri net model it is possible to decompose the complexity of the system in
hierarchical fashion. It has been explained that the Petri net formalism can be used in
different phases of developments. Therefore, stepwise reduction of abstraction of
development can be realized through this system modeling formalism.
The Petri net based DES modeling formalism has been adopted in this thesis to approach
this problem. This approach decomposes the problem in a hierarchical fashion. In each
cycle, the level of abstraction is reduced. In the early cycles, the abstract model may be a
combination of hardware and software, but in the late cycles, they are very specific
hardware and software design representations. In every phase, the developer will be able
to verify the correctness afthe functionality of the system under development.
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1.5 Objective of tbis Thesis
The objective of this thesis is to synthesize engineering knowledge to develop a highly
reliable SFS using a system engineering approach. Although the main focus of this thesis
is to address the system aspects of the development process of the SFS. due 10
insufficient public domain solutions, this thesis also includes the unique algorithmic
aspects pertinent to the development of highly reliable SFS for mission and safety critical
applications (e.g., space, medicine). The long-term objective of this thesis is to develop a
software tool to automate the development process of reliable sensor fusion systems. The
specific short-term objectives are summarized in the following points;
1. To develop formalism for the DEVR model orlhe SFS with the provision of different
modes of sensor integration in the same system: competitive, complementary,
independent. and temporal. This intuitive and quantitative model of the requirements
win be a virtual machine to satisfy the customer needs. This model will be the
reference of commwtication between the customer and the development engineer. The
intuitiveness of this model will help the clients to understand whether the system
under development satisfies their requirements. The quantitative aspect will enable
the developer to analyze different attributes of the system (e.g., modes of sensor data
integration, logical and temporal correctness).
2. To develop a formalism for the DEVS model of the SFS. This model will enable the
developer to define the dynamic interaction among the computing components to
serve an event. The event level specification will be decomposed into the computing
component level. The allocation of time for the computing components 10 serve a set
of periodic and aperiodic events will be optimized through this model. This model
will help the developer enhance the logical and temporal correctness of the execution
ofcomputing components to serve the events.
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3. To develop reasoning taxonomy of the DSPU. This taxonomy will establish a link
between the DEVS model of the system and the underlying computing system to
implement this model. The quantitative aspect of this reasoning process will enable
the developer to design the architecture of the DSPU to satisfy the DEVS model.
4. To develop a framework to measure the reliability that data will be provided to each
stage of sensor fusion from the supporting sensors. It is also an objective to develop a
predictable redundancy management scheme. This scheme will enable the developer
to consider the effet:t of redundancy management overhead on the system
performance. This quantitative information will be considered in the DEVS model of
the system, so that the architet:tureofDSPU will keep enough room (determined from
redundancy management overhead) to cope with the aperiodic events while
maintaining logical and temporal correctness ofDEVR model.
5. To develop a simple and adaptable sensor fault detection scheme, so that sensor fault-
tolerance can be implemented using estimation based fault-detet:tion approach. Due to
the potential of transient faults to corrupt sensor data in safety and mission critical
operations (e.g. medicine and space), one of the objectives of this work is 10 detect
and locate transients in sensor data stream.
6. To develop methodology to minimize the effect of lost sensor data during fault
clearance time. This work will address the problem of dala recovery during the fault
clearance time. Appropriate algorithms will be developed to recover this data. This
data recovery scheme will also extend the data acquisition time. An estimation oftbis
extension will be provided which should be considered in developing the DEVS
model of the system.
29
1.6 Overview of this Thesis
The synthesization process of engineering knowledge to satisfy the objective of this
thesis has tailored the relevant developments in the related fields to fit in the solution
domain. This development can be broadly classified as the design automation for highly
reliable sensor fusion systems. The theoretical developments of this work have been
reported in main body of this thesis. The verifications of these theoretical developments
through simulations and experimentations have been summarized in the Appendix.
The development of the fonnalism to capture the customer's requi....ement in tenns of a
discrete event dynamic virtual machine known as DEVR model is reported in Chapter 2.
This proposed modeling technique has the ability to model different modes of sensor data
integration: competitive, complementary, independent, and temporal. The graphical
representation and quantitative analysis of this model is also shown. The quantitative
analysis justifies the logical and temporal correctness. The realization of the task directed
sensing and abstraction of RS as a sensor in the DEVR model to provide bi-directional
communication are depicted in this chapter. The quantitative framework to measure the
utilization factor of the underlying computing system is developed to realize a cost-
effective SFS. It is also shown that this model can be analyzed to check the presence of
deadlock, reachability, and repetitiveness of the operation ofSFS.
Chapter 3 reports the development of the formalism of the DEVS model of the system.
The dynamic interaction among the computing components to realize the DEVR model
of the system under development is shown in the DEVS model. The optimization model
for the allocation of time to computing components considering both temporal and
computational constraints is reported in this chaptet". The sensitivity analysis of
component execution time is reported here to detect temporally critical computing
components. This detection will help further development andlor special implementation
(e.g.• implementation in hardware) of these critical components.
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The reasoning taxonomy of the DSPU is developed in Chapter 4. The relationship
among service time of an event, waiting time in the queue, and the execution time and
parallel nature of the corresponding traces is used as the basis of reasoning for the
architecture of the DSPU. The reasons of randomness of execution times of the
computing components on modem processors are reported here. Necessary guidelines are
also provided to avoid this randomness of execution time to realize reliable
implementation ofDEVS model on the underlying embedded computing system.
The potential to enhance the reliability of the sensing system using redundant sensors is
evaluated in Chapter S. A novel technique to measure the probabilities of failures of
different levels of sensor fusion (e.g., data, features, and decision) due to the failure of the
supporting sensors is proposed in this chapter.
The development of the estimation technique using local statistics to detect and locate
sensor's faults (specifically transient faults) is reported in Chapter 6. The profiles of
local statistics of four test signals at transient faults are also evaluated. The dependence of
local statistics based approach on the location of transient, window size, the location of
window relative to the starting of transient and the frequency of the transient to detect and
locate transient fault are evaluated through simulation.
Chapter 7 reports the development of the restoration scheme of lost sensor data during
the fault clearance period. The reported scheme minimizes the loss of these real-time sensor
data during fault-clearance period. This scheme is based on the restoration of data through
parallel sensing. The restoration processes for both dual and triple modular redundancy
schemes are explained. The effects of both hardware and software implementation of voting
logic on the performance of the system and the quality of restoration are shown, and it is shown
that this scheme is capable of recovering almost every datum lost during fault-clearance.
Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions and provides recommendations for future work.
Jl
1.7 Tbe Novelties of Ibis Tbesis
This thesis presents a novel, unified framework for the development of reliable sensor
fusion system, which will help produce a set of designs reducing the system abstraction
from conception to implementation. The proposed framework allows the developer to
avoid faults in both the development and operation phases of SFS's lifc cycle. The
following points summarizes the novel aspects ofthe work proposed in this thesis:
I. The proposed DEVR model of the SFS provides a novel framework for modeling the
system requirement as a virtual machine covering different modes of sensor data
integration. The quantitative attributes of this framework enable the developer to
analyze different aspects of the system under development at different phases of the
development process to ensure that the system satisfies its intended purpose.
2. The proposed DEVS model of the SFS allows the developer to decompose the DEVR
model in a hierarchical fashion to the computing component level. This unified
approach helps ensure that the dynamic interactions among the computing
components satisfy the logical and temporal correctness of the DEVR model.
3. The proposed derivation of the architecture of the underlying computing system from
the DEVS model ensures that temporal correctness ofDEVR model is provided in the
operations phase of SFS. The identifications of sources of randomness of execution
times to run computing components on modem processors and the proposed solutions
to avoid them allows the developer to implement an SFS ensuring temporal
correctness in operation phase.
4. The measure of reliability that data are provided at different levels of sensor fusion by
the supponing sensors helps the designer to measure system petfonnance at different
levels of sensor integration. The identification of computing overheads to incorporate
hardware redlUldancy and proposed different techniques to cope with this overhead
helps to develop predictable redlUldancy management schemes.
5. The proposed local statistics-based approach is a simple and adaptive sensor fault
detection technique. This technique has the ability not only to detect a transient fault
at different conditions, but also to locate the fault.
6. This work proposes different schemes to restore time4critical sensor data lost during
fault-clearance interval. This contribution helps develop fault-tolerant sensor fusion
system for safety critical operations where the system performance degrades
considerably due to loss ofdata.
To the best of the author's knowledge there is no report of such developments in the
public domain. It appears that these novelties have sufficient potential to enhance the
state-of-the-art of engineering methodology for developing reliable sensor fusion system
for safety and mission critical applications.
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Chapter 2
_
ITheDiscrete Event Requirements
Model of the Sensor Fusion System
2.1 Introduction
From system point of view, the basic unit of the user's need can be defined as the
requirement of completion of a particular sensing task within a specific period of time. A
block diagram representation of the
requirement for the measunnent of
the standard deviation of N samples
of a vibration sensor data is shown
in Fig. 2.1. This can be clarified as '- ~
follows: if the inputs are ready, the Figure 2.1: Block diagram ofcomplction ora task.
enabled task should be executed within the specified time. The enabLing ora task can be
considered as an extra input in addition to the necessary data. A Pctri net formalism for
modellng this requirement is shown in Fig. 2.2. The availability of the inputs is the
Oulputbuffcrs
~.. .. .
Process :Pr
Time of
e:-:ccution:Te
lnputbuffcrs
outputs of an event can be used as the partial
generation of an event and the event is served
by the execution of the corresponding process
P, within time Te. The execution time includes
both the processing of the inputs and the
transmission of outputs to the corresponding
buffers. Therefore, the basic unit of the user's
requirements can be modeled as the service of
an event if certain conditions are met. The ""'"gu="'""'"'",",,p""=tn=n"'''=m=o'''d'''"'o"',=typ='",,",'
user requirements.
fulfillment of the generation of another event. The service of this event within the
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specified time window is also part of the user's requirements. Therefore. the user's
sensing requirement can be abstracted as a discrete event dynamic system (DES). The
discrete event requirements (DEVR) model of the SFS transfonns the user's need into a
finite state virtual machine. "This virtual macltine represents the dynamic interaction of the
discrete events to satisfy the user's need. The user's requirements can be broadly
classified as:
Periodic requirements
Aperiodic requirements
The growth in the complexity of the SFS creates numerous problems for the engineers. In
the requirement analysis stage. one is required to deal with the increased capabilities of
these systems due to the unique ...- .,
5% 2%
49%
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combination of hardware and software.
which operate under stringent timing
constraints. It is well known that the flaws
in understanding requirements
substantially contribute to the reliability,
time and cost [8]. The lack of a formalism
contributes to the improper understanding
by the developer of the user's requirements
of these systems [8]. Statistics of non-
clerical requirement error are shown in Fig.
2.3. Moreover, requirement management is L.- ---l
Figure 2.3: Types of non-clerical
an important issue. Therefore, the analysis requirement error [©198IlEEE Computer
of the DEVR model should address to Society Press].
answer the following questions to minimize these errors:
I. Logical correctness
2. Temporal correctness
3. Reachability
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4. Presenceofdeadlock
5. Repetitiveness
6. Sensitiveness
2.1.1 Petri Net Model of Different Modes of Sensor Data
Integration
The objective of sensor fusion is to integrate information from multiple sensors in order
to make a more accurate or complete inference about a physical event, activity, or
situation than could be achieved with a single sensor [2],[3]. In this fusion process,
sensors can provide temporally related competitive, complementary, and independent
information [6]. The Petri net models of different modes of sensor data integration are
represented in the following subsections.
2,1.1.1 Competitive or Redundant Sensor Integration
Competitive integration requires replicated sensor .- ,
readings, which ideally are identical, but in reality may 3-+P"
be noisy and one or more sensors may fail partially or I
oompletely. It I, the objeotlve to Igno« the erroneo" : Po P,
information from faulty sensors in the integration Pro
process. A Petri net model of this integration process IS.:l
is shown in Fig.2.4. In this process model, data in the '-:::F,-.",-e""2'"'.4".p""e:-tn""n""'et-m-od-'-e-'-l0'""':-'
form of n tokens come from n competitive sensor competitive sensor integration.
processes to the place Pc. It has been assumed that tokens will be sent to the place only if
the corresponding sensor functions properly. Availability of only one token in the place
Pc is required to drive the following process Pro Therefore, this sensor suite will serve the
purpose as long as one sensor is functioning properly.
2.1.1.2 Complementary Sensor Integration
Partial and overlapping information from more than ,_--::- ---,
one sensor is integrated into more complete ~:J+'p,
information. The synergistic use of overlapping and Pc Pr
complementary sensor data provides information that : n
is not available from individual sensors. The Pro
integration of information from n complementary L..:;::=---::..,....,,.,..,.--::--,...,....,.....
sensors in the Petri net model is shown in Fig.2.5. FIgure 2.5. Petn net model of
complementary sensor integration.
Here, the process Pr integrates information derived
from n sensors. Every sensor specific process sends only one token in the place Pc and n
tokens are required in the place p to drive the integration process Pro In this operational
scenario, the integration process runs if every sensor functions properly.
2.1.1.3 Independent Sensor Integration
Independent data from n sensors are integrated to develop ,_-;::-_=__---,
wider world model of the operating environment. The Petri ~SlPr Pc,
net model of such an integration scheme is shown in Fig. P
2.6. Failure of one or more sensors will result in an Pro Pc"
incomplete model of the environment. This modeling s~
technique can also be used to model the validation of "F",gu-"-::'''''.6"'''.P"etn""'n""e,-m-od"'"e'"\0""'"
diverse sensor data to provide robustness in the system at a independent sensor integration.
fusion level (e.g., the use of laser ranging sensor to validate stereo image data).
2.1.1.4 Temporal Integration
In temporal integration, data sampled from different sensors at particular time intetvals
are processed to sense the environment in a particular sequence so that temporal
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relationship among the sensed signals can be exploited. Using the frequency and phase
concept data can be acquired from different sensors in a particular sequence to achieve
this objective. The proposed mathematical fonnalism to model temporal integration is
explained as periodic requirements in the following section.
2.2 Periodic Requirements
in SFS, data should be acquired from sensors at regular intervals of time. These events
are generated using a clock signal as shown in Fig. 2.7. The system consists of a set of
sensors, S=-{Sj: if? 1. I is the size of the set). TSi is the period of individual sensor.
Min(.dTsi) is the allowable service
time for the periodic events of the
ith sensor. This is the time period
between the generation of the event
for the irh sensor and the generation
of the temporally closest event for
another sensor. The value of
~' s",'PE",Ts,.5, PE,T.,
min(.dTsj) is dynamic as shown in
Fig. 2.8. in the worse case, this
value may be reduced to zero
resulting in overlapping of sensing
periods of multiple sensors. If this
problem is not addressed in the
"""""=====::7.':==-=:::--'development of the SFS, the single Figure 2.7; Petri net model ofgeneration and
processor based SFS may not be service of periodic events for data acquisition.
able to show expected petformance. Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of the problem,
the petfollTlance will be unpredictable. As a result, the reliability of the system will
suffer. One of the novelties of this work is to address this problem.
J8
,::;~:~,r__I ----::10:'=----::f-I~~I_-,--I----::±:-I
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Figure 2.8: Timing diagram of the generation of periodic events for three
example sensors.
To overcome the overlapping of sensing periods of multiple sensors, a scheme should be
developed so that required service time can be guaranteed. A simple solution may be to
reset the system, when the value ofLlTsj goes lower than the acceptable limit. The time to
reach this point can be caJled the system period. SP. There is a cost to reset the system in
terms ofquality of performance. In the worse case, the system may not function at all if
the value of SP is smaller than the threshold limit. Therefore, it is necessary to devise an
algorithm to maximize SP while guaranteeing the critical value of min(LlTsil. The
problem can be defined by the following set of equations. Here, all the numbers are
positive integer.
(Ni-NI)~min{t.Ts;) for all ior!i andNj8li
Maximum value of Ni' Nnw. =1(¢I;.TSi )
C1>/ $<tliS<tl;"
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
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Now, the job is to select optimum values forTs; and ¢It to maximize the value ofNi (Le.,
the system period).
Here, Ni; the instances of generation of periodic events corresponding to the ith sensor.
lll;: the phase of the ith sensor.
lllj; the lower limit of the value ofthe phase of the ith sensor.
llli: the upper limit of the value of the pnase of the ith sensor.
T/; the lower limit of the value of the period of the ith sensor.
Tt: the upper limit of the value of the period of the jth sensor.
The analysis of tbe computational complexity:
Let the difference between upper and lower bound of 4>/ be Di and that of TSj be Cj.
Therefore, the size of the solution set for [number of sensors is
(2.6)
$0, the sequential search of this solution set for the maximum value of Ni even for a few
sensors may be unrealistic. Two examples shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 will help to
understand the structural narure of this problem to reduce the solution size.
Table 2.1: The sensing sequence ofan example sensor system
Time of generation of periodic eventsSensors Period Phase
o 0 10 l' 20 "
10 1 lITTTTTTTTI Jill I I I 21
l'
20
17
40
Table 2.2: The sensing sequence ofan example sensor system
Sensors Period Phase Tiroeofgeoennionof periodicevenlS
o 0
10 2
12 t5 18
17
241 I 127
25
III
In Table 2.1, the events do not collide. Here, the periods are integral multiple of 5 (i.e.,
grain size of the periods is fixed). The phases of the periods increase at constant step.
From a knowledge of nwnber theory [58] it appears that under chis circumstance the
events will never collide if the phase is smaller than halfof the period grain size.
The analysis of the data of Table 2.2 reveals that due to the absence of the integral
multiplicity of the periods, it is virtually impossible to guarantee that the events will not
collide. Therefore, the solution of avoidance of collision of events can be simplified by
imposing the following constraints to select periods and phases for the sensors:
The periods and phases should be integral multiple of grain sizes Gp and gp respectively
and Gp is the integral multiple of gpo The grain sizes Gp and gp are the smallest period
and phase respectively. No two sensors will have the same phase, but they may have the
same period. The phase of any sensor should satisfy the following condition
It>i <Gp for all j (2.7)
For more simplification of this problem, it can be asswned that the min(LlTsj) for each
sensor is the same and maintains the following relation
min(LlTsJ 2:max(min(LlTsJ: i€J} (2.8)
Then satisfaction of the following condition will guarantee iliat min(LlTsj) will be
maintained for each sensor of the set.
gp::: min(llTsi ) (2.9)
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The imposed constraints will limit the size of the sensor set. The maximum number of
sensors is equal to Gp/gp. The maximum value of Gp is limited by the variability and
minimum values of periods of sensors and the minimum value of gp is limited by the
required maximum service time of any event. In the worse case, if the event service time
is greater than Gp, this scheme will not accommodate more than one sensor. These
constraints simplify the solution significantly. From the literature it appears that in real
life applications, the number of sensors assigned to a single SFS is on order of 10 and the
service time is much smaller than Gp [18-30]. For larger number of sensors, multiple
SFSs may be used to cope with this problem.
This proposed technique has been used successfully to detect overlapping sensing periods
in the design of an example sensor fusion system in section 8.6. The modification of the
values of phases and periods of the sensors using this technique have been used to avoid
this overlapping.
This new development has improved the state-of-the-art of the engineering of multiple
sensors based system. This critical design decision is based on sound quantitative
reasoning.
2.2.1 Task Directed Sensing
A recent study has revealed that the reasoning sub-system only needs that information
which is directly in support of the current tasks that the intelligent system is trying to
accomplish [59]. The concept of 'task directed sensing' or active sensing is a response to
this operational requirements [59]. The task directed sensing can be incorporated in the
discrete event requirement model by abstracting a physical sensor as a set of virtual
sensors as shown below:
Sl={ Sij:jEVi, Vj is the size of the set of the virtual sensors for theith sensor}.
"
These virtual sensors have different phases and periods as per the requirements of
variable sensing from the ith sensor. In the synchronization planning phase ofthc periodic
requirements as explained in the previous sections, these virtual sensors will be treated as
independent physical sensors, one ofwlUch will be in operation at one time.
2.2.2 Communication with the Reasoning Sub-System
The closed-loop Petri net model of an intelligent system as shown in Chapter l(pp.I,
Fig.I.I) depicts that the communication between the sensor fusion sub-system (SFS) and
the reasoning sub-system (RS) is bi-directional. The DEVR model so far developed only
incorporates unidirectional communication, from the SFS to the RS. From the perspective
of communication from the RS to the SFS, the RS can be abstracted as a sensor in the
DEVR model of SFS. This incorporation of an extra sensor does not change the general
DEVR model of the SFS other than the addition of an extra virtual sensor. The
propagation time of feedback from the RS to SFS should be considered to specify the
phase and frequency of this virtual sensor.
2.3 Aperiodic Requirements
fn SFS, periodic events collect infonnation from "'P:::=:::'''''d:::iti:::'M~---PO-''-''-'d-iti-''''''''
the environment reading sensor values. If the ~o::.~~::~ to :':e~~c
acquired infonnation satisfies particular events
conditions, the corresponding processes should ~.
be executed to fuse these data within defined: :
time windows. These conditional requirements
are known as aperiodic requirements. The Process : Pr
Time of
generation of this type of requirement is known execution: Te
as an aperiodic event. These aperiodic events are '-------------'
Figure 2.9: Peln net model ofan
serviced by executing corresponding processes. aperiodic event.
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A Petri net model of an aperiodic event is shown in Fig. 2.9. It should be noted that
aperiodic events are dependent, while periodic events are independent. Conditions may
flow to an aperiodic event from both periodic and aperiodic events. But an aperiodic
event can generate conditions only for other aperiodic events..
An SFS consists of a set of aperiodic events, AE={AEj: j EZ. Z is the set of positive
integers}. The generation and service of these events are controUed by a set of
preconditions, Prc>={Prc;: JEZ } and a set of postconditions, Poc"'{Poc;: j fEZ t. If there
an: M preconditions and N posrconditions, M-bit and N-bil binary numbers may be used
to specify the corresponding preconditions and postconditions of an aperiodic event
respectively. The value ofa bit will indicate the presence or absence of the corresponding
precondition or postcondition. Therefore, an aperiodic evenl can be defined by updating
the basic definition ofan event as shown,
AE"'{I, Pre, Te,Pr,Poc } (2.10)
Similarly, a member of the set of periodic events, PE= (PEj: j EZ I, can be defined as
PE-{I.Te,Pr,Poc) (2.11)
Here, lis the identity number of the event; Te is the service time; Pr is the corresponding
2.4 Combination of Periodic and Aperiodic Requirements
The requirement of an SFS consists of dynamic interaction of a set of periodic ~d
aperiodic events to derive a decision from sensor data. The periodic events are activated
by temporal infonnation. Therefore periodic events have no preconditions; but they have
postconditions and these are the subsets of preconditions of aperiodic events. The
relationship between periodic and aperiodic events Can be defined as
(PEfPOC (\ AE/Prc) :5 I
( PEj.Poc ('l PE/Prc) = 0
(AEj.Poc ('l AE/Prc) S; I
(2.12)
(2.13)
(2.14)
The life ofa postcondition is LpCi. This finite life concept ofa postcondition will enable
the designer to incorporate the temporal value of information in the system model, which
is an important factor to consider in modeling real-time systems.
2.5 Discrete Event Model of Reqnirements (DEVR)
The Petri net structure of the discrete event model of requiremenIS, DEVR, is a four-tuple
precondilions and postconditions,
m ~ J. The number of the places
should be at least one to hold the
net, DEVR=(pc, E, Pre, Poc). The tuple Pc={PC1.P~.PCJ>""'Pc",} is a finite set of places
to hold conditions. both k Readiness state forto~'"~phase delay , ToTs, RSreadiness state to respond to the L,,--....,..,,.,:::::--=--..,::=::....._,,....,--_.J
next periodic event. £o;aPE uAE is Figure 2.10. The Stmplesl sensor fusIOn system.
the set of all periodic and aperiodic events, E :t J. This means that the system has at least
one sensor. The set of conditions and events are disjoint. The tuple Prc is the input
function, which defines the required conditions for an event. Poc defines the conditions
generated from the service of an event known as output functions. A place Pc, holds the
precondition ofan event Ej if PCi € Prc(EjJ: PCjholds the postcondition of an event Ej if
PCj E Poc(Ej). Therefore, according to this model the most simple sensor fusion system
may have only one sensor, a periodic event and no aperiodic event as shown in Fig. 2.W.
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This system only acquires data and after preliminary processing sends these data 10 the
RS. The maximum number of sensors and aperiodic events are not limited by the model,
that is rather defmed by the user's requirements. The number of periodic events is equal
to the number of sensors. In case of task directed sensing, each virtual sensor will have a
periodic event. The DEVR model of a typical SFS is shown in Fig. 2.1 L. Here, all the
aperiodic events are shown as a single event. The process corresponding to this event is
responsible for the data fusion, feature fusion and decision fusion. After the formation of
this DEVR model, the input and output fimctions of the modeled SFS can be studied to
ensure that the system has been modeled according to this formalism. This study has
Clear the
matured conditions
been performed on the model of an example sensor fusion system shown in section B.I.
This characteristic of the proposed discrete even! based modeling framework enables the
designer to avoid partially faults at the very earLy stages of system development resulting
in better reliability in system performance.
To make the concept comprehensible the following example can be considered. This
sensing system consists of five sensors. The sensing job is done by the interaction of five
periodic events and six aperiodic events. Seven places, Pct , .••,P~, hold conditions
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generated from periodic and aperiodic events. The post conditions generated by periodic
events are shown by the bit pattern ofPoc used in specification of periodic events. The bit
patterns ofPoc and Pre to specify aperiodic events define the required post conditions and
generation of preconditions by the aperiodic events respectively. The DEVR model of
this example sensor fusion problem is shown in Fig. 2.12.
AE,={I,Prcl=OOOOOOII,Tel.Pr"OOIOOOOO}
~={I.Prcl=OOOOOOIO,Te;,Prl,OIOOOOOO}
AEJ={I,PrcJ=OOOOOIOO,Tel,Prl,IOOOOOOO}
AE.={I,Prc.=OOOIIOOO,Te.,Pr.,IOOOOOOO}
AEs={ I,Prc,=OOO 1OOOO,Tes'Pr" IOOOOOOO}
AE.={ I ,Prc.=()J IOOOOO,Te.,Pr., 100000001
Periodic events
87654321
PE1={<!l"Ts1, Tel' Poc1=OOOOOOOI}
P~={¢l2,Ts2' Te;. Poc2=OOOOOOIO}
PEl={¢lJ.Tsl' T~, Poc)=OOOOOIIO}
PE.={¢I.,Ts., Te., Poc.=OOOOlOOO}
PEI={¢lI,Tsl, Tes' Pocl-oDOIOOOO}
Apniodic evenls
87654321 87654321
Clear tbe marured
conditions P,
Aperiodica:rea_
Figure 2.12: The discrete event requirement model of an example sensor fusion system.
2.5.1 The State Spaces of lhe DEVR Model
A marking /l is an assignment of conditions to the places of the modeL Conditions are
assigned to the places by the execution of the events and they reside in those places for
their life times if they are not consumed by the events. At the end of the life-time mey
disappear from the model. The number and position of conditions in the model change
during the execution of the system. The marking jl can be defined as an m·vector. 1l""{I-l"
1l2' ...• I-tn,}. where ....i corresponds to the number ofcorresponding conditions (!],[32].
The state of the modeled SFS is defined by its markings. The firing ofan event represents
a change in the stale of the system by a change in the distribution of conditions in the
system. The state space of the model with m conditions or places is the set of all
markings, that is N"l, where N is the number of any conditions. The state of the system
changes due to the firing of the events as well as due to the expiration of the life of the
conditions.
During the life-time of the conditions, the change in state caused by firing an event is
defined by a change function 5 called the next~state function. When applied to a state Ji
and an event Ej this function yields the new state Ji', 0(/1, ~) = Ji'. The change of state due
to the expiration of time of the conditions can be defined as d(1J, Cy = P'. Cj is the jlh
condition.
2.5.2 The Effect of Death of Conditions on tbe Performance of tbe
Sensor Fusion System (SFS)
In the sensor fusion system, the conditions generated by both periodic and aperiodic
events have a certain lifetime. If during this lifetime, the conditions are not consumed by
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the aperiodic events, they will die. This provision is very useful to incorporate the
temporal characteristics of conditions in the operation of the system, but this provision
also creates complications in the system analysis. If it is assumed that no condition will
die during the period min(L1Tsj) for the jth event, the problem will be simpler. Under this
operational scenario, the conditions can die during the time when the system is in
readiness state. This will ensure that during min(,1Tsj) the system will only change state
due to the consumption and generation of conditions by the events. At the end of each
periodic cycle the system will do housekeeping work to clear the conditions whose lives
have expired. This assumption seems to be not unreasonable as min(,1Tsj) is usually very
small.
2.6 Analysis of Discrete Event Requirements Model
It has been shown that discrete event model captures the user's requirements as virtual
machine. However, modeling by itself is of little use. It is necessary 10 analyze the
modeled system. In order to verify the conformity of the modeled system performance
with the user's requirements the independent (periodic) events are generated in the SFS at
regular intervals of time. The phase and period information of the periodic events are
shown by the following matrix
<1>, Ts,
PET = (2.15)
The system starts at c=O. The flow chart of the algorithm for the generation of periodic
events for t < 4>1 is shown in Fig. 2.13.
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I ...lR.-
Figure 2.13: The flow chart aCthe algorithm for the generation of periodic events.
The generation of periodic events for l> cD j can be controlled by the following matrix
relation
If (t=t+GP) is equal to (l1>j + Tsjw/), irh periodic event is generated and CSt is
incremented by one. Here, Csj is the nwnber of cycles already generated corresponding to
the ith sensor.
2.6.1 Logical Correctness
The firing sequence of the Petri net model can be used to check logical correctness. In
fact, logical correctness can be verified by depicting the interaction between the events.
The matrix representation of the postconwtions and preconditions of the aperiodic events
and postconditions of the periodic events make this task simpler.
"
Aperiodic
events Preconditions
b,.
b_
Periodic
The events responsible for the generation of an aperiodic event can be found by checking
the value of the elements of the preconditions and postcondition matrices.
Theory:
For the ith aperiodic event, if the bi) element of the precondition matrix is
I, the events having the jth element of postconditions matrix of non-zero
value are responsible for the generation of the ith event.
The numerical nature of the representation of system behavior makes software based
automation feasible for this task. This automation has potential to make designer's job
faster and more accurate.
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This concept can be explained by analyzing the previous example problem.
Aperiodic
events
.<£'1
0
.<£, 0
AEJ 0 0
AE. 0 0
AEs 0 0
AE. 0 I
'1
0
o 0
o ,
o ,
o ,
o ,
Periodic
~ Posteonditions
[
PE'l0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ']~OOOOOOIO
PEJOOOOOI1{)
PE. 0 () () () I () 0 0
PEsOOO\OOOO
From the analysis of these matrices it can be shown that
Driven report:
AEJ is driven by PEj3ndPE2orPE3
AE2is driven by PE20r PE3
AE3 is driven by PE3
AE4 is driven by PE4 and PEj
AEj is driven by PEj
AE6 is driven by AE2andAEJ.
"
Drives report:
Periodic events:
PEjdrives AEj,AE6(knownaspath)
PE2drivesAEj.AE6
AE2.AE6
PE3 drives AE3. PE4 drivesAE4. PE5 drives AE5
ApeTiodicevents: AEj drivesAE6. AE2 drives AE6. A£3 drives none, AE4 drives none,
AE5drivies none, AE6 drives none.
The death of the conditions has not been considered, because the objective of this report
is to observe the inter-dependence of the events. The inclusion of the limited life span for
the conditions reduces this inter-dependence. Now, this report will vary with the user's
requirement document. Any modification can be incorporated with corresponding
changes in the precondition and postcondition matrices.
This basic concept to check logical correctness has been applied more systematically in
an example SFS through execution path analysis technique as shown in Appendix 8.2.
The analysis of all execution paths for each periodic event allows the designer to check
the logical correctness of the interaction of different periodic and aperiodic events to
serve each sensing task. This attribute of this proposed framework allows the designer to
avoid logical faults in the very early phase of system development.
2.6.2 Temporal Correctness
[t has been explained that the ith periodic event should be served within min(LlTsj). This
includes the time for PEi and the execution times of !''.lbs-=quent dependent aperiodic
events. Let the ith periodic event drives p paths. Each rath can consist of any number of
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aperiodic events for any number of times. Therefore, under this situation, the following
condition should be satisfied
min(LlTsi) 2: max { Tpil. Tpi2. .... Tpip} (2.17)
Here, Tpij is the execution lime for the jlh path driven by the irh periodic event. The time
required for the completion ofa path can be calculated by the following relationship
(2.18)
Here, aij is the number of times the jrh aperiodic event executes in path i. Therefore,
from the user's data corresponding to the execution time of periodic and aperiodic
requirements. the temporal correctness of the operation of the system can be verified.
AEi"Te is the maximum allowable time to accomplish the ilk task. Now, within this
constraint. Eq.(2.17) should be satisfied. Therefore, there is a need to optimize the
distribution ofexecution times to the events. The relative complexity information of each
task is necessary to derive a solution of this optimization problem. Let AEi.Pr.C be the
complexity information of the process (computing component) to serve the irh event. The
problem can be simplified by asswning that unit time is required 10 execute a single unit
of complexity. In real life problem, the degree of complexity is usually variable.
Therefore. the degree of complexity of the execution of every event has a lower and an
upper bound. The upper bound is AEi. Te and the lower bound is greater than zero.
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Now the optimization problem can be defined as
Maximize AEj.le and PEpe (2.19)
Here,AEpe is the execution time of the ilh aperiodic event and PEi.te is the execution
time of the ith periodic event.
Subject to constraints
+a_AE.../eSmin(6Ts.l
(2.20)
lower limit S AEi.te ~ AEj.Te. lower limit s: PEi.le ~ PEi.Te
Here, m is the total number of possible paths for all periodic events. If the ith periodic
even! contains Pi paths, min(L1Tsj) will be copied to Pi rows. The total number of rows of
this optimization matrix can be calculated by the following relation
(2.21)
Here, I is the total number of periodic events (Le., sensors). Using a mathematical
prograrruning technique, this optimization problem can be solved.
For an example sensor fusion system, every execution path for all seven periodic events
corresponding to seven sensors has been analyzed as shown in Section 8.2. Based on this
analysis, the maximum service time for each periodic event has been estimated as shown
in Table 8.3. The distribution of the sensing times ofall these seven sensors are shown in
Fig. B.12. This analysis anows the developer to ensure temporal correctness for data
acquisition from each sensor and the fusion of acquired. This capability of this proposed
framework allows the developer to avoid temporal faults, resulting in improved system
performance.
2.6.3 Reacbability
The reachability problem is one of the most basic analysis problems associated with
discrete event systems. Through this analysis it can be verified whether it is possible to
fire an aperiodic event from a particular state of the system. The reachability set R(DEVR.
Jl) is the smallest set of states defmed by,
if Jl' E R(DEVR.Il) and Jl~=.s(Jl', Ej ) for some Ej E E. then J.1" e R(DEVR.Il).
Death afthe conditions should be considered during the transition period of the system.
The drives and driven report shown in the previous section will be lhe basis of this
reasoning. From this analysis, the developer will be able to verify the possibility of
execution of an event. Moreover, the developer will optimize the life-time of the
conditions to ensure expected functionality of the system. At this stage, close co-
operation between the developer and the customer will help ensure expected system
functionality.
The reachability analysis of an example SFS is performed in section B.3. It is shown that
using this proposed framework it is possible to perform reachabitity analysis of each
periodic and aperiodic events.
2.6.4 Presence of Deadlock
A deadlock is a set of conditions such that every event which outputs to one of these
conditions in the deadlock also inputs from one of these conditions. This means that once
all of these conditions in the deadlock become consumed, the entire set of conditions will
always be unmarked; no event can execute in the deadlock because there is no condition
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available to fire an event. Under this condition. the system will go in an endless loop and
will not be able to come back to the readiness state to serve the next periodic event
generated by the clock. To overcome this problem, the developer can avoid recursive
representation of the user's sensing requirements. Otherwise. special care must be taken
so that all the conditions of the deadlock set are not consumed.
2.6.5 Repetitiveness
The repetitiveness is the condition that after the service of every periodic event, including
the subsequent aperiodic events, the system will come back to the readiness state to serve
the next periodic event. To ensure th.is, the last events of all the paths from all periodic
events will generate only the readiness condition, certainly no other conditions. The left-
most digit of the postcondition numbers of these events should be one and all other digits
should be zero.
This basic concept to check repetitiveness has been applied successfully to veritY that a
sensor fusion system consisting of seven periodic events and eight aperiodic events is
repetitive in its operation as shown in section B.3. This feature of this proposed
framework allows the designer to avoid unwanted operating state (e.g., non-repetitive
operating state) thus resulting in higher reliability of system operation. This knowledge
component specifically contributes to the enhancement of the reliability of an intelligent
system by avoiding such a catastrophic (system hung up) fault in the early stages of
development.
2.7 The Utilization of the Operational Time
It has been explained previously that the system remains busy handling periodic and
aperiodic events during certain intervals of time. The rest of the time the system is
waiting in the readiness state to serve the next periodic event. The utilization factor of
operation time is the ratio of the maximum busy period required to serve the events to the
minimum waiting period in the readiness state. From the optimum distribution of
execution times to both periodic and aperiodic events as proposed in section 2.6.2 it is
possible to determine the maximum busy period of the system to serve the ilh sensor by
the following equation
BPi = PEi·Te+ max {Tp;p TPi1' .. ,Tp",} (2.22)
The graphical representation of the busy and idle periods of a typical system is shown in
Fig. 2.14. The total busy period during the operational time t can be calculated by the
following relation:
(2.23)
Figure 2.14.: The distribution of busy and idle
periods in the DEVR model.
Therefore, the utilization factor of the operational time is
(2.24)
The value of U(I) is also the measure of the utilization of the underlying computing
system. By maximizing the use of the computational system, the developer can reduce the
system cost. The increase of U(t) allows the developer to switch to the less powerful
computing module for performing the same amount of computing job resulting in cost
savings. Alternatively, this increase will allow the same computing module to incorporate
more sensors. Therefore, it is desirable to increase the value of U(t). The value of U(t) can
be increased by, (1) increasing the value of BPi. and, (2) incorporating more sensors.
The utilization factor of the underlying computing system based on single processor to
implement an example sensor fusion system (Fig.B.!) has been measured as shown in
Eq.(B.47). The detailed specifications of this sensor fusion system is given in Appendix
A. For this example system consisting of seven sensors, the utilization factor is 27.62%.
This attribute of this proposed framework offers a quantitative means to measure system
performance in terms of utilization of computing resources. This measure allows the
justification ofalternate sensing strategy as explained in sec. 2.7.1 and sec.2.7.2 for better
utilization of the computing resources resulting in reduced system cost.
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2.7.1 The Approaches to Increase the Value of the Busy Period
The sensors are grouped in a number of clusters. Each cluster is served by individual
sensor fusion systems. One of the limiting factors for the maximum value of busy period,
Bpi, of the ilh sensor in a cluster is min(.1Tsi)' This limiting factor is the function of the
phases and the periods of all the sensors corresponding to that cluster. By changing the
phases and periods of the sensors, the busy period can be increased as explained before
(section 2.7). The value of BPi also can be increased by dropping sensors from a cluster
or by reorganizing the sensors among the clusters.
2.7.2 Incorporation of More Sensors
The total busy period, Bp(tJ, is the function of the total number of sensors when Bpi is
constant. Instead ofmin(.1Tsi), if the maximum allowable execution period of the events
limits the value of Bpi, more sensors can be accommodated in the cluster in order to
increase Bp(t}. The addition of more sensors to the cluster will make it more difficult to
ensure min(.1Tsi) for each sensor. Therefore, by selecting appropriate phases and periods
of all the sensors more sensors can be added to increase Bp(t) resulting in higher
utilization factor.
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2.8 Chapter Summary
The discrete event approach for modeling different modes of sensor data integration h.as
been reported in this chapter. It is shown that different levels of sensor integration can be
accomplished in this modeling framework. This is a generalized requirement modeling
technique, which is not limited by the nwnber of sensol'S. The nwnber of sensol'S. which
can be accommodated in a particular SFS, is limited by the sensing requirements. The
quantitative basis of this attribute of this modeling paradigm is shown in Section 2.2. The
technique to ensure logical and temporal correctness of a modeled SFS is demonstrated.
A quantitative approach to measure the performance of a SFS in reference to the resource
utilization is proposed in this chapter. The effectiveness of this proposed discrele event
framework to model requirements of a multisensory sensing system is shown in
Appendix A. It can be concluded that this novel quantitative system approach 10 model
the requirements of sensor fusion system has enhanced the state-of-the-art of engineering
methodology for developing the sensing sub-system of multisensory systems.
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Chapter 3
-
IDiscrete Event Specifications
of the Sensor Fnsion System
3.1 Introduction
Generalized system theory allows the designer to decompose a discrete event dynamic
system (DES) into components, which are also conceived as DES [60]. This hierarchical
decomposition of the DES proceeds in cycles, each closer to the actual physical system.
The component specification in (n-l) cycles becomes the system specification in the nth
cycle. In the nth cycle. the system is again represented as dynamic interaction of
components which are (n+l)th level systems. This hierarchical decomposition of the
system complexity is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Hi~rarc:hiealde<:omposilionofdiscreteevenl
'Y"=
Discr<:te event interacrion among components at a
particularleveJ
Pemncl"'P,osentationofcomponcminleraction
Figure 3.1: Hierarchical decomposition ofa discrete event system.
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~.. .. .
Process :Pr
Time or
exeeution:Te
This process of recursive
discrete requirement as shown in Fig. 3.2 are
defined in the requirement modeling stage.
These discrete requirements wilt be conceived
as systems. These systems will be decomposed
as dynamic interaction of next level sub-
It has been explained that sensor fusion system (SFS) is a discrete event dynamic system.
Therefore, SFS is decomposable in hierarchical fashion using generalized system theory.
The discrete event requirements model is the zero level representation (i.e., system
requirements from user's perspective). In this level, the requirement engineer interacts
with the customer to develop the virtual prototype of the system. This prototype defmes
the user's discrete requirements and their dynamic interaction. The preconditions,
postconditions and execution time of each ,- ~_~,....,
Precondition Poslconditions
ofadiscrclC ofadiseretc
requirement requlItment
decomposition will continue to reach the level to
systems.
represent the system as discrete event dynamic
interaction of discrete computing components. Figure 3.2. P::~i%:;:;1 of a discrete
The number of level of decomposition depends
upon the complexity of the system as well as the size of the computing components.
In each level, a system (micro system) will be defined ,------,P:::",-.---,
as preconditions, postconditions and execution time. 8
r"Each micro system is cOlUlected to the rest of the
system through the interface of preconditions and Prco./ l
postconditions. Here, preconditions and S ... ~
postconditions are the input and output of the system ~reO_I'l Pl'C(J.I .•
according to the conventional system theory. The r---*--,
TeO./.J ••• ~
dynamic interaction of the constituting components '-;:::=======~
must satisfy the functional and temporal specification Figure 3.3. Flow of functIonal
and temporal specifications.
of these micro systems. It has been explained that
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components in the (n-/)th level are treated as systems in the nth level of decomposition.
Therefore, functional and temporal specifications flow from higher level, (n./), to lower
level, n, as shown in Fig. 3.3. The functional and temporal perfonnance of the (n-I)th
level must be supported by the dynamic interaction of the components in the mil level.
This is the job of the discrete event specification (DEVS) model to establish. the link
between the (n.l)th level and nth level. This hierarchical decomposition will also allow
the simulation of the discrete event model in modular fashion to cope with the complexity
of the Petri net model, which usually grows exponential with the increase of system size.
3.2 Discrete Event Dynamic Interaction of the Compnting
Components in the SFS
A system in the nth level (i.e., a component in the (n-l)th level) is realized by the
sequence of dynamic interactions of the components. In an SFS, these sequences of
interactions are conditional. In order to satisfY the functional and temporal specifications
of the system, the execution of all of these traces should be accomplished within the
defined time window, Tn.i, the execution time of the ith system at the nth level
determined by the (n.l)th level specifications.
3.2.1 Functional Specification of the System
The interaction among the components in a particular sequence (trace) guarantees the
functional specification of the system. A trace may be elementary or compound. In an
elementary trace, all the components are connected one after another fonning a series as
shown in Fig. 3.4(a) [1],[32]-[35]. This elementary trace consists of sequential operation
of four components as represented by the Eq. 3.1.
(3.1)
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CJ C} Cj C,
IJ-O+O-+--O-i--O
(a).Elementaryttace
Cj C,
~
C, C,
(b) Compound rrace
Figure 3.4: Examples ofelementary and compound traces.
A compound trace consists of a number of elementary traces connected in series and/or
parallel pattern as shown in Fig. 3.4(b). Mathematically. this trace can be represented by
the following equation
S<:"'{Se"Sc"Se:l
Here, SC," {c"c:!:Sc, '" \Scn,Se,l};Se" '" {CI,C~J;
Se'l = {Cj,C.J;SCl = {c7f
(3.2)
The systematic approach for the raonation of these traces is explained in the following
sub-sections.
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3.2.1.1 Formation of Elementary Traces
Let the component set consists of n nwnber of components, C=(cn: n EZ}. The
formation of m elementary traces can be represented by the following matrix relation:
Se1 ':1 ':2
Se2 Pzl Pu
(3.3)
Se=oPC (3.4)
Here, Se, P and C are the trace, position and component vectors respectively. The values
of the elements of P indicate the position of a component in the corresponding trace; the
null value stands for the absence of the component. The following example explains this
trace formation phenomena:
[S"]_[' '] [C,]e2 - 3 2 c1Se) 0 1 c l (3.5)
The elements of the first row of the position matrix defines that the component c l has
second position ('2'), component c2 does not participate ('0') and the third component cl
is in first position in the formation of the elementary trace Sel' The matrix relationship
shown in Eq.(3.5) forms the following traces:
Sel : {c),cll (3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)
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In this matrix operation, '+' operator ofconventional matrix algebra has been replaced by
'position operator', which uses the elements of P matrix to position the corresponding
components of C to form a trace.
3.2.1.2 Formation of Compound Traces
A compound trace is composed of a number of segments, Sg={Sgr i EZ}. Each segment
may fonn as
a trace (elementary or compound);
a parallel operation of more than one elementary and/or compound traces;
II branch to other traces (elementary and/or compound);
II loop ofa trace (elementary and/or compound) ;
Segment formation operators (So):
st =: (l,p): pick one trace from a set of traces
pr =(2,p) : runs more than one trace in parallel
br =(3,p) : select one trace from a set of traces to branch
Ip =(4 ,p): runs a trace multiple number of times.
Here, p stands for position infonnation.
Segments are of two types:
Elementary segment, Sgej: i EZ ; composed of only elementary traces related
by segment formation operators.
Compound segment:. SgCj: iEZ; the constituting elements are compound
traces related by segment formation operators.
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Formation of simple segments can be defined by the following matrix relationship:
Sge! SOil SOl7
Sge7 SO!I S021
(3.9)
An example to explain the above segment formation relationship is as follows:
[sge,]. [(2,1) (2.2)] [se,]Sge,. (3,2) (3,1) St; (3.10)
The first row of segment formation operator matrix defines that the first elementary
segment Sge l is fonned by the parallel operation of elementary traces Sel and Se1 • The
second elementary segment is formed by the branching operation of the elementary traces
Set and Se2 defined by the elements oflhe second row of the segment formation operator
matrix. Therefore, newly fanned elementary segments can be defined by the following
equations:
Sge l "'pr{Sel ,Se7 J
Sge2 =br{Se2 ,Sed
The Petri nets models of these two traces are shown in Fig. 3.5.
~~
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5. Formation of elementary segments.
(3.1\)
(3.12)
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The compound traces can be formed by the following matrix relationship:
SCI ~I ~l
SCl Pzl P22
(3.13)
In the first iteration. segments, Sgi, are simple. but in the following iterations they are
compound. The following matrix relation defines the fonnation of compound segments.
Sgc\ Soil SOil
SgCl Sou SO~l
SOli Sci
SOli SCl
(3.14)
The formation of compound trace as well as compound segments is recursive in nature.
These trace formation processes using matrix operations enable the developer to specify
the component interaction through the values ofelements of the matrix. This quantitative
representation of the dynamic interaction among the components facilitates the
development of design automation software. It should be noted that the use of recursive
for stepwise reduction of system complexity is different from recursive representation of
user requirements. The recursive representation of user requirements has the potential to
create deadlock in system operation.
The representation of the processes to serve the aperiodic events of an example sensor
fusion system through elementary and compound traces is shown in section C.2.1.
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3.2.2 Verification of the Logical Correctness of the Functional
Specifications
The methodology to check the logical correctness of the discrete event requirement model
as explained in chapter 2 can be used to verify the logical correctness of the executions of
the components to realize the system specification. Moreover, other related issues, as
such avoidance ofdeadlock, rcachability, and repetitiveness in the dynamic interaction of
the components can be checked in the similar way.
The decomposition of the processes to serve eight aperiodic events in tenns of interaction
among sixteen computing components of an example sensor fusion system has been
shown in section C.2.1. This decomposition allows the verification of the logical
correctness of the component interaction in the similar way as shown for the DEVR
model. This is one of the most important advantages of using the same modeling
technique at different phases of the development cycle.
3.3 Determination of the Temporal Specifications of the
Computing Components of the Sensor Fusion System
It should be noted that the ,--;======;;::====:;-,
execution of an event is
conditional in an SFS. The
generations of postconditions
for the executions of the
processes are variable. Due 10
the firing of a process, a
fraction of the total conditions, L-':=:::::~=:::::=;:::====:!....---.J
Figure 3.6: Petri net model ofan example system.
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no condition or all of the conditions, rna)' be
generated. This situation can be explained by an
example shown in Fig. 3.6. The possible firings
of the processes are summarized in Table: 3.1
( this is not the exhaustive list). Now. for any
sequence of firing of the processes. the total
execution time of any sequence or trace should
be smaller than or equal to the system respOnse
time. The system includes of a number ofpataIlel
traces. and the system's temporal specificlltion
should be grealer than the temporal longest uace.
Table 3.1: The possible firing
sequences of the processes of an
example SFS as shown in Fig. 3.6
p,"" Firing of processes
"', "', "', "'. p"
I 0 0 0 0 0
2 I 0 0 0 0
3 I I 0 0 0
4 I I 0 I 0
5 I I 0 2 0
6 I I I 2 I
The execution of the system can be abstracted as the execution of m parallel traces, S-
ISj, lSi.? m} as shown in Fig, 3.7. It should be noted that the execulions of these traces
are conditional as explained (seclion 3.1), lf1 the best case. no trace may be required to
execute; but in the worst case all Ihe
traces may be required to execute, PreCOnditions PQS(COIlditiODS
The design should be based on the
worst case situation. and the
executions of all these trae:es should
satisfy the following relation:
FIgure 3.7. Abstraellon ofSFS as a collecnon of
parallel traces.
(3.15)
Here, Sti is the execution time of the ith trace.
This proposed technique is applied successfully to compule the service time of eight
aperiodic events for an example sensor fusion system as shown in section C.2. These
aperiodic events have been served by the interaction ofa set of 16 components.
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The execution times required for m traces for n components having execution time ctican
be calculated using the following matrix relation
Is" _[a" a'"j:::St.. a.I ••• a"", c'" (3.16)
The coefficient ali is the number of times thejth component is present in the fonnation of
the irh trace. A zero value of this coefficient indicates that the jth component is not part of
the fonnation of the ith trace. Usually there is a domain of selection of component
execution time, and there is a scope for optimization in the distribution of time to the
components. The objective of this optimization is to allow maximum component
execution time. There is a cost to lowering the execution time of the components. This
cost may be due to the requirement of additional research to lower the computational
complexity of the components, or to use computationally less powerful algorithms to do
the same type of work sacrificing quality, or to switch to higher cost processor. The
objective of optimization is to maximize the execution time of each component while
satisfying the temporal specification ofeach trace.
Maximize cli ; Subject 10
+a,~,c .. S T. i
(3.17)
""d
(3.t8)
Here, C"i is the lower limit and c" / is the upper limit of the ith component execution
time.
This optimization function has been successfully utilized to select the execution times of
a set of computing components to serve the aperiodic events of an example sensor fusion
system as shown in section C.3. The application of a fonnal quantitative approach 10
optimize the use of system resources is one of the novelties of this research work. This
knowledge component enhances the state-of-the-art of the practice of scientific methods
to engineer sensor fusion systems.
3.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis of the Components Execution Times
The sensitivity analysis of the component execution times is a measure of the rate of
change of the total distribution of execution time of the components due to the change of
execution time of a particular component. Due to a change 61; amount in execution time
of the ith component, the total change of the execution oftime, LIT, over n-l components
can be calculated by the following relation:
(3.19)
Therefore, the sensitivity of the execution time of the ith component is
(3.20)
This sensitivity analysis can be related to cost optimization. If Ci is the cost related to the
per unit change of computational lime for the ith component, the cost sensitivity of the ith
component can be measured by the following relation
(3.21)
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An investment to decrease the computational time of the ilh component is justified as
long as the value of Cseni is greater than one. Therefore, this basic relationship can be
used to justify the investment on the research to develop computationally less complex
components. Moreover, this finding can be used to justify the decision to implement
highly sensitive computing component in dedicated hardware or in other special type of
devices to reduce the overall system cost.
The sensitivity analysis of the component execution times will enable the developer to
optimize the system cost, while maintaining temporal performance of the system. Similar
analysis can be perfonned on the discrete event requirement model to determine the rate
of change of the optimum service times of both periodic and aperiodic events. This
development has added scientific knowledge in the engineering process of such system
development.
3.4 The Reliability Aspects of Ihe Discrete Events Specification
The DEVS model generates the functional and temporal specification of each computing
component and represents the dynamic interaction among these components. This model
satisfies the execution of each discrete requirement as defined in the discrete event
requirement model. The Petri net based modeling tool as proposed in this chapter has
enough power to ensure the realization of the functional and temporal specifications of
each discrete requirement by defining the specification of each component and the
dynamic interaction among them. Therefore, it can be concluded that this model has
enough potential to avoid error in mapping the user's sensing requirements to the
component level specification. This thesis has addressed the problem of enhancement of
reliability of SFS by avoiding temporal and logical faults in the development phase. This
objective can be partially achieved by practicing this proposed engineering methodology
as explained in this chapter.
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3.5 The Modeling of Multi~nodebased Sensor Fusion System
In a multi-node based SFS (e.g., distributed sensing system of mobile robots. distributed
air defense system), the nodes are organized in hierarchical fashion [6]. In lhis
hierarchical organization, each leaf node consists of processing unit and a set of
associated sensors. At each level, nodes receive infonnation from lower-level nodes,
integrate the infonnation received according to their position in the hierarchy, and send
extracted infonnation to nodes at next higher level. This proposed discrete event based
modeling technique can be directly applied to model leaf level sensing nodes. To model
higher level nodes, associated each lower level node can be abstracted as virtual sensor.
Abstracting each lower level node as virtual sensor this modeling approach can be
applied to model each node of different levels. Therefore, the discrete event modeling
approach reported in this thesis can be used to model multi-node based sensor fusion
system as well.
3.6 Chapter Summary
The hierarchical decomposition of DEVR model to component level specification has
been proposed. A mathematical framework 10 model the interaction of the components in
tenns of trace and segments has been shown in section 3.2. This quantitative abstraction
of component interaction enables the automation of the design work. The proposed
technique (section 3.3) to optimize the component execution times provides means for
improved utilization of system resources. This novel technique has been used
successfully to derive component level specification from the DEVR model of the
example SFS shown in Appendix B. This proposed formal method of mapping the user's
sensing requirements to component level specifications is an important contribution of
this thesis.
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Chapter 4
_
, The Architecture of the Embedded
ComputingSystem to Implement
tbe DEVS Model of tbe SFS
4.1 Introduction
The discrete event requirements model (DEVR) of a sensor fusion system (SFS) defines
the interaction of user level events and allocates optimum times to the execution of the
corresponding processes. The discrete event specifications model (DEVS) defines the
computing component level interaction to implement the DEVR model of the system
under development. The underlying computing system must execute every computing
component within the time window as specified by the DEVS model. The architecture of
the computing system should be optimized to economize the cost as well. The work load
offered [0 the system is defined by the DEVR model. Therefore, the architecture should
be reasoned from the DEVR model.
4.2 The Execution Time of a Computing Component
The interaction of the computing components is defined in the DEV$ model. The
execution of these components must be accomplished by the redefined time windows
derived from the DEVR model. In leons of computational complexity, a component can
be represented by a five-tuple vector as shown in the following equation
c= {I. F. D. M. H} (4.1)
Here, /, F, D, and M stand for computation load of integer, floating point, compare and
memory operations respectively. The fifth tuple H, represents other execution overhead
(e.g., component specific system management job). Due to the presence of decision
making and looping operations in a computing component, estimates for plausible values
for the tuples are usually subjective. But in a SFS system, the components should be
executed within defined time windows. Therefore, tbe temporal worst case operation
scenario should be considered when calculating the values of the tuples.
The execution time ofa computing component on a particular processor can be calculated
by the following equation
cr=] (P//+PpF+PDD+PMM+PHH) (4.2)
Here, PJ. PF, PD, PM. and PH represent the estimated required clock pulses to execute
each unit of integer, floating point, compare, memory operation and execution overhead
operations respectively. The time period of the processor clock is represented by ilf. The
execution time of simple and compound traces as explained in the DEVS model in the
previous chapter (Sec. 3.2. t) can be calculated by the equations
SCr=Set/+Sct/+Ser2
SCII=max(Sell/ ' Selll ),jor parallel operation
SCI/=Set/ /+Selll ,jar sequential operation
(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
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4.3 The Reasoning Basis of the Architecture of the Computing
System
The quantitative relations developed so far help us ,.----------...,
to reason about the architecture of the embedded
computing system. The request for the execution
of a computing component by the computing
system can be considered as a discrete event. The '-F-,gure--4-.t-A-m-Od-e-to-'-em-b-ed-d-ed..J
arrival and service of these events can be modeled events service system
as single server queue as shown in Fig. 4.1. Now to serve an event properly the following
condition must be satisfied
Wq+TsSTe (4.7)
Here, Wq is the expected waiting time of an event~.
in the qu~ue; Ts is the ex.ecution .time ~f the inllse<:HQ
correspondmg process; Te IS the time wmdow I'
within which the event must be served to satisfy ...!. 0.2 •
the DEVS model. To simplify the modeling pro<:ess, o. I 1(1
the atrival of the events (i.e., the request 10 execute Tp10 nS ~
the computing components) is considered as a
Figure 4.2: The exponential
Poisson process [GIl· In this simplified growth of the waiting time with
representalion of the problem. the request of the the increase of the arrival rate.
execution of only one type of computing component arrives in the queue in a random
fashion. Then the expected waiting time in the queue can be shown as [61]
~=-t-:-
-(--AI
Ts Ts
(4.8)
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Here, 'A. is the arrival rate of the events in the queue of the computing system. The waiting
time increases exponentially with the increase of arrival rate as shown in Fig. 4.2. Here,
to simplify the problem the service time to each event is assumed to be the same. For a
particular event, the service time Te is predetermined from the DEV$ model. In the
DEVS model, Te represents the component execution lime.
4.4 The Architecture of the Computing System to Execute
Elementary Traces
In an elementary trace as explained in the previous chapter (sec.3.2.1), the execution of
the components takes place in a sequential manner. The outputs of the upstream
components become the inputs of the downstream components. The existence of
parallelism in the execution of these components can be detected using Bernstein's
conditions[62]. The Bernstein's conditions state that two processes PJ and p} with their
input sets [, and [2 and output sets 0, and 02, respectively can execute in parallel if the
following conditions are satisfied:
I, n O} = ,. Here, ,is the empty set
I2 nO, = 4>
0, n 02 = $
(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)
Therefore, from these conditions it is evident that the components in the elementary
traces cannot be executed in parallel. It should also be noted that the executions of
upstream components generate the events to execute downstream components. Under this
circumstance, no event waits in the queue to be served resulting in zero waiting time.
Therefore, the execution time of the components composing the elementary traces should
be equal to or less than the time windows specified in the DEVS model. The speed ofthe
execution of a elementary trace is limited by the computing power of a single processing
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units. Under this operational scenario, a single node based computing system is a solution
for executing elementary traces. The developer can negotiate with the customer to
redefine the time requirements to increase the time windows of the elementary traces 10
switch 10 a less powerful processor.
4.5 The Architecture of the Computiug System to Execute
Compound Traces
Therefore,
multinode architecture can be
used to exploit the power of
commodity microprocessors to l",.-==';=====:==-:-:JFigure 4.3: Multiple nodes based architecture of the
realize a cost effective sensor embedded computing system to execute compound
fusion system as shown in Fig. traces.
A compound trace consists ofa number of elementary traces connected in sequential and
in parallel manner as explained in the previous chapter (sec. 3.2.1.2). The sequential part
does not satisfy the Bernstein's
conditions as explained in the
previous section 4.4. But the Eveots Queue
parallel part satisfies those
conditions.
4.3. The parallel elementary traces can be executed in sequential fashion as well, as
shown in Eq. (4.5, 4.6). In that case the waiting time will be eqll3.1 to the execution of the
previous parallel elementary traces. Therefore, both single node and multiple nodes
based architecture can be used to implement compound traces. In the distribution of time
windows to the events in the DEVR and DEVS models the parallelism of the setvice of
the events must be considered for optimum allocation. This makes it very clear that the
DEVR and DEVS models are directly related to the architecture of the underlying
embedded computing system. Therefore, both DEVR and DEVS model, and the
8.
,,,,"or]
operatlon
architecture of the computing system should be recursively optimized to reach an
optimum solution. In some cases, there may exist parallelism in the DEVR and DEVS
model but due to the cost consideration the underlying computer system may adopt single
node based architecture. It should be noted that multiple nodes based architectures can
enhance the execution speed only if there exists parallelism in the DEVR and DEVS
model. Therefore, a Petri net based fonnalism in the modeling of the requirements and
specification wili enable the designer to detemtine the optimum architecture of the
embedded computing system. This is one of the novelties of this work to link the
different stages of the development process through a unifonn reasoning technique. The
higher level abstraction in the early cycles of the development process gradually proceeds
to physical system in the latter cycles through sound quantitative reasoning. This
reasoning basis has been utilized to reason the basic structure of the embedded computing
system of the example sensor fusion system as explained in section D.2 and section D.3.
4.6 Implementation of Multiple DEVS Models on a Single
Computing System
The method proposed in section 2.2 to avoid overlapping of sensing periods in order to
satisfy periodic requirements may not keep the underlying computing system busy during
the entire period of
operation. Rather the
system will remain
busy for a defined
period of time as
determined by the
DEVR model as L -====::... ~
shown in Fig. 2.11. Figure 4.4. Interlacing of two DEVR models to increase the
Therefore, the utilization factor of the embedded computing system.
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multiple DEVR model can be interlaced to be implemented on a single computing
system. The implementation of two DEVR models in interlaced fashion is shown in Fig.
4.4. This will increase the total busy period of the system resulting in higher utilization
factor of the underlying computing system. To utilize this interlacing concept, sensors
can be divided into muttiple clusters and each cluster will have its own DEVR model.
This will increase design complexity, because these different DEVR models should be
interlaceable. The discrete event formalism proposed in this thesis will help deal with this
complexity transparently. There is a scope to increase the utilization factor of the
computing system interlacing DEVR models of different SFSs resulting in cost effective
solution. This is a new concept about the architecture ofa sensor fusion system.
4.7 Randomness of Execution Times of Computing
Components on Modern Processors
It has been mentioned (Sec.4.2) that the computational time ofa computing component is
a function of a number of variables as defined by Eq. 4.1. The DEVS model allocates
definite time windows to the components. In order to satisfy the DEVS model, the
component execution time must be predictable and the maximum value must be within
the corresponding window.
Over the years the architectures of microprocessors have adopted pipeline architectures to
achieve high average throughput. This pipeline feature, however, has incorporated
randomness in the actual execution time of a computing component as explained in sec.
0.5. The actual execution time not only depends upon the computational complexity of
the component, but also upon the sequence of instructions constituting the component.
The reasons behind this randomness are the hazards that prevent the next instruction in
the instruction stream from executing during its designated clock cycle (63]. These
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hazards include structural hazard, data hazard and control hazard (63]. The OCCUlTCnce
of these hazards will stall the pipeline and the execution time of an instruction will be
extended by an undefined amount depending upon the nature of the other previous
instructions in the stream. Therefore, the value of the tuples l F and D should be
computed by nmning the component on the actual processor. The value computed by
analyzing the computational complexity will not provide the basis of calculating actual
execution time. If this is not done in the prescribed way, it will be very difficult or may
be impossible to satisfy the DEVS model in the implementation phase in a cost-effective
manner. As a result the reliability of the system will suffer.
The statistics of clock cycles per instruction (CPO for different benchmark programs
running on a modem processor has been reported in Section D.3 [63]. From these
statistics, it appears that the variations of CPI in these programs are more than 100%.
Therefore, the consideration of this source of randomness in the component execution
time is very important in estimating the actual computing time.
Hierarchical memory organization has been accepted as a realistic approach in building
memory system (64]. Memory devices at a lower level are faster 10 access, smaller in
size, and more expensive per byte, having a higher bandwidth and using a smaller unit of
transfer as compared with those at higher level. The effective access time of a data unit
from the memory can be defined by the following equation (62]
Here,Ji is the access frequency (probabilistic tenn) to ilh level, ti is the access time to ith
level, h;is the hit ratio (probabilistic term) at irh level. Therefore, it is evident from these
equations that data access time is random, and depends upon the distribution of data in
different memory levels. The processors developed in recent past (e.g., Pentium, Alpha)
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have internal memory known as on-chip cache [63]. Therefore, the designer of the
embedded computing system to implement the DEVS model has little room to avoid this
randomness in data access time. It should be noted that this randomness not only depends
upon the data access pattern within the computing component, but also upon the initial
data distribution at the different levels of memory due to data access of the previous
computing components. It has been mentioned that the randomness of the generation of
aperiodic events will make it virtually impossible to predict the distribution of data at
different memory levels. Therefore, it is recommended that the data distribution in the
different levels of the memory system must be initialized to obtain predictable value of
the 4th tuple, M. Due to the requirement of this initialization at the begilUling of the
execution of each computing component, the value of the 5th tuple H will increase. But
but this will help to make good estimate of the execution time of a particular component
resulting in higher reliability of the implementation of the DEVS model. This problem
can be dealt with as weB by measuring worst case value if the system requirements do not
put constraints on lower bound ofexecution times.
A quantitative example of different scenarios of data distributions at different memory
levels has been shown in Table 0.6. From this example problem, it appears that the
randomness of initial data distribution may make the actual execution times of the
components highly random. The consideration of this source of error is important to
ensure temporal correctness ofthe DEVS model in the operational stage.
4.8 Chapter Summary
The rationale of selecting the architecture of the embedded computing system for
implementing the OEVR model of a SFS has been outlined here. The hazards to ensure
temporal correctness of the DEVR model in the implementation phase have been
identified and potential solutions to address these hazards have been proposed. The
quantitative framework discussed in this chapter will help the developer implement a
sensor fusion system ensuring temporal correctness in a cost-effective manner.
84
Chapter 5
-I
5.1 Introduction
Hardware Fault-Tolerance of the
Sensor Fusion System (SFS)
From the hardware perspective, an SFS is a physical system consisting of a number of
electronic components and sensors connected in a particular fashion. Mechanical
components (e.g., connectors, wires, PCB) to suppon the system are not pan of this work.
Due to the effect of the manufacturing process, aging, and operating conditions these
components may fail to do their job in course of time. Therefore, the reliability of the
system is a function of the mea.'1 time to failure (MITF) of these components [65]. Due to
the requirement of the unsupervised operation of the SFS for a prolonged period of time
in safety and mission critical operations, the failure of these components should be
detected and a faulty component should be replaced by a fault-free one autonomously.
The detection and replacement of the faulty components will be treated as if these
components did not fail,
provided that this fault
clearance operation is not
detrimental to the system's
performance. This redundancy
in the use of components has
the potential to increase the
reliability of the system [57].
This is based on the argument
that if there are n identical
components in parallel, on the Figure 5.1; The rc:liabil~~sie:~le of redundant parallel
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assumption that only one working component will provide the required output, the
reliability of this parallel system is
R:I-p· (5.1)
Here, p is the probability of failure of each parallel component. The reliability profile of
such parallel system for different numbers of parallel sensors (paths) is shown in Fig. 5.1.
Due to the need of some mechanism for checking the working component and switching
to the next component when it fails, a bener figure for overall reliability is given by
multiplying R by the reliability of the checking and switching mechanism.
If no fault-free component is available, the SFS should report its functional status to the
reasoning unit to avoid the malfunctioning of the intelligent system as a whole. Due to
the stringent timing requirements of the periodic and aperiodic events (Chapter-2), the
overhead of the detection and clearance of these component faults should be estimated.
This estimate will allow the developer to keep enough room in the temporal spedfication
of the discrete requirements and the constituting computing components to ensure the
correct temporal perfonnance of the system.
The SFS is composed of multiple building blocks. The fault-tolerance of these building
blocks can be achieved using different techniques. The redundancy overhead of these
building blocks has different effects on the periodic and aperiodic events of the
requirements model of the system. In general, different techniques to achieve fault-
tolerance of different building blocks of SFS will be explained in this chapter with
particular emphasis on the sensor module. The improvement of reliability and the
required overhead for the incorporation of fault-tolerance in sensor module will be
analyzed. Special emphasis will be given to the dependence of different levels of fusion
on the reliability of the supporting sensors.
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5.2 The Fault-Tolerance of the Building Blocks
The SFS is made of six major building blocks: sensors, analog processors (APs), analog
to digital converters (ADCs), digital processors (DPs), memory modules (MMs), and liD.
These building blocks operate in the analog, hybrid and digital domains. Due to their
uniqueness, the techniques and effects of detection and clearnnce of faults of these
building blocks are not identical.
5.2.1 The Fault-Tolerance of the Sensors
From the perspective of .....--------------..,
fault-tolerance, a
can be modeled as an
analog electrical signal
source g(l) as shown in '- ....J
Figure 5.2: Model ofa sensor as an analog Signal source.
Fig. 5.2. Some of the
commercially available sensors have built-in preamplifiers and filters to sense very weak
infonnation in noisy environment. Therefore, there is a justification for modeling a sensor
as signal source from a practical point of view. Here. it has been defined that physical
information (e.g.• pressure. vibration. temperature) will be called physical signal and its
electrical equivalent will be called signal. The wave form of g(l) depends upon the
pattern of the sensed physical signal. p(l). and the functioning state. s(l). of the sensor as
shown by the relation
g(t) = Kp(t)s(t) (5.2)
Here. the coefficient K. the conversion ratio. is a constant. From the perspective of fault~
detection (i.e.• presence of fault). s(l) is a binary signal: erroneous value and error-free
value.
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sensors
5.2.1.1 Techniques of Fault-Tolerance of Sensors
To achieve fault-tolerance in the operation of the sensors, the faulty sensors should be
detected and replaced by fault free ones. Through a simple switching mechanism a faulty
sensor can be replaced by a properly functioning one. The main problem lies in the
detection of a faulty sensor. The stale ofthe functioning ofthe sensors can be detected by
using majority voting and estimation teclmiques [55],[57],[30].
5.2.1.1.1 Majority Voting Tecbnique for Sensor's Fault Detection
The majority voting technique in ,- ,
fault detection of sensors is based
on the principle that if a set of
sensors S"'{s;: 2:S ; ) is used to
sense the same physical parameter,
by comparing me sensed signals
from different sensors the state of .",._"':":"-:-,....-,....-__--,--,-.__~
the sensors can be determined. Figure 5.3: Redundan~:::~:~ to detect the states of
This phenomenon is explained in
Fig. 5.3. Experimentally faulty
sensor was detected using this
voting concept as reported in section
G.2. Different types of voting L.;:,=~=__===-=-.~
techniques are used in the Figure 5.4: Two redundant sensors can detect
only the presence of faults.
comparator module to detect the state
of the sensors. Available voting techniques work satisfactorily if the size of the set of the
redundant sensors is more than two [57}. In case of two redundant sensors, the voting
technique is able to detect only the presence of faults, but is unable to detect the faulty
sensor as shown in Fig.5.4. This technique completely fails to detect the state of the
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sensor if the size oftbe set is one. The state diagram using Markov's Model showing the
possible stale transitions for a triple modular redundant sensor system using voting as a
fault detection technique is shown in Fig. EA. The reliability profiles of fault-tolerant
sensor systems having triple and 4-modular redundancy are shown in section E.3. From
these profiles it is evident that a sensor module with redundant sensors has the potential
to have higher reliability than that of single sensor alone.
The addition of the comparator module (usually in hardware) increases the complexity of
the system. The failure of this module will result in the failure of the system. Thus the
reliability of the system will suffer. To make this scheme effective, the redundant sensors
should be in operation. This operational requirement will make the effective service time
of the sensors shorter. Moreover, in a power constrained operation (e.g., unsupervised
autonomous system in microgravity powered by battery) the extra power loss in the
operation of redundant sensors will impede the application of this scheme. The cost
related 10 deploy extra sensors is another limitation of this scheme. This scheme becomes
ineffective and even can provide a completely wrong decision if more than half (or all) of
the sensors fail simultaneously. This situation may occur due to a problem in power
supply. The overheads in the form of hardware, energy, and space to incorporate fault
tolerance in the sensor module of an ex:ample sensor fusion system are explained in
Appendix E.2.1.
The saturation characteristic of the physical sensor and the supporting electronics is
another constraint to the effectiveness of this approach. If the values of the physical
signal go beyond the expected threshold value, due to the saturation effect of the sensor,
the signal generated from the sensor will not represent the corresponding physical signal.
In this operating condition, all the sensors will generate the same g(t)(dc value due to
saturation effect). Therefore, this vOling technique will fail 10 delect that the sensors have
failed to convert the physical signalp(t) to its equivalent electrical signalg(t).
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5.2.1.1.2 Estimation Tecbnique for Sensor's Fault Detection
The message space M. the state of the sensor, has two messages ml , fault-free state, and
mz• faulty state and the decision space D also has only two elements d l , sensor is
functioning properly, andd1 , sensor is malftmctioning. Therefore, this is a binary
decision theory problem (66} and the decision is based on the measure of differences
between the features of the p(t) and g(t}. If the probability distributions of the features of
p(t) are known. the decision rule d(z) maps the observation space, features of g(t), inlo
the binary decision space in some optimal manner. Since there are only two decisions,
this is equivalent to dividing Z into two decision regions 21 and Zl such that
(5.3)
(5.4)
The regions 2 1 and 2 1 must be disjoint (i.e., 21 r. 21 = 0) in order that each point in Z
will yield a unique decision. The regions Z, and Z2 must cover Z (i.e., Zl U 22=Z) in
order that each point in Z will have a decision associated with it.
If the adopted estimation teclmique satisfies these decision conditions, most of the
limitations to detect sensor fault using different voting techniques will be overcome. The
limitations of this scheme are the degree of accuracy of its ability to detect sensor faults
and the required computational time to perfonn this detection.
The comparisons of the reliability profiles of a triple and four modular redundant fautt
tolerant sensor systems using voting and estimation teclmiques as a means of fautt
detection are given in section E.5. The ratios of the reliability profiles of fault tolerant
systems using voting and estimation techniques shown in Fig. E.9 dearly indicate that
estimation based technique has the potential to achieve higher reliability than voting.
'0
5.2.1.2 Tbe Effect of Sensor's Fault-Tolerance on the Performance of
the System
~E.T'TeAr &rvicetime:O~OAT ~r.;.:l I
---+j Time between two successive periodic events j+---
Figure 5.5: Distribution of time for different tasks
between two successive periodic events.
interact with the sensors.
The periodic events (Chapter 2)
Therefore, the overhead related
to the fault-tolerance of the
sensors will affect the periodic OAT: Data acquisition time.
TeAD: Time for the computation ofthe acquired data
performance of the system. The PE.Te: Time: fnr the service of a periodic event
system waits in the readiness ~;~:;=c:tnC:~~c~:~::~~:j~:~~~ event
state to serve the next periodic L...S_T_AE_'_S'_~_ice_=_·_"_'.;.''''_ri_''''_''_,._'"_" ....J
event. To make the operational
scenario comprehensible, the
interval between two successive periodic events is divided into multiple segments as
shown in Fig. 5.5. The relationship among these segments is given by the following
equations
TBPE.:: DAT+TCAD+STAE+WT (5.5)
PE.Te.::DAT+TCAD (5.6)
The occurrence of a sensor's fault during TCAD. STAE, and WT does not interfere with
the operation of the tasks executed during these periods. Therefore, the detection and
clearance ofsensor's fault occurred during these periods can be deferred to the beginning
of the next periodic event. The value of WTis random, which varies from zero to a certain
positive number depending upon the operating conditions of the system. Therefore, fault-
clearance during this period may not be justified for safety critical systems. However, for
systems with limited safety requirements, the developer can use this time for the
clearance of faults. The conservative solution is to extend the DAT to accommodate time
for the detection and clearance of faults of the corresponding sensor. Unfortunately, this
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creating no temporal overhead on the
scheme wastes system resources. Another scheme is to pause the periodic event
generation clock to extend the DAT on demand basis. This scheme dynamically changes
the sensing period. [f both the rate of occurrence of faults and the time required for
detection and clearance of the faults are very low, this scheme is an acceptable approach.
There is a need for optimization to select a particular approach.
If fault occurs during OAT, lhe fault should be cleared immediately. During this fault
clearance period data will be lost and the OAT will be extended due to this interruption.
Therefore, steps should be taken to address this problem to handle faults occurred during
OAT.
The effects of fault-tolerance overhead on the system depend upon lhe adopted fault
detection scheme (i.e., voting and estimation). Therefore, they should be treated
separately.
5.2.1.2.1 The Effect or Voting Technique
If the voting algorithm is l--
implemented in hardware logic in the
comparator module, lhe fault AmPlitude) ?
detection scheme will run in paraliel
with the service of other events -+l Fault clear-I.-- lime
anceperiod -
execution of the user's requirements.
Therefore, it is recommended to
Figure 5.6: Loss ordala dunng fault clearance
period
extend DATto clear the faults occurred during rCAD, STAE. and WT. But if faults occur
during DAT, valuable data will be lost during fault clearance time as shown in Fig. 5.6.
The presence of this effect has been detected in an experimental setup to achieve fault-
tolerant triple modular optical sensor as shown G.2. Either the data must be restored or
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the data acquisition process must be repeated. 80th the restoration and the repetition will
extend the DA T. The developer has the option either to keep enough room (required for
restoration or repetition) to specify the PE.Te or to pause the clock until error free data
acquisition is complete to accommodate this extension. The decision will be driven by the
nature of the system. For stringent temporal specifications. it is reconunended to specify
PE. Te considering the time required for data restoration. On the other hand. for less time
critical systems it may be feasible to pause the dock until error free acquisition is
complete.
5.2.1.2.2 The Effect of Estimation Technique
This technique analyzes the sensor data to estimate the state of the sensor. Since the
acquisition of data is a precondition of this technique, part of PE.Tc is permanently
assigned to do this estimation job. If the fault is detected. the faulty sensor must be
replaced by a fault-free one and the data acquisition process must be repeated. It should
be noted that the fault detection task is executed in sequential fashion. The estimation
technique is unable to separate the faults occurred during OAT and TBPE-DAT. In this
scheme there is no room for data restoration. The estimation algorithm should be
executed every time to acquire data from the sensor. Therefore, this will create significant
overhead in the temporal behavior of the system. To reduce this effect. the estimation
algorithm should be simple and effective. A very complex algorithm may be very
effective in fault detection, but may not be suitable for application due to temporal
overhead. An optimization of the effectiveness and temporal overhead should be
perfonned to deploy any estimation technique for fault detection.
This basic framework to detect the overhead to incorporate sensor fault tolerance in
system design has been used to detect temporal overhead of an example sensor fusion
system as explained in Section E.?
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5.2.2 The Fault-Tolerance of the Analog Processors (APs)
The job of the analog processors is to ~---------~
condition the signals generated from the
sensors to make them easily interpretable.
The propagation of physical signal through l..- --l
the and analog processor Figure 5.7: Generation of[(t) from
physical signal.(responsible for signal enhancement) can be
explained by Fig. 5.7. In a sensor fusion system. the infonnation about p(t) is recovered
from [(t). Therefore, it is essential that the wave shapes of f(t) and p(t) must be very
similar. If it is assumed that the sensor is fault free, the relationship among p(t). f(t) and
the operating state of the AP, ap(t). is defined as follows
f(t)=Kp(t) ap(t) (5.7)
This Eq.(5.7) is similar to Eq.(5.2), which relates the physical signal, the operating state
of the sensor and the output signal g(t) from the sensor. Therefore, the fault detection
teclmiques as described for the sensors can be applied for the APs. The analog processors
like the sensors are used to serve the periodic events. Therefore, the effects of the fault-
tolerance of the APs are similar to those of sensors.
5.2.3 The Fault-Tolerance of the Analog to Digital Converters
(ADCs)
The ADC converts the analog signal,f(t), conditioned by the AP into a digital signal,
f(nT). The information content off(nT) andf(t) must be very close to make it possible to
recover information fromf(nt) about p(t). Therefore, the relationship betweenf(t),f(nT)
and the operating state of the ADC can be explained in the same way as for the
relationship between sensor and the AP. Like sensors, Aps and ADCs are only used to
serve periodic events. Therefore, their fault tolerance and effects on the operation of the
system can be viewed in the same ways as those for sensors and APs.
5.2.4 Separation of faults of Sensors, APs and ADes
If the voting technique is used to detect the faults in the sensors, the APs and the ADCs,
the failure of these units generate unique events as shown by Fig. 5.8. If the estimation
technique is used to detect the faults of sensors, APs, and ADCs, the problem is
complicated as the estimation technique is based upon the difference of the features of
j(nl) andp(t) as shown in Fig. 5.9.
Event for fault in Evenl for fault in
analog processor
Event for fault In
ADC
Figure 5.8: The generation ofevent for detection offaults in sensor, AP and ADC
Figure 5.9: The generation ofevents for detection of fault in sensor, or
AP,orADC
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Therefore, the faults of sensors, APs and ADCs are fused together as single fault. Under
this circumstance, the sensors, APs and ADes should be replaced one after another until
the system is fault free. This will increase the fault detection overhead significantly.
Therefore, to use estimation lecbnique, this overhead should be considered.
5.2.5 Tbe Fault·Tolerance oftbe Digital Processors (DPs)
Both voting and estimation techniques may be used to detecl the faulty processor. The
voting technique uses more than two processors connected in parallel through a
comparator similar to the tedutique used for the sensor. After detection of a fault, the
faulty processor should be replaced by a fault free one. The voting technique for detection
of faulty processor suffers from similar limitations to those of the voting technique for the
detection of faulty sensor. Therefore, these disadvantages should be considered before
accepting technique.
The estimation techniques for the detection of faulty processors are different from those
for sensors, APs and ADCs. The basic concept of estimation of the presence of faults in a
processor is to test the functional reproducibility of the processor {57]. Allowing the
processor to perform a known task can test this. The execution of this test job should use
all of the internal components of the processor.
Different types of voting and estimation techniques are available in the public domain
ISS]. The objective of this work is not to develop a new technique or explain the publicly
available ones, rather it is to study the effect of these techniques on the performance of
Ihesystem.
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5.2.5.1 The Effect of Digital Processor's Fault-Tolerance 00 the
Performance of the System
The failure of the digital processor will affect both the aperiodic and periodic events
unlike sensors. APs and ADCs. Therefore. special care should be taken to handle faults of
the digital processor.
5.2.5.1.1 The Effect oeVoting Technique
In this scheme. due to the occurrence of faults in the processor. any event (both aperiodic
and periodic events) under execution will be interrupted. If a fault occurs during OAT.
either data lost during the fault clearance time should be restored or the data acquisition
process should be repeated until error free data are collected. If a fault occurs during the
period other than OAT. only the problem of unpredictable delay of service of the events
should be addressed. It has been assumed that due to the occurrence of faults in a
processor all processing states can be restored from a parallely operated fault free
processor. The delay of the service time of the events due to the temporal overhead of
fault clearance can be addressed either keeping enough room (required for restoration or
repetition) in the temporal specification of the discrete events or pausing the periodic
event generation clock on demand basis.
5.2.5.1.2 The Effect of Estimation
Estimation is a delayed fault detection technique and in order to minimize the effect of
delayed detection the test program should be run as frequently as possible. The
malfunctioning of the system due to this delay should be as minimum as possible. This
requirement "'ill create extra computational overhead on the service of the events. If n is
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the munber of times the test program is run during the service of an event, the service
time of the event will be extended by
!J.Te = nT
Here, Tis the execution time of the test program.
(5.8)
Therefore, during the requirements modeling this overhead should be considered to
ensure temporal performance of the system. It should be noted that the effect of the delay
of the detection of fault should be optimized with the execution overbead of the test
program. The sequence of tasks to acquire fault-free data while estimation technique is
used to detect faulty sensors is shown in Fig. E.24.
5.2.6 The Fault-Tolerance of the Memory Module (MD) and the
digital 110
The fault tolerance techniques for memory module and digital VO are similar to those for
the digital processor. The effect of faults of memory module and digital VO are also
similar to those for the processor. Therefore, these problems should be addressed as
discussed in section 5.2.5.1.
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5.3 The Measure of the Dependence of Different Levels of
Fusion on the Reliability of Sensors
In a typical sensor fusion system, fusion occurs at three different levels: data, feature. and
decision. To achieve the goal of this work to synthesize an engineering framework for
the development of a reliable sensor fusion system, it is important to measure the
dependence of a particular level of fusion on the availability of data from the supporting
sensors. To materialize this objective, .- .....,
a fault tree [65] has been used to
visualize lhe !inks of the failures of
the sensors 10 the failures of the
generation of the events at different
levels of fusion. In this proposed
discrete event frame work, fusion
occurs through the service of these
events. Therefore, a failure to
generate these events will result in
the failure of fusion. The fault tree of
a typical event is shown in Fig. 5.10. 1.::==_===--===--===
In this proposed framework, the Figure 5.10: The fault tree ofa typical event.
service of the event 'At will result in the fusion of data from sensors 1,2,3, and 4. The
failure of the supply of data from the sensors I or 2, 3, and 4 will result in the failure of
the generation of the event 'A'. The reliability of the generation of the event 'A' (i.e.,
fusion of data by the service of event 'A') is a measure of the compound reliability of
these sensors. The quantitative relation to measure this reliability profile is shown below.
R(t) '" [1- {l- R,(l)} {l- RlCt)) ]RJ(t)R.(t) (5.9)
Here, R(t) is compound reliability; RI(t). Rl(t). RJ(t). and R-t(t) are the reliabilities of
sensors 1,2,3, and 4 respectively.
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This development has been applied for the depiction of the fault trees and reliability
profiles of different aperiodic events of the example sensor fusion system (Appendix A
and B) at different levels affusion. This SFS fuses data at three different levels (e.g.• ~ta
level. feature level. decision level) by the service of eight aperiodic events (i,e.,
AE" ...,AEJ.
5.3.1 The Fault Trees and Reliability Profiles of the Example
Sensor Fusion System at Data Fusion Level
The data level fusion is perfonned by the service of the five aperiodic events: AE,•~,
AEI , AE., and AEs. The fault trees of the generation of these events AE,,~, AE., and
AE, are shown in Fig. E.1O, Fig.E.16, Fig.E.lS, and Fig.E.12 respectively. The reliability
profiles of these events with different levels of redundancy arc shown in Fig.E.lI,
Fig.E.l?, Fig.E.19, and Fig.E.!3 respectively. From these reliability profiles it is evident
that the redundancy in the sensor modules decreases the probability of failures of these
5.3.2 The Fault Trees and Reliability Profiles of the Example
Sensor Fusion System at Feature Fusion Level
The generations of the aperiodic events AE6 and AE, cause the feature level fusion. The
fault trees of AE6 and AE, arc shown in Fig.E.20 and Fig.E.22 respectively. The
reliability profiles of these events shown in Fig.E.21 and Fig.E.23 make it clear that the
fault tolerance in the sensor system has the potential to enhance the reliability of feature
fusion.
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5.3.3 The Fault Trees and Reliability Profiles of the Example
Sensor Fusion System at Decision Fusion Level
The fault tree of the only event AE. responsible for decision fusion in this sensor fusion
system is shown in Fig.E.14. The reliability profile of this event shown in Fig.E.15 shows
that the redundant sensor system also increases the reliability ofdecision fusion.
5.4 Chapter Summary
The pOlential 10 enhance the reliability of sensor system by the use of fault tolerance has
been evaluated. The overheads to incorporate this fault lolerance have been identified.
Techniques have been proposed to change the DEVR model to accommodate this
overhead. The fault-tree based approach is proposed to measure the reliabilities at
different levels of fusion and this technique has been used successfully to evaluate the
reliability profiles at different levels of fusion of an example sensor fusion system as
shown in Appendix E. This novel technique to measure the reliability of different levels
of fusion in tenns of the reliability of the supporting sensors has the potential to improve
the stale-of-the-art of the engineering melhod of multisensory sensing systems. The
measurement of this critical design parameter is based on sound quantitative reasoning
and tested in the design of an example sensor fusion system. This knowledge component
specifically contributes 10 the process of synlhesization of scientific knowledge to
engineer highly reliable sensor fusion system.
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Chapter 6
_ IThe Detection of Sensor Faults
Using Local Statistics
6.1 Introduction
High reliability is a precondition for the deployment of multi~sensoriautomated systems in safety
and mission critical operations. The use of redundant sensors has the potential to enhance tne
reliability oflhe sensing sub-systems (Appendix A). The estimation based fault detection scheme
has better potential to enhance the reliability than voting technique based fault detection scheme
(Section E.5). Moreover, the voting technique fails to detect the presence of faults if all the
redundant sensors are affected [57), for example in the case of transient faults due to the
switching actions of the neighboring inductive loads (e.g., de mOlors, relays) [67] or due to
electrostatic discharge induced in a space environment. These transient faults may corrupt the
data acquired from multi-sensan unsupervised autonomous systems (e.g.• scientific experiments
deployed in unmanned space environment [55} or in other special environments). If the presence
of b'ansients remains undetected, the corrupted data acquired from lhese unsupervised
autonomous systems may lead [0 the misconceptions about the sensing envirorunents. To remain
within lhe scope of this thesis, lhe detection of transient faults will be investigated in this Chapter
of this lhesis. Other rypes of sensor faults are not addressed by this work (e.g., intermittent faull).
tn a single processor based multi-sensori system, data are acquired from each sensor for a short
period of time in a particular sequence. The sequence of sensing is defined by the phases and the
periods of the sensors defined by the DEVR mode! of lhe SFS (section 2.2). The data acquired
from each sensing session must be interpreted to detect the presence of faults. The main aim of
this research is to devise a robust mechanism to detect the presence of transient faults in the
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acquired data. As reported in Section 5.2. t .2, the data interpretation time required fault detection
must be as small as possible to keep temporal overhead at minimal leveL
For a particular process, the measurable parameters have specific domains of amplitudes and
variances. The prior knowledge of these domains may facilitate the detection of faults in the
sensors deployed to measure these process parameters (68]. The detection of sensor faulls by
examining the pattern of deviations ofengine signals from their nominal unfailed values has been
reported [69J, and a Kalman filter-based dedicated observer has been used to detect sensor faults
[70J. The requirement for a dedicated processor for each sensor is a limitation for its use in single
processor-based multi·sensori systems. Sensor faults have been detected by using
computationally complex and model-based estimation technique [71]. The sensor signal
amplitude has been used to detect the failure of faults in automotive engines [72J. The detection
of ttansient fault has not been addressed [72J. The different algorithms based on analytical and
knowledge based redundancy for fault diagnosis reported in a survey (73] are computationally
complex. The development of another computationally complex algorithm has been reported to
detect sensor faults [74]. The requirement for a dual-redundant system is the limitation of a
reponed technique to detect sensor faults (75). The limited scientific basis (subjective due to the
dependency on training set) for measuring the pattern recognition performance makes the neural
network based fault detection approach [76] inappropriate for the present problem. A reported
technique for the detection, isolation and identification of sensor faults in nuclear power plant
does not address the problem of detection of transient faults [77]. The use of statistical
characteristics to delect faults in earth sensors has not covered the detection of transient fault in
sensor data stream [78].
The available techniques uncovered in this literature search have been developed mainly to detect
the permanent faults of sensors. Despite the mathematical sophistication of these methods, it is
fair to say that most of these techniques are computationally complex. Moreover, none of these
techniques has addressed the problem of detection of transients present in sensor data in multi-
sensori systems in a comprehensive manner. The requirement of a dedicated processor to detect
fault in each sensor is another limitation of some of these methods. Therefore, it is fair to
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conclude that these available techniques for the detection and isolation of faulty sensors are not
computationally simple and adaptive. The objective of this part of this thesis is to develop a
simple and adaptive technique for tbe detection of transients in sensor data stream. It should be
noted that due to the potential of degradation of sensor signal the use of a low pass filter to
eliminate the transient has not been pursued in this thesis.
6.2 The Detection of Transient Faults Using Local Statistics of
Sensor Data
A typical sensor used to measure physical parameter produces an equivalent electrical signal
corrupted with normally distributed random noise as given by
(6.1)
Here, g(nT) and p(nT) are discrete sensor and physical signals respectively, and T is the
sampling period.
The local variance and mean of a segment of this sensor signal are measured by the following
relations:
t' .. ((K ..... /lTl
i"iKTw-'··--N--
Here, g2{K) and g(K) are the local variance and mean of the K segment.
(6.2)
(6.3)
The variance is the measure of the scatter of the corresponding sensor data (e.g., pressure,
temperature) from the mean value [78]. The upper and lower limits of the variance specify the
acceptable domain of randomness of the corresponding sensor data The presence of a transient
fault is characterized by the presence of variances outside of this domain. The use of this
Table 6.1: The local means of test signals.
Test signals Upper bound Lower bound
8,(nT) 7.01 1.82
glnT) 8.20 2.91
gJ(nT) 7.01 1.82
g.(nT) 7.60 3.72
parameter is proposed to detect the transient fault [79]. The transient is modeled here as damped
sinusoid as explained in Section F.3 [67]. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, the local
statistics of four test signals at different fault conditions are calculated by simulation and
documented in Appendix F.
6.3 Tbe Statistical Cbaracteristics of tbe Test Sigoals
The wavefonns of the four test physical signals and the corresponding sensor signals are shown
in section F.2. Each lest signal has been divided into 50 segments. The local statistics of each
segment is calculated by placing a window of the same dimension at the beginning of each
segmenL The local means of these sensor signals resemble the wavefonns of the corresponding
physical signals. The upper bounds of local variances of the first three sensor signals are very
low. Due to high frequency components of the
founh sensor signal the upper bound of the
local variance of this signal is much higher than
those of the first three sensor signals. The
upper and lower bounds of the local means and
variances of these four test sensor signals are
shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 ~tively.
The bandwidths of these test signals are shown '------'-----'-----
in Table 6.3.
Table 6.2: The local variances of test signals.
Test signals Upper bounds Lower bounds
Table 6.3: Bandwidth of the test
signals
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6.4 The Analysis of the Signature of the Transient Faults on the Test
Signals
A transient fault in the form of a damped sinusoid [67] of 5ms duration has been superimposed
on these four test signals at 70ms from the origin as shown in section F.3.1, F.3.2, F.3.3. and
F.3.4. It appears that the local means of these signals do not indicate the presence of these
transients. The signature of these faults as sharp rise of local variances at almost 70ms from the
origin reveals that the thresholding of local variances can be used to detect the presence of
transients. The ratios of the peaks of these local variances to those of the corresponding fault
free sensor signals are shown in Table 6.4. The locations of these variance peaks are also shown
in this table. It appears that the ratios of these variance peaks are function of the highest
frequency components present in these Table 6.4: The statistics related to the signature orlhe
transient on test sensor signals.
test signals as shown in Fig. 6.1.
Thetesisignals
The distribution of the ratio of the peaks
for different signals
Th.~,;oo<j[l;;]..
the peaks 2
,
,
,
o ~ [ ! i
Test signals Ratio of peaks Location from origin
gl(nT) 42 70ms
ginT) 16 70ms
g)(nT) 13.79 7llim
g,,(nT) 2.10 70ms
Figure 6.1: The dlstnbunon of the rana ofthe peaks of
local variances of the test signals at transient fault.
From this simulated test result, it is
found that there is a good potential to
detect and locate the presence of
transients on sensor signals by
comparing the peaks of the local ~=============~
variances at faulty condition with those
at fault free condition. It should be
noted that the achievable locational
accuracy is extremely high and is not a
function of the bandwidth of the sensor
signals. It is found that the
delectability of transients by this
method diminishes with the increase of
the bandwidth of the sensor signal.
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6.5 The Effect of the Transient Faults at Different Locations on the
Local Statistics of the Sensor Signals
The occurrences of transients at 98 different locations on these test signals are studied. These
faults have been simulated at integral multiples of 2ms from the origin. The profiles of the locaL
statistics of the test signals with transient faults at different locations are shown in section FA.I,
F.4.2. F.4.3, and FAA. From this simulation results it is clear that the local means are not
affected by the variations in faults locations. But the ratios of the maximum peaks of the
variances vary noticeabLy with the variation of the location ofoccurrence of transient faults. The
pertinent salient features of these variations are summarized in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: The variation of the maximum peaks of the sensor signalS with the occurrence
of transient faults at different locations.
Sensor signalS Upper bound Lower bound Difference of % ofvariation
of the of the variations
maximum peak maximum peak
g,enn 43 34 32%
gl(nT) 20 14 50%
gJ(nT) 18 13 38%
g.(nT) 50%
Due to this wide variation of the peaks with the location of the transient faults, it is
recommended to consider the worse case scenario to set the threshold. This simulation reveals
that the ratios of these variations are not directly related to the bandwidth of the signals. But the
differences in these variations are found related to the bandwidths of these test signals. From the
profiles of variances of the occurrences of transients at two different locations from the origins
(e.g., Oms and 18 ms) it is understood that the locational accuracy is not a function of the position
of the faults.
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much higher value at the location of the transient
than at other places. With the increase of the
window size, values of the peaks at other places
of the signal become comparable to those at the
location of the transient resulting in a false
detection. The effect of window size on the
6.6 The Effect of Window Size on Local Statistics at Transient Fault
on Test Signals
The local statistics of the sensor signals at differel1t window sizes varying from .2 ms to 12 ms
have been calculated. The simulation results of this study have been reported in sections F.5.1,
F.5.2, F.S.3, and F.5.4. With a decrease in window sizc, the computational complexity increases
linearly. From this simulation study it is found that with the decrease of window sizc the
transient detectability increases due to the generation of higher value of variance peaks. At large
window size the transient detectability decreases significantly. This finding can be clarified
further by observing the effect of window size on the local variances of the fourth signal. At a
Ams window size, the maximum peak has a ,-__-========,
=]Q
.4ms 3m. 10ms
detectability of transients using Otis proposed ~__-,,_....,......,......,......,......,.._,..J
local statistics based approach is shown in ~~;:~~~~gv=:li~:~ ~:~:~~:::
Fig.6.2. From this graph it appears that the during the rest ofthe signal at different
probability of false detection of a transient window sizes for the fourth test signal.
increases with an increase in window size. It
should also be noted that the peak size decreases with the decrease in window size beyond a
certain value (e.g., the .6 ms for this test simUlation). The maximum peak values for these four
test signals have been detected at the .6 ms window size. Therefore, the dependence of the value
of the peak on the window size must be taken into consideration in order to select the threshold
for a particular sensor signal.
'"
Test signals
"'[Ijjj""~~: 150Ihe rallo of 100 .. _. ..Ihepeaks
'",
First Second Third Fourth
6.7 The Effect of Window Locations Relative to the Position of the
Transient
The window location has been varied in r-----~------___,
.05ms steps relative to the starting position
of the transient. The simulation study
reported in section F.6.1, F.6.2. F.6.3, and
F.6.4 reveals that the value of the peak is a
function of the location of the window. For
these four test signals. it has been found
consistently that the maximum peak size
occurs when the window is located at the L,F,=,,,,,,=,76."3.<Th",:-:m:-:,,,:-:,'=m"'um""""van=a,:-:,o"'n""o,"',h"",",,"',,"'oo,.,.l,
start of the transient. The variations of peak the PI::i::r~:'~Va;~ti~h: a:::~:~~dOW
sizes with the change of the location of the
window are shown in Fig. 6.3. Therefore, this characteristic must be taken into consideration in
order to detect the transient using a local variance method.
6.8 The Effect of Different Frequencies of Transient Faults on the
Local Statistics
The frequency of the transient has been varied from 500 Hz to 10 kHz in 500 Hz increments. The
simulation results are reported in sections F.7.1. F.7.2. F.7.3. and F.7.4. From this study it is
found that the detectabiJity of transient increases with the increase of the frequency. The effect of
the change of frequency of transient is more visible in low frequency sensor signal than in higher
frequency sensor signal.
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6.9 The Effect of Noise Power on Detectability of Transient Faults
Figure 6.4: Variation of ratio of local variances with
the signal to noise ratio(SNR).
'LR3tlo 35ofpnks30of 25loc;o1 20",rl,"~':!
8.57 ,..~ 20.56 26.t11 30.17 32.76 34.fM 36.16
Slgn31 10 noise ntlo (dB)
power. The ratio of the maximum
value of local variance ofa sinusoidal
signal (first test signal as shown in
section F.2.1) to that of the same '- ...J
signal corrupted with transient noise
is snown in Fig. 6.4.
It has been noticed that the ,---------------,
detectability of transient faults using
local st<llistics (e.g., variance)
diminishes with an increase in noise
6.10 The Detection of Permanent Faults
Under permanent faults. the possibility that the output may be stuck at the lowest value or stuck
at maximum saturation level (intennediate values have not been addressed) has been addressed
here. Due to these extreme low and high values of the sensor signal, the local mean will go
beyond the normal operating domain. This deviation of the local mean at faulty condition than
that at nonnal operating condition can be used to detect the faulty sensor. It has been shown
through simulation in Appendix F that the local statistics mostly remain unaffected due to the
occurrence of transient fault. Therefore. it would be possible to separate permanent faults from
transient faults.
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6.11 Chapter Summary
In this thesis it has been reported that there is a potential to detect and locate transient sensor
faults sensor signals based on the local variance of the sensor signals. The detectability based on
this principle is a function of the location of the transient, the window size, the location of the
window relative to the starting of transient and the frequency of the transient. Through
simulation study, the quantitative information of these relationships has been developed in this
work. It has been shown that particular type of permanent fault can be detected with the
information of local mean which is virtually unaffected by the transient fault. It should be noted
that the estimation based sensor faults detection technique is based on finding odd features in the
sensor signals. There is always a potential that the estimation based technique can falsely identitY
odd features.
Chapter 7
_ IRestoration of Lost Sensor's Data During
Fault-clearance Intervals
7.1 Introduction
The application of voting technique to detect faultS in the fault tolerant sensor fusion
system as shown in Fig. 7.1[80] will result in loss of data during the fault-clearance
time(sec. 5.2.1.2.1). In a simplified form, Fig.7.2[56] shows the fault-tolerant sensing
scheme with hardware redundancy. In this figure, p(t) is Ute physical signal andf(/11) is
its equivalent digital electrical signal. The detection and replacement of faulty
Af'lJ:AnoI"lJipalp<ocessin,uni' ADCU: An>101 "'diJit>1 DI'-:Dipl>lda"PfOC"';nlu";,
AI'I~.A""""""'''IJip'''_''''''' convet$ion"" pJ'/_.;sI'w.",microproceuon
M/,f1"'lnll"llWit<h ADCt_.ADC.ue ..>.lOJ DSl:SeconddigiW ....;lCh
AF/:Fintr...'d<t<cti""""i, rodiJital«>n DF1'Sramdr..ltol<lttlion ....i';n
in..,.I"I'"'' OS, , fintdlJjtal h dig;taI .....
DF,:Fintf>.td'ol<l«rionllll;' DFCfJ:f""l,cle:lF.lllC.""j'ofOPU
inditulrutc. RS, "'aJon;,,;PJl>.sy>'.m
Figure 7.1: An architecture offault tolerant sensor fusion system [801.
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components with fault-free components require certain amount of time known as the fault
clearance interval. During this time. on-line sensor data will be lost. A simple solution to
this problem is to repeat the data acquisition cycle. If the signal is highly transient. the
repetition of the acquisition cycle will lose significant amount ofinfonnation. Moreover.
the unpredictable repetition will create significant overhead to satisfy the stringent timing
requirements of the system. This unpredictable behaviour may result in malfunctioning of
the system. Therefore, a scheme should be developed to restore the lost data.
The restoration of lost samples in digital signals in the area of communication and digital
storage is based on the estimation of the unknown samples from the infonnation of the
neighboring samples (81]. The methods documented in public domain literature deal with
the restoration of samples of band-limited and low-pass signals [82]-[85]. If the signal is
highly transient, the perfonnance of these schemes suffers significantly. The estimation
schemes having the ability to recover transient signals with reasonable perfonnance are
computationally complex [84]. Usually these schemes are iterative in nature. Initial
estimates for unknown samples are chosen, the signal is restricted to its assumed
frequency band, and the signal values at the positions of the unknown samples are used as
new estimates. This procedure is repeated until satisfactory results are obtained (86]. The
recovery of lost samples as solution of unknown samples from a linear system of
equations has also been used [82]. Some of these schemes are non-adaptive due to the
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requirements of signal spectrum, or equivalently the autocorrelation function has to be
known in advanced [86},[87J. It appears that these available digital samples restoration
schemes are not very effective to recover sensor data lost during the fault-clearance
interval. To overcome these [imitations. this thesis has proposed a new sclteme based on
parallel sensing to restore data lost during the fault-clearance interval in hardware
redundancy based fault-tolerant sensing. This scheme is computationally very simple.
non-iterative and is not limited to particular class of signals. It does not require any
information about the nature of the signals and is virtually independent of the information
for the neighboring samples. This proposed scheme is capable of restoring lost sensor
data during fault-clearance interval.
7.2 A Unified Approach to Restore Lost Samples During Fault-
Cleanance Intervals
In a data acquisition r-----------------,
session. N samples are
acquired from a sensor. LeI
s[n] ; n=c.J.2, ...•N be the
segment of samples
acquired in a particular
session and s, the vector in '--;FO:,gure=~7.73:-:'10=':":,,=qu:::',="='o:::oo:::f:::d.=t.:":~::;l="od=to:-:th~e:-:,="",:::e:-'
which the segment of data is physical signal using two parallel channels
arranged. Let us asswne that two segments of data s,[njand s2[nj are collected in parallel
from two separate sensors and analog channels sensing the same physical signal as shown
in Fig. 7.3. Therefore, under fault-free operation, these two segments are identical. When
a fault occurs, these segments of data contains FJ and F2 number of fault-clearance
intervals. The positions of the samples during these intervals are at fij(k). k=/.2.....mij and
j'="O./ ....•Fi. Here. i is the channel number,j is the number offault-c1earance interval and k
is the number of lost samples in the corresponding fault-clearance interval. It is assumed
that these segments have OJ regions having undefined samples of length U at locations
starring at the positions /irfU]. r=O./ ..... oi and u=O.J•..• u. It has also been assumed that
the fault-clearance intervals of these two charutels do not overlap (i.e.• at least one of
these two channels is functioning properly during the entire data acquisition period). The
samples in the ith channel during the fault-clearance intervals can be processed by the
following equations
Si[n]=O, if naij(k) for all the permissible values ofi.nJ. and Ie. (7.1)
sJln]=2*sj[n], if nSij(k) for all the pennissible values ofi.nJ, and Ie. (7.2)
Most of the lost samples can be recovered by the following relation
s,[n] = s,(n l ;sl[n] (7.3)
Due to the switching effect. data at locations /ir[U} I
in this recovered segment will be undefined. Due to ·:~:;:=- ....I~ -:-_
the very short duration of switching time the value I
ofu win be very small. Therefore, these undefined ":::"'..":'-,_---,- -,--_
data can be recovered by simple linear interpolation I
without incorporating significant error to obtain the ::-=::=::1~ '-' ,.------:_
estimated signal. This data recovery scheme can be
explained by a simulated test signal as shown in ;:.::=.: ~'II.
Fig.7A. This concept has been successfully used to l::::=-=-===~~=~==J
recover data lost during fault clearance intervals in Flgure 704: An example of recovery of
a laboratory experiments as shown in section GA. samples lost ~~~~I~~ult.c1earance
lIS
7.3 Restoration in Fault-Tolerance with Dual Modular
Redundancy
[0 dual modular redundancy, the voting technique cannot detect the faulty block. The
presence of faults in anyone of the constituting blocks (e.g., sensors, analog processors,
and analog to digital converters) detected by the voting technique must initiate a process
to detect and change the faulty block. The time at different steps of the fault-clearance
process should be recorded 10 detect corrupted sample positions, so that sample values of
those positions can be restored using lhe restoration technique as explained in the
previous section (sec. 7.2).The fault-clearance process is explained in Fig. 7.5. Let us
consider that the probabilities of failure of the same type of blocks in both the two
channels are the same. It is assumed that only one block fails at a lime and no other block
fails during the subsequent fault-clearance interval. Since the fault-elearance time is
extremely small in comparison to the total operating period of the system. this
assumption is reasonable. It is also assumed that fault-free blocks are available for the
fault-clearance operation. It should be noled that if the replacement of a probable faulty
block in the first channel does not clear the fault, it is likely that the fault has occurred in
the second channel. Then the fault-free block must be switched back 10 its previous
position. This switching in the fault-free channel (in this case channel I) will make a few
samples during these transitions tmdefined. The transitions should be made as small as
possible so that these undefined samples can be recovered using simple interpolation
teclmiques (e.g.• linear interpolation) without introducing significant error in the
reconstructed signal.
The restoration of corrupted samples due to fault-clearance is shown in Fig. 7.6. It has
been assumed that the interrupt generated for fault-clearance will carry the time of
occurrence of fault. It should be noted that ifIs is the sampling frequency of the signal.
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the deLay (i.e., the value of m in delay block) and the fault-clearance interval snould
maintain the following relation
m >< 1. ~ fault.clearance interval.
r,
This means that both the two sequences must be stored before reconstruction.
1$2-Qme3.nSswitehingin
channel did notOCCllr.
Figure 7.5: The flow diagram of the fault·cLearance process.
b,b, b. Status word
o 0 0 Fault-freeeondition
o 0 I Fault in sensor
o I 0 Fault in analog processor
I 0 0 FaultinADC
(7.3)
Figure 7.6: Restoration of data during fault-clearance in dual redundant fault-tolerant sensing.
Sl so seleeledmodule
00 1
01 2
10 3
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7.4 Restoration in Fault-Tolerance with Triple Modular
Redundancy
In triple modular redundancy, the voting algorithm to detect and replace the faulty block
can be implemented either in hardware or in software. Usually the fault-clearance time is
longer using software implementation than using hardware implementation. The fault-
clearance time in hardware implementation can be made within the range of a few (e.g.,
one or two) sample times. The samples lost in this low fault-clearance time can be
restored through simple interpolation techniques, such as linear interpolation. The
restoration techniques in both the two approaches of implementation of voting algorithms
are explained in the subsequent sections.
7.4.1 Restoration Using Hardware Implementation of Voting
Algorithm with Triple Modular Redundancy
The basic concept of restoration of samples using r----------,
hardware implementation of voting algorithm with
triple modular redundancy in fault-tolerant sensing
is shown in Fig. 7.7. For this reason it is assumed
::u::s ::o:u:::
UI
: ss::: :e;i~~~~::: I---:F"i""'-,-='.-="""'A,-'""'im-p7"lifi""oo..,.-....J
representation of voting module
input signals are derived from the corresponding
block as shown in Fig. 7.9. These signals are analog
for the sensors and analog processors and digital for
the analog to digital converters. The relationship .",._=-::::----:--:_,,--:-:'
between the two output signals and the selection of Figure 7.8. The selectlon of module
with the output from the voting
the corresponding block is shown in Fig. 7.8. module.
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To
Figure 7.9: The restoration of lost samples in hardware implementation of the voting algorithm.
The input signals of the voting module are to detect the presence of fault. Analog
comparators are used for the detection of faults of sensors and analog processors. For the
detection of faults of ADCs, digital ...- .......
comparators are used. The comparator
module and the relationship of the
comparator module with the rest of
the voting module is shown in Fig.
7.10. The fault-free block is selected
from among the three modules based
on the output of the comparator
module using majority agreement of L__....:==== J
the inputs.
Figure 7.10: The comparator and majority voting
modules in the voting module.
The output ofa comparator is zero if its inputs are equal (within certain range) and is one
if the inputs are nol equal. The inputs and outputs of the majority voter are binary.
Therefore. the voter can be Table 7.1: Generation ofoutputs from the voting module in
designed as a digital response to the inputs from the comparators.
combinational circuit. The Input to the voter from Output of the Fault~free
truth table for the majority the comparator voter to the mw:. modules
unrealistic
available
voter is shown in Table
7.1. If only one module 1--~+--"--+"+--;;-+-"+~1','2,.&'3.---i
fails, the voting algorithm
is capable of generating f-O-+-~+"-+--::-+---:-+"'-unre=a:Cl;"""'-;c-i
the corresponding output f-O-+-~+-;--+-;;-+-"-+-71&'"2.--i
signal to the multiplexer f-~+-"+"-+--::-+---:-+"'-u..,-","'-oa:CI;"""'-k-i
to switch to the next f-~+-~+-;--+-;;-+-~-+-'2&"'3.--i
fault-free f-~+-~+"-+----''---+-''-+-71&'''3.--i
module. If more than two f-~+-~+-;--+----''---+-~-+-unkn=''o'''-wn=--i
modules fail. the output (1 '---_-L_---'--_---"-__-L_---"- -'
Figure 7.11: Hardware realization of the voting logic.
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, I) is an indication that more than two modules have failed. The digital logic circuit to
implement this algoritlun is shown in Fig. 7.11.
In this scheme, the multiplexers select one among the three inputs as output. This selected
one can be called the main module and the remaining two can be called support modules.
If the fault occurs in the main module, the hardware realization of the voting logic
generates a command to the multiplexer to select a fault-free support module. After
switching to the fault-free module, the voting unit interrupts the processor to replace the
faulty module with spare fault-free module. The outputs of the comparator module (i.e.•
CI.C), and CJ) are used as inputs to an 'OR' gate to generate this interrupt. The output of
the comparator module enables the processor to r----------,
replace the faulty module directly without trial
and error. Therefore, in this process data is lost
only during the switching period of the faulty
main module. This switching period can be
called fault-clearance period in this scheme. This
fault-clearance period (FcP) comprises mainly
three components as shown in Fig. 7.12 and by
the following relation:
t.:cornaparisontimetakenbythe
companllormodule
t~'sektioDtimetakenbythevoter
t..:switchrngtimetakenbythemultiplexer
Figure 7.12: Fault-clearance time
consists of three components.
(7.4)
As all these three operations are done in hardware, FcP is very small. As a result very few
samples (one or two) are recoverable by using simple linear interpolation.
Due to the addition of extra hardware components to realize the voter, the reliability of
the system decreases. This situation can be improved by implementing the voter in the
software level provided that the software module does not contain bugs. Based upon the
characteristics of particular application the designer will choose the specific approach for
the implementation oftbe voter.
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7.4.2 Restoration Using Software Implementation of Voting
Algorithm with Triple Modular Redundancy
The software level implemenlation of the VOler increases the value of Is. which increases
the length of the faull-clearance period. This increase imposes constraints on the
restoration of lost samples using different restoration algorithms. Because the quality of
the perfonnance of available algorithms depends on the number of the lost samples (i.e.,
Fe?) and the known signal characteristics, steps are taken 10 overcome this problem.
This problem is overcome by reading data from two channels simullaneously, similar to
the case of dual redundancy. The signal from the support module is only used by the
comparator to assist the software voter to detect the faulty module without trial and error.
This scheme is better than dual redundancy in the sense Ihat the chance of swilching of
the fault-free module will be avoided. Therefore, there will be no undefined samples in
Figure 7.13: Restoration ofsignal in triple modular redundancy with software
implementation of voting algorithm.
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the lirfUJ periods. The overall system diagram is shown in Fig. 7.13. Due to the
avoidance oCthe chance of switching of fault-free module this scheme has the potential to
recover the signal completely. It should also be noted that this scheme outperfonns the
hardware voter through complete elimination of lhe need of interpolation to restore
undefined samples. This scheme has been applied successfully in a laboratory set up to
realize triple-modular redundant fault tolerant optical sensor as reported in Appendix G.
7.5 Generalized Fault~ToleranceScheme
From the system development point of view, it is logical to have the provision of
different levels of redundancy in the same system. This will maximize the use of the
system resources. The system uses triple redundancy when there are three or more than
three similar blocks. Dual modular redundancy is used when only two similar modules
are available. When no redundant modules are available. the system uses the estimation
B---T?9§J ~ §J
.00
o off
algorithm 10 detect the fault. To achieve this objective
it is necessary to have a switching module which
allows both single and broadcast type of cOlUlections,
such as the crossbar switch. The basic concept of a
crossbar switch is shown in Fig. 7.14 [41]. Through
this switch module any module in the input can be
connected with anyone in the output. It is also
possible to connect an input module to multiple output
modules. In Fig. 7.12., the input module, 12 has been L..",.....--=-,....."...--.....,,..J
Figure 7.14: The structure of
connected to 01. and II has been connected with both crossbar switch to connect the
02 and On. This broadcast feature of crossbar allows modules
different levels ofredundancy in the same design. The
overall system diagram is shown in Fig. 7.15.
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For dual redundancy, the same module is connected to the two inputs of the comparator.
In the case of no redundancy, the same module is connected to all three inputs of the
comparator. The software maintains the record of the failed components and the level of
redundancy.
7.6 Cbapter Summary
The proposed scheme is not based on the recovery of lost samples from the infonnation
of the neighboring samples and is not limited to any class of signals (e.g., band limited
signal). It does not require prior information about the signal characteristics. This scheme
is computationally simple and is not iterative in nature. Therefore, this proposed scheme
based on parallel sensing is fast and is capable of recovering lost samples of any class of
signal. The addition of error to recover lost samples during switching periods through.
interpolation is low due to the availability of very fast switch.ing devices. Although the
requirements of hardware and software for the implementation of this scheme increase
the system complexity, the rapid recovery of lost samples makes this sch.eme a useful
solution for restoration oftime sensitive signal in safety and mission critical operations.
Chapter i
_
Conclusions aud Recommeudations for
Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis work was to synthesize a novel engineering methodology for
developing highly reLiable sensor fusion systems of multi-senson intelligent systems for
the applications in the safety and mission critical environments. This methodology
includes both the avoidance of faults during the development phase and the tolerance of
sensor failures during the operation phase. The salient features of this thesis work are
summarized in the following points:
t. Petti. net based a nove! discrete event framework has been developed to model
requirements of sensor fusion systems as finite state machine. This framework allows
the modeling of different modes of data integration: competitive, complementary,
independent, and temporaL in a unified manner. This framework has both the
graphical and mathematical attributes. The intuitive graphical attribute has the
potential facilitating communication between the developers and the clients to capture
sensing requirements resulting in avoidance of requirement errors. The mathematical
attribute will enable the developer to ensure logical and temporal correctness of the
sensing requirements through the simulation of the modeled sensor fusion system.
The effectiveness of this novel development has been demonstrated by simulating an
example sensor fusion system.
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2. A novel methodology of deriving the computing component specifications from the
discrete event requirements (DEVR) model has been developed. This is based on the
decomposition of DEVR model as hierarchical finite state machine. The use of the
same fonnalism at different levels of sensing system decomposition will help avoid
errors in deriving specifications of the computing components from client's high level
sensing requirements. The use of the optimization technique in deriving temporal
specifications of the computing components has been shown in order to enable the
developer to optimize the cost of the underlying computing hardware. The use of this
methodology has been illustrated by deriving the specifications of the computing
components ofan example sensor fusion system.
3. To ensure the temporal correctness of the sensor fusion system during the operation
phase, the reasoning basis to derive the arehitecturc of the underlying computing
system from the sensing requirements has been developed.
4. A novel methodology to include redundant sensors to tolerate the failure of sensors
during operation phase has been developed. The sensor fault tolerance using
redundancy has been experimentally verified. The temporal overhead in incorporation
of redundant sensors has been detected and necessary techniques have been
developed to deal with this overhead. A fault-tree based novel technique to measure
the dependence of different levels of fusion on the reliability of sensors has been
developed. This technique has been used to derive the fault trees and reliability
profiles of different levels of fusion of an example sensor fusion system.
5. The voting technique based fault detection scheme cannot detect transient faults
generated due to the switching actions of the neighboring inductive loads (e.g.,
electric motors, electromagnetic relays) or due to electrostatic discharge in space and
industrial environments. A computationally simple novel technique has been
developed to detect the presence of transients in sensor data stream using local
statistics.
6. The loss of sensor data during fault-clearance interval is one of the limitations of
using voting technique based on redundancy for sensor fault tolerance. A novel
parallel sensing based technique has been developed to address this problem. The
implementation of this technique for fault tolerant sensor system of different levels of
redundancy has been shown. The utility of this technique to restore data during fault-
clearance interval for a triple modular optical sensor system has been experimentally
verified.
The use of this fonnal, graphical, and mathematical technique will help the developer to
avoid faults during the development phase. The use of redundancy will help tolerate
sensor faults during the operation phase. The novel engineering methodology that is
reported in this thesis has addressed different issues of fault avoidance and fault tolerance
of sensor fusion systems in a unified framework. Therefore, it's the understanding of the
author that this novel engineering methodology will enable the developer 10 engineer
highly reliable sensor fusion systems of multi-sensori intelligent systems for the
applications in safety and mission critical environments.
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8.2 Recommendations for Futnre Works
The novel contributions reported in this thesis are the outcomes of a research work
towards the development of a software system to automate the development process of
highly reliable sensor fusion systems. Results of simulations and experiments have
demonstrated the utilities of these contributions. There is a need to undertake
development work to develop a software system in order to make the novel engineering
methodology reported in this thesis readily usable by the deVelopment engineers.
It is necessary to develop a set of integrated discrete event software tools. This tool set
will allow the modeling of requirements of sensor fusion system (SFS) as discrete event
dynamic system. User friendly intuitive graphical user interface should be provided in
order to facilitate communication between the developers and users. The simulation of
this model will help ensure logical and temporal correctness of the $FS. This tool will
also measure different features of the modeled SFS (e.g., the sensitiveness,the utilization
of the operating time). This tool set will allow the decomposition of the D£VR model as
hierarchical finite state machine in order to derive the specifications of tbe computing
components. The architecture of the underlying computing system will also be derived
with the help of this tool set in order to ensure the temporal correctness during nm time.
This same 1001 set will also generate control signals in order to execute the computing
components in run time as an interpretation of modeled SFS. The fault trees and
reliability profiles at different levels of fusion of sensor fusion system will also be
derived with the help of this tool set.
A repository of the computing components required for fusion of data should be
developed. The discrete event tool set in run time will activate these components
interpreting the discrete event model of sensor fusion systems. The use of same 1001 set in
both development and operation phases will help the developer to avoid faults in
realizing sensor fusion systems. This formalism will also be suitable for the enhancement
of the features of already developed sensor fusion syslems using this framework.
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Due to the availability of high performance computing system and graphics library (e.g.,
OpenGL) at a reasonable price. the development work can be undertaken for the
visualization ofmodeled sensor fusion systems as discrete event dY'-1amic systems in 3-D
graphics environment. This development work will include the visualization of the
sensing systems including sensors and interactions among computing components.
sensing environments. and sensed information. The computing components will process
data generated by simulated sensors. This visualization scheme will further enhance the
communication between the developers and clients resulting in better understanding of
sensing requirements and limitations of different sensing schemes.
Further development work: is required to validate the proposed local statistics based
technique for the detection of transient faults present on sensor data stream. The
development work should include the acquisition of transients generated by different
phenomena (e.g.• switching of inductive loads, electrostatic discharge in space, industrial.
and laboratory environments) in wide variety of conditions, the modeling of these
transients and the improvement of this proposed technique to make it capable for
detecting.
In this thesis it has been shown that redundancy has the potentia! to improve the
reliability of sensing system. In order to make this concept readily usable, it's necessary
to undertake development work to develop fault-tolerant sensor modules using different
levels of redundancy. so that SFS developer can use them as building blocks. These fault-
tolerant sensor modules should implement the proposed parallel sensing based technique
to recover sensor data lost during fault clearance interval. These fault-tolerant sensor
modules should be smart enough to infonn the higher level system modules about the
status of different sensors, so that the system can avoid the interpretation ofdata provided
by potentially faulty sensors.
The use of this methodology to develop complex sensor fusion systems will provide
feedback in order to make this framework more effective and versatile. Moreover, there
will be a need of continuous development of this framework to keep pace with the ever-
increasing requirements of more complex intelligent systems.
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Appendix A
_ IA Design Problem to Verify tbe Discrete Event
Framework to Engineer a Reliable Sensor
Fusion System
A.I Introduction
This is an example design problem to verify the different proposed modeling techniques
and algorithms developed in this thesis. The parameters of this design problem have been
chosen to demonstrate the capability of the proposed discrete event framework to deaJ
with worst case sensing scenarios. This design problem is stated in the ronowing section.
A.2 Prnblem Statement
1. The set of sensors is, S={S" Sl, . ,S,}.
2. The sensing sequence is defined in the Table A.I in tenns of phases and periods.
Table A.I: The phases and periods of sensing
Sensors Range of phases (in units) Range of periods (in units)
<Il' :Lowcr limit 4l-:Uppe-rlimit r/:Lowerlimit r":Uppe-rlimit
S, 1900 2000
S, 50 100 1800 2000
S, 200 250 2000 3000
S. '00 400 2000 2000
S, 500 550 '000 3000
S. 600 650 2000 3000
S, 800 850 1000 t 100
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J. The set of conditions is. PC::{Pc" PC;, ..• Pc ll}. The lifetimes of these conditions are
shown in Table A.2.
Table A2: The lifetimes (in units) of the conditions
4. The set of sensors specific periodic processes (activities) is. PE={PE" PE,•...• PE,}.
The service times of these processes are shown in Table A.3.
Table A.3: The service times (in units) of the periodic processes
Pel'"iodic processes
Servic:etimes PE, I PE, I PE, I PE, I PE, I PE, I PE,
Ulwerlimit 10 I 18 I 12 I 14 I 16 I 20 I 25
Upper limit 15 1 22 I 14 I 16 I 19 I 27 I 30
5. The set of aperiodic or conditional processes (activities) is, AE""{AE" AE!. . .• AE.}.
The service limes of these processes are shown in Table A.4.
Table A.4: The service times (in units) of aperiodic processes
Apel'"iodic: processes
Service times AE, 1 AE, T AE, I AE, I AE, I AE, I AE, I AE,
Lower limit 12 1 14 T 15 I 16 I 20 I 18 I 12 I 15
Upper limit 16 r 16r 19 1 20 I 24 I 20 I 14 I 16
6. The relationships between conditions and processes are shown in the Tables A5-A 7.
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Table A.S: Generation ofmaximum number ofconditions (tokens) by periodic processes
The periodic processes
Tbecondltions PEl PE, PE3 PE. PES PE6 PE,
Po, I I 0 0 0 0 0
p,. 0
Po,
Po.
Po,
P~
P~
Po,
P~
Pc"
Pc"
P, T" T" T,. T,. T,. T, T"
Table A.6:Generation of maximum number ofconditions (tokens) by aperiodic processes
Tbe aperiodic processes
The conditions AE[
pC! 0
p"
P'3
p"
P'S
P'6
p"
p"
P"J
PClO
PCll
Pd
o 0 0 0 0 0
Table A.7: Absorption ofconditions by aperiodic processes
The aperiodIc processes
The conditions AEI AE2 AE3 AE4 AES AE6 AE7 AES
Pc, 0 0 0 0
Po,
Po,
p'.
P'-
p'.
Po,
p'.
p'.
Pc,.
Pc"
An event (periodic or aperiodic) will generate conditions by placing tokens in particular
places. For example, aperiodic event AE! can generate the condition Pc. by placing a
token in place Pc•. An event will absorb conditions by removing token from places. For
example, the event AE2 wi!! absorb tokens from places Pc! and Pc,. An event mayor
may not generate conditions (tokens in places). The generation of conditions depends
upon the state of sensing environment (e.g., the periodic process, sensing temperature
sensor, may generate a condition if temperature goes beyond certain threshold value, the
specific value depends upon the sensing requirements ofa particular environment).
These tables represent the discrete requirements of customers in a summarized form. The
infonnation in this tabular fonn will be generated in the requirements definition phase of
the system development. In this phase, each discrete requirement (e.g., the execution of a
particular aperiodic process) will be treated as a separate entity. This approach will
enable the system developer to capture the of user's requirements with fewer errors.
Appendix B
_ IVerification of Discrete Event Requirements
Model of SFS by Simulation
B.llntroduction
L..-JL..-J
Data Acquired
acquisition dala
P,
L-tL-J~
Oata Features Featurf: Decisions Decision
fusicm fusion fusion
Figure 8.1: The Petri net model of the specified example sensor fusion system
The DEVR model of the sensor fusion system as specified in Appendix A is shown in
Fig.8.1. In this modeled SFS, sensor data are acquired in a particular sequence and are
integrated exploiting temporal relationships among these sensed data. In this integration
process, sensor data are integrated in different modes. For example, sensors I and 2 are
playing redundant roles due to the placement of tokens by periodic events PEl and PEl at
the same place Pc, and the requirement ofonly one token by the aperiodic event AE ,. The
mode of data integration from these two sensors can be defined as complementary by
adopting the constraint that AE, needs 2 tokens from the place Pc l . Using the
conventional terminology of sensor fusion the role of these events are shown in Table
8.1.
Table B \. Different levels of data integration in the example SFS
Data acquisition Data fusion Feature fusion Decision fusion
PE,
PE,
Here, in the data fusion level the decisions placed by the event AE., and AE, in place PC II
play redundant role. But they can be complementary if AE1 requires two decisions from
the place PCII •
The input and output functions of the modeled SFS are defined by the following matrices
D- and D· respectively. To define the input function, the feedback from the reasoning
sub-system to the periodic processes shown as dashed arrows have not been considered,
because the reasoning sub-system is outside the scope of this work. To capture the
interaction between the sensor specific periodic processes and aperiodic processes, the
tokens generated by the clock and the phase related processes have not been considered to
define the output function.
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P', PJ~ P', P', P>, P" P" Po, Po, Po, Po, Po, po. Po, po. po. Pe ,a Pen Pd p.
PE, T" 0 0 0 0 I
PE, T>, 0 0 0 I
PE, 0 T" 0 0 0 I
PE, 0 0 n, 0 0 0 I
PE, 0 0 T" 0 0 1
PE. 0 0 0 T,. 0 0 1
PE, 0 0 0 T" 0 0 1
D- - A£, 0 0 0 1 0 0
AE~ 0 0 0 1 0 0
AE, 0 0 0 I 0 0
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0
AE. 0 0 0 0 0 0
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0
HE 0 0 0 0 1 0
(8.1)
Po, Po, Po, Po, Po, Po. Po, Po. Po. Pe,o Pc" P</Po
PE, 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
PE, 1 I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
PE, 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
PE, 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 o 0
PE, 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 00
PE. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 00
PE, 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 00
D' '"' AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 00
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 00
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 00
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 I 0
AE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
AE, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
AE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0
HE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(8.2)
To study the salient features of the modeled sensor fusion system, the matrix D- defining
the input function can be partitioned into a number of sub-matrices. The first one is at the
leftmost lOp comer as shown below.
T" 0
T"
0 T"
D-J_ 0 0 T,. (B.3)
0 0 n,
0 0 TSII
0 0 0 T"
According to this proposed framework, every sensor is periodically sensed with unique
periodic process. Therefore, the number of periodic processes is equal to lhe number of
sensors and the diagonal matrix represents the relationship among them. So, if this sub~
matrix of a modeled SFS is other than a diagonal matrix, lhe system has not been
modeled properly using this framework. For a system of n number of sensors, this sub-
matrix is a n x n diagonal matrix; where the diagonal elements are the sensing periods of
the corresponding sensors.
The second sub-matrix is at the left-most bottom one relating the places PS" .Ps
"
AE" ...,AE., and HE as shown below.
o
o
o
o
D- 2= 0
o
o
o
o
00
o 0
00
00
00
00
o 0
o 0
00
(BA)
This is a null matrix. According to this framework, the clock drives only the periodic
processes; therefore aperiodic processes do not have any direct link. with the clock. So,
for a modeled SFS if this sub-matrix is other than null, the system has not been modeled
correctly using this framework. For a system of n sensors, this sub-matrix is a matrix of n
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column and any number of rows. The number of rows will depend upon the nwnber of
aperiodic events.
The third sub-matrix is at the top+most right comer in the input definition matrix 0-.
This sub~matrix relates the periodic events PEl' .,P~with PCW··,Pc ll • P4• and Po.
'0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0-3~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (B.5)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
According to this modeling framework, tokens in the output places of periodic and
aperiodic events. and house keeping event do not drive the periodic events. Only the
token in the place Po drives the periodic events. Therefore. all the elements, except those
of the right·most column of this sub-matrix, are zero and all the elements of the right
most column are 1. If the matrix D- .3 does not satisfy this criteria., the modeled system
has a flaw according to this framework. If there are n number of sensors. p conditionaL
places, this third sub-matrix dimension is (n x p+2).
The fourth sub-matrix defines the generation of all aperiodic events and this is at the right
bottom part of the input definition matrix as shown below. Here. the rows are the
aperiodic events AE I , •••AE. and the columns are places for the conditions Pc l , ...PCII •
I I
01
01
I 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
00
00
00
00
00
I I
00
00
(B.6)
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The number of non-zero element in a column is the possible value of the token placed in
that place. For example, if the token in place Pc! represents the size of a targct, in this
case the target may have three different sizes (e.g.• small, medium, big). These different
values or color of token (e.g., size of the target) are used in this model for branching to
generate appropriate events to address the issue of detection of different sizes of targets.
The presence of more than one number in a cell indicates that the corresponding place
receives the same token from more than one process (e.g., periodic sensor sensing). These
redundant tokens may be used by the corresponding event [0 increase reliability. If there
are m nwnber of aperiodic processes and fI number of conditional places, the dimension
of this matrix is a m x fl.
The 5th sub-matrix relates aperiodic processes AE!>..,~, Pol with Po as shown in
Eq.(B.7). This is a null matrix, because the tokens in the places Pol and Po do not generate
aperiodic events according to this modeling formalism. The rows of this matrix represent
aperiodic events and the columns correspond to Poland Po. If there are m aperiodic events,
the dimension of this matrix is m x 2.
00
00
o 0
o 0D-5'"
00
00
00
00
(B.7)
The input relationship of the house keeping event, HE, with the conditional places,
Pc l , ...Pc ll , Pol and Po is shown by the sixth sub-matrix given in Eq.(B.8). All the elements
of this matrix arc zero except the second element from the right. IT there are n conditional
places, the dimension of the matrix is /ll: n+2.
D-.6=[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 ° 0 I oj (B.8)
The partitioning process for Ihe input definition matrix can be repeated for the output
definition matrix o· to reveal more features of Ihe modeled system. The generation of
the tokens in the places, Pcl,...•Pc ll • by all periodic and aperiodic events,
PEw..,PE,.AEI.....AE., is shown by the top left-most sub-matrix of the output definition
matrix as shown below. Here, the rows represent the events and the columns are places.
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
O·j .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (8.9)
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multiple non-zero elements in a particular column indicate that the corresponding events
are playing redundant role by generating tokens in the same place. For a system of m
events (both periodic and aperiodic) and n conditional places the size of this matrix is m x
n. According to this modeling paradigm. the possible values of an element of this matrix
areOor I.
The tenninal events are identified by the 2nd sub-matrix of the output definition matrix
relating all periodic and aperiodic events with the place p~ as shown in Eq.(B.10). This
matrix has been represented in transpose fonn.
0·2 .. (0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 0 1JT (8.10)
1"
The events corresponding to the non-zero elements of this matrix are terminal events. In
this present example, the tenninal events are AE,• AE•• AEs. According to this design
formalism. all the elements of this sub-matrix must not be zero.
The third one is a nuU matrix relating all periodic and aperiodic events with the place Po
as shown below in transpose form.
D~.J .. [O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o]r (B.II)
The forth sub-matrix relates the token generation of the housekeeping event, HE, with all
conditional places. Pd and Po as shown in Eq.(B.12). According to this framework. all the
elements of this sub-matrix are zero except the right most one.
D·.4-[O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I) (B.12)
The check of the characteristics of these sub-matrixes for a particular modeled SFS will
enable the designer to have a preliminary check to ensure that the system has been
modeled according to this formalism. Due to the numerical nalure of these verification
techniques, software based automation is quiet feasible for this work. It's the author's
understanding that this automation has the potential to improve the accuracy of the design
and speed up the design process. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that this
formalism wiU enable the designer to partially avoid faults at the very early stage of
system development resulting in better reliability of system performance.
The execution path analysis will enable the designer 10 check logical and temporal
correctness of the modeled system. The technique of this execution path analysis is
depicted in the following sub-section.
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B.2 Execution Path and Time Analysis
Parallel
(pr)
Brmching
(brl
The value (i.e., color) of a token in a ,----------,
place is used by the SFS for branching
decision. The execution of a process (i.e.,
service of an event) may generate tokens
in morc than one place resulting in
parallel operation of multiple processes.
This concept is depicted in Fig.B.2. The FIgure B.2. The branchmg and parallel
underlying computing system may execute operations in the Petri net model of the SFS.
these parallel processes simullaneously or sequentially.
B.2.1 Execution Paths From the First Sensor
The sequence ofexecution ofdifferent processes to serve the sensing requirements of the
1st sensor is shown in Fig. 8.3.
P,
AE,
Figure B.3. The execution paths from the periodic process PEl to serve the sensing of
the 1st sensor.
ISO
The execution paths to serve the first sensor are defined by the following equations
S,.p,""PE"AE,
S,.p,=PE"AE"AE,.AE,
S,.p,=PE,.AE..AE.,AE.
The maximum total time to serve the event of periodic sensing ofthe first sensor is
(B.13)
(B. 14)
(B.15)
Spt= max { (PE,.t+AE,.t), (pE,.t+AE•.t+AE,.t+ AE•.t+AE•. t)} (B.16)
for sequential execution of two paralJetizable processes AE. and AE, ,or
S,.t= max{ (pE,.t+AE,.t), (PE,.t+AE•.t+max.(AE,.I, AE.,.t)+AE•.t)} (B.17)
for parallel executions or AE6 and AE,.
B.2.2 Execution Paths from the Second Sensor
The execution paths for sensing the second sensor are shown in Fig.SA.
p~!
AEl'f:' AE!f'
~!:! AEo!AEo!
AEo!
Figure 8.4: The execution paths from the periodic process PE,. to serve sensing of the second sensor.
lSI
The execution paths to serve the second sensor are defined by the following equations
S,.p,=PE" AE,
S,.p,=PE" AE., AE., AE.
S,.p,= PE" AE.. AE" AE.
S,.p.=PE" AE" AE., AE.
The maximum total time for periodic sensing of the second sensor is
(B.18)
(B.19)
(B.20)
(B.21)
(B.22)
S,.t=PE,.t+max. {(AE,), (AE.+AE.,+AE,+AE.)}+max. {(AE,+AE.+A.E.),
(AE,+A£.+AE.>l (B.23)
for sequential execution of paralielizable processes, or
S,.t=' PE,.t+max. [max. {(AE,), (AE.+max. (AE., AE,)+AE.)}' max. {(AE,+AE,,+AE.),
(AE,+AE.+AEJ) 1 (B.24)
for parallel execution of para11e1i2able processes.
B.2.3 Execution Paths from the Third Sensor
The execution paths for sensing the third sensor are shown in Fig.B.5.
Figure 8.5: The execution paths from the periodic process P~ to serve sensing of the third sensor.
The execution paths to serve the third sensor are defined by the following equations
S,.p,=PE.. AE., AE" AE,
The maximum total time for periodic sensing of the third sensor is
S,.t= PE,.t+ AE•. t+ AE.,+AE,.t+ AE..I
for sequential execution of paralielizable processes, or
S,.t= PE,.t+ AE,.t+max.( AE,., AE,.t)+ AE,.t
for parallel execution ofparallelizable processes.
8.2.4 Execution Paths from the Fourth Sensor
The execution paths for sensing the fourth sensor are shown in Fig.B.6.
P,
AE,
(B.25)
(B.26)
(8.27)
(B.28)
rEO
AE/\E'
AE'j l~'
IA~
Figure 8.6: The execution paths from the periodic process PE4 to serve sensing of the fourth sensor.
The execution paths to serve the fourth sensor are defined by the following equations
S•.p,=PE" AE,
(B.29)
(B.30)
S,.p,-PE.. AE., AE., At;.
The maximum total time for periodic sensing ofthe fourth sensor is
(B.31)
S•.t= PE•.t+ max. {(AE,.I+ AE.-t+A£. .1), AE,.1, (AE,.t+ AE,..t+A£. .t)} (8.32)
B.2.S Execution Patbs from tbe Fiftb Sensor
The execution paths for sensing the fifth sensor arc shown in Fig.B.8.
AE,
P,
p~j
p'
AE/\:. AE.1
~l ~11P1
~l
Figure B.8: The execution paths from rhe periodic process PEs 10 serve sensing of the fifth sensor.
The execution paths to serve the fifth sensor arc defined by the following equations
(B.33)
(B.34)
(B.3S)
(B.36)
The maximum lolal time for periodic sensing ofrhe fifth sensor is
1>4
S•. t= PE,.t+ [max. {(AE,.t+ AB•.t), (AE,.t+ AE,.t) }+ AE,.t+(AE..t+ AE,.t)]+A.E..t
(B.37)
for sequential execution ofparallelizable processes, or
S,.t- PE,.t+ max. [max. {(AE,.t+ ~.t), (AE,.t+ AE,.t) }, AE,.t+max. (Mo.t,
AE,.t)]+AE..t (B.38)
for parallel execution of paralielizable processes.
B.2.6 Execution Patbs From tbe Sixth Sensor
The execution paths for sensing the sixth sensor is shown in Fig.B.9.
p.
Figure 8.9: The execution paths from the periodic process PE6 to serve sensing of the
sixth sensor.
The execution paths to serve the sixth sensor are defined by the following equations
S6·PI=PE., AE,
S6·P!=PE., AE" AE,
The maximum total time for periodic sensing of the sixth sensor is
S•.t=' PE.,.t+( AE,.t+ AE,..t+AE".t)
for sequential execution of para11elizable processes, or
(B.39)
(B.'O)
(BAI)
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S•.t"" PE"t+max. { AE•. t, (AE,.t+A£..t) }
for parallel execution of parallelizable processes.
B.2.7 Execution Paths from the Seventh Sensor
The execution paths for sensing the seventh sensor are shown in Fig.B.1 O.
(B.42)
Figure RIO. The executIon paths from the penodlc process PE7 to serve senSing of the
seventh sensor.
The execution paths to serve the seventh sensor are defined by the roUowing equations
The maximum total time for periodic sensing of the seventh sensor is
S7.r- PE,.t+(AE,.t+ AE,.I+A£..t)
for sequential execution of parallelizable processes, or
(8.43)
(B.44)
(B.45)
5,.1= PE,.t+max. {AE,.t, (AE,.t+AE..t)} (8.46)
for parallel execution ofparallelizable processes.
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B.3 Repetitiveness and Reacbability Analysis
To facilitate the reachability and repetitiveness analysis the service sequence ofdifferent
events are summarized in tabular ronn as shown in Table 8.2.
Table B.2: The summary of the execution path analysis
Execution paths Periodic Events· Aperiodic Events
,.p,"PE"AE,
,.p,-PE,.AE.,AE."Afa
,.p,"PE,,AE,,AE..AEa
,.p,-PE"AE,
,.p,. p~ AE,. AE" AE.
,.p."'PE" AE" AE.. AEa
,.p,- PE..-, AE,. AE.. AE.
~·PI"'PE" AE.., AE,., AEo
,.p,-PE"AE"Af.o.AEa
•.p,-PE"AE,
,·P.·p£... AE" A£" AEa
,.p,"PE"A.E"AEo,AEo
•.p,=PE,. AE,. AE" AEo
.p,"'PE,. AE" AE.. AE•
•.p."PE" AE.. AE" AE,
•.p,-PE",AE,
,.p,-PE", AE" A£,
,.p,-PE,.AE,
A few salient features of this fonnalism can be highlighted from the design data
summarized in the above table. It should be noted that this proposed design formalism of
SFS considers that for each sensor there must be a unique periodic event. The validity of
the design to satisfy this proposition can be justified by checking the columns of the
periodic events for each execution path. To satisfy this proposition each execution path
serves only one periodic event (Le., only one cell in the periodic events area is marked for
each execution path).
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In this proposed framework ofSFS, the sensing operation is periodic in nature. To verifY
this repetitiveness criterion a simplified model of the SFS is shown in Fig.B.l\. In this
simplified representation only the terminal events (AE"AE.. AE,) and the periodic events
are shown.
The periodic
(e.g.. PE" ...,P~) are
generated at regular
intervals of time. Now
if there is at least one
execution path from
each periodic event
ending in anyone of
the terminal events
(e.g., AE"AEI.AEs),
the operations of the
designed SFS will be
periodic in nature. To
PE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
satisfY this requirement Figure B.ll: The Simplified Petri net model of the example
at least one cell of the SFS to understand the problem of verification of repetitiveness
column of each periodic event should be marked and at least one shaded cell of the same
row should be marked. The design data summarized in the table for this example SFS
satisfy this criterion. Therefore, this designed SFS is repetitive.
{feach member of all the events (both periodic and aperiodic) is executed by at [east one
execution path, it can be concluded that every event is reachable. To satisfy this
proposition each colunm of the events as shown in the table must be checked at least one
and this is satisfied for the design of this example SFS.
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B.4 The Sensing Sequence Analysis
The total sensing time of each sensor considering minimum event service time and
sequential execution of the corresponding processes is shown in the following Table 8.3.
Table B 3' The summary of sensing time estimation
Sensors Execution time relating equations Sensing time
S, S,.t'" maxI (PE,.l+AE,.I), (PE,.t+AE••t+AE,.t+ AE".t+AE•.l)f max..(22,53) 53
-max.{ (10+12), (10+16+12+15l}
S, S:.!"" PE.:.t+max. {(AE,), (AE,+AE.+AE,+AE,.)}+ 18+max.(l2,
max.{(AE:+AE,,+AEo). (AE,+AE,,+AE,,) 61) 125
-18+max.{ (12), (16+18+12+15)}+max.{14, 15}+18+15 +15+33
S, S,.t- PE,.t+ AE•.t+ AE,.+AE,.!+ AE•.t 61 61
-12+16+18+15
S, S,.t- PE•. t+ max. ({~.I+ AE".t+AE" .1), AE,.!. (AE,.t+
AE,.I+AE,.l)} 14> 61
"14+max.{(14+18+15),20,(20+12+15) f max. (47,47)
S, S,.P" PE,.t+ max. {(AE,.t+ AE,..I), (AE,.t+ AE,.t) }+ 16+max.{32, 109
AE,.t+(AE,..t+ AE,.t)+AEa.! 32)+16+30+15
-16+ max.{ (14+18), (20+12)}+16+(18+12)+15
S. S•. t- PE".t+( AE,.l+ A£,.t+AE.,.I) 67 67
-20+20+12+15
S, s,.t-PE.,.t+{AE,.I+AE,.t+AEo·t) 72 72
- 25+20+12+15
The time for house keeping operation isr-------------,
Sensing time distribution
more or less constant for each sensing
sequence and has been assumed to be zero
for simplicity in remaining calculations
The distribution of the sensing time of
each sensor can be shown in graphical
fonn as in Fig.B.12. Here, the minimum
sensing time is 53 units for S, and
m",im= " ..ing tim, i, 125 unit> fo, '--F,gure--B.-12.-0-"tn-b-ut-wn-o-f,-,n-"n-g-tom-,,-o--'f
S2' different sensors.
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A plot of the sensing sequence using initially user's deftned sensing phase (max. phase),
frequency (min. frequency) is shown in Fig.B.l3. This plot shows the available and
required total sensing time for each sensor.
5,r-•., , , .. , , ,.. ,.".,., , , , , , .
5'1·'·· L , , ; i. , .
5'1·;······,····,····;···"_,···,··,··,,
5'1'·'········<
5. 1 ..; ; , , .
S,!cO-5f,;O--+"100~""--""
!c.1 ~!
Figure 8.13: The sensing sequence using user's initial specification.
•••
922 2000
From this plot it appears that in the first sequence of sensing, except one instance, there is
no overlapping of sensing times and the first sequence of sensing finishes before the
beginning of the second sequence. Therefore, the distribution of phase needs little
modification to avoid this overlapping 10 make the SFS implementable on a single
processor.
II is now worthwhile to go back to the proposed theory of sensing phase and periods
distribution. From the initial investigation of the specified phase it seems that the phase
grain size, gp:::150 satisfies the initial condition, which is larger than the largest sensing
time, 125. Now, all the phases should be integral multiple of this grain. Therefore, the
proposed modified phases are shown in the Table 8.4.
Table 8.4: The modified phases of the sensors.
s,
Phases 0
s,
150
s,
300
Sensors
s,
450
s,
600
s.
750
s,
900
This modification in phase value will avoid detected overlapping of sensing time in the
first sequence as shown in the previous figure. If the client agrees with this modification,
the first sequence of sensing is free from overlapping.
Now according to the theory, the grain size of the periods should be larger than the sum
of the longest phase and the corresponding sensing time, and should be an integral
multiple of phase grain size. In this case, Gp=1050 is a reasonable choice. Now all the
periods should be integral multiple of this grain size. To satisfY this condition the slightly
modified periods are shown in the following Table B.S.
Table 8.5: The periods of the sensors.
Sensors
Ts,
Periods 2100 2100 3150 3150 3150 3150 1050
If the client agrees with this modification, according to the theory th.ere will be no overlap
in the sensing time. This can be verified by planing the sensing time in the second
sequence of sensing as shown in Fig. 8.14.
With respect to this design data this SFS can accommodate a maximum of7 sensors. The
sensor's number can be increased either by decreasing the maximum sensing time (in this
case the sensing time of the second sensor is 125) or increasing the smallest period. It
should be noted that in the 2nd sequence of sensing the system is idle for a long period of
time. The CPU utilization factor of this system is shown below
U(3900+ 67)" (53+125+61 +61+ 109+ 67 +;:~+~~~+ 53+ 125+61+ 61 + 109 +67) ,. ~:~ '" 27.67%
(B.47)
lOl
5,
S,
5,
5,
-
5,
5, ...
S,
I' 20 21 22 2J 24 27 2829 30 31 12
."••. h~5 "... I ••••• ~'~I~l~
Figure 8.14. The sensmg ttmes dunng the second phase ofsensmg.
This simulation study has shown the use of the proposed novel technique (chapter 2) to
model the requirements afthe example sensor fusion system (Appendix A). Through the
execution path analysis technique the temporal and logical correctness of the modeled
SFS has been studied. The repetitiveness and reachability analysis has been performed.
The overlapping of the sensing periods has been identified by the analysis of sensing
sequence and that has been avoided by the use of the technique proposed in chapler 2.
The resource utilization factor of this example SFS has been measured by the proposed
method (section 2.7).
162
Appendix C
_ IVerification of Discrete Event Specifications
Model of SFS by Simulation
C.I Introduction
Every aperiodic event of the DEVR model as shown in appendix B will be served by the
interactions of a set of computing components. It has been assumed that the size of this set is /6.
The lower and upper limits of computation times of these components are shown in Table Cl.
These limits have been selected randomly and vary from 1 to 4 units of time. The input and
output conditions of these components are selected randomly as well and shown in the same
table. The sequential, branching, looping and parallel operations afthe computing components to
serve an event have been considered here. It has been assumed that every event in DEVR model
has appropriate unique I/O interfaces requiring very smB.ll execution times.
Table Cl: The specification of a set of computing components.
Components Execution times va conditions
Lower limit Upper limit fnputs Outputs
0, 3.6 3.6 2 I
C, 3.9 4.0 3 2
0, 3.8 4.0 I 2
0. 3.2 3.4 3 I
0, 4.0 4.0 I I
'"
2.S 3.0 2 I
C, LS 2.0 2 2
'"
3.2 3.6 2 3
'"
3.4 3.8 I 2
0" 2.1 2.3 2 I
0 .. 3.2 3.4 2 2
0 .. 3.2 4.0 2 I
0 .. 2.0 2.1 I I
0 .. 2.7 3.0 I 2
0 .. 3.5 3.7 2 I
0" 2.8 3.0 I I
C.2 The Decomposition of Aperiodic Events in Terms of Interactions
among the Computing Components
The eight aperiodic events of the DEVR model of the example sensor fusion system as modeled
in appendix B will be served by the execution of a set of computing components as shown in
Table C.l. Each execution path of these interactions is analyzed 10 compute the total execution
times required to serve these aperiodic events.
C.2.l The Decomposition of the Aperiodic Event AE1
The representation of the aperiodic event AE, with the interaction of the computing components
is shown in Fig. c.t.
~p".;~:\pj :'Pc : .!"'.".,/
Figure C.I: The decomposition of the aperiodic event AE I .
The execution paths to serve the aperiodic event AE, is shown by the following equations:
(0)
(0)
(C3)
The maximum total computation time to serve the event AE I is
for sequential execution of parallelizable components, or
for parallel execution ofparallelizable components.
The objective is to maximize the execution time of each computing component with the
constraint that the total execution time of the constituting components does not exceed the
allocated service time of the corresponding aperiodic event in the DEVR model. The maximum
and minimum values of total computation time to serve the event AE1 for sequential execution of
parallelizable components are shown by the following two relations.
S"E1.c",..- 0 +2x2.0+ 2.1 +max.(4.0, 3.0)+ 2.1=4.0+2.1+4.0+2.1"'12.2 (C.6)
S"EI'!"';."=' 0 +2x:1.8+ 2.0 +max.(4.0, 2.8)+ 2.0=3.6+2.0+4.0+2.CFI1.6 (C.?)
From the above two equations, it appears that S"E1.t"... exceeds the allocated service time of AEI
specified by the DEVR model, but S"EI.1,m, is lower than the allocated total time. Here, a decision
should be made to reduce the computation times of appropriate computing components. It should
be noted that these components will be used to serve other aperiodic events within temporal
constraints defined by the DEVR model. A few salient features of the effect of the reduction of
computing time ofa component on the total execution time can be explained by an example. For
example, if the execution time of C, is reduced by .1 unit, the total execution time of the
components 10 serve the event AE, is reduced by .lx2=.2 units. On the other hand, the reduction
of execution time of the component c" from 3.0 units to 2.8 units does not have any effect on the
total execution time. The effect of the reduction of computing time of each computing
component on the service times of all aperiodic events should be studied before the selection of
computing time of any component to maximize the total reduction of execution times 10 serve all
the aperiodic events.
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C.2.2 The Decomposition of the Aperiodic Event AE2
The representation of the aperiodic event AE! with the interaction of the computing components
is shown in Fig. C.2.
Figure C.2: The decomposition of the aperiodic event ~.
The execution paths 10 serve the aperiodic event~ is shown by the following equations:
(e.S)
(e.9)
(C.10)
(e.ll)
The maximum total computation time to serve the event~ is
for sequential execution of parallelizable components, or
for parallel execution ofparallelizable components.
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Therefore, using the sequential execution ofall the components
S...E2.t"...=O+3.6+4.o+max.(2.1,3.0)+4.0+0=7.6+3.0+4J)=14.6 (C.14)
S"'E2.l".;,,-O+3.6+4.O+max.(2.0, 2.8)+3.2+0=7.6+2.8+3.2=13.6 (C.15)
The S"'E2.t"... exceeds the allocated lower limit of service time for AE2, but it is smaller than the
upper limit of the allocated time. On the other hand, S"'E2.t",;. is even lower than the lower limit of
the allocated service time.
C.2.3 The Decomposition of the Aperiodic Event AE)
The representation of the aperiodic event AE) with the interactions of the computing components
is shown in Fig. C.3. The execution paths to serve the event AEJ is shown by the following
equations:
......
(C.16)
(C.17)
(C.18)
(C.i9)
Figure C.3: The decomposition of the aperiodic event~.
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The maximum total computation time to serve the event AEl is
for sequential execution of parallelizable components, or
for parallel execution of parallelizable components.
Therefore, using the sequential execution of all the components
SAE,.t,..;~'::()+3.5+4.0+3.2+max.(2.0,3x3.2)+0=10.7+9.6"'20.3, and (C.22)
SAE,.t........::()+3.7+4.0+4.o+max.(2.1, 3x3.4)+o=II.7+ t 0.2"'21.9 (C.23)
Here, the minimum execution time (20.3 units) to serve the aperiodic event AE} is higher than
the upper limit (19 units) of the service time defined in the DEVR model.
C.2.4 The Decomposition oftbe Aperiodic Event AE..
The representation of the aperiodic event AE4 with the interaction of the computing components
is shown in Fig. CA.
Figure CA: The decomposition of the aperiodic event AE...
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The execution paths to serve the aperiodic event AE. is shown by the following equations:
(C.24)
(C.2S)
(C.26)
(07)
The maximum total computation time to serve the event AE4 is
SAE..t = AEH.t + c•.t +cz.t+4 C".t + c•. t + AE•.o.t (C.28)
for sequential execution of parallelizable components, or
SAE..t = AE•.i.t + c1 .t + max.(C:2.t , 4 clI.t) + c,.t + AE•.o.t (C.29)
for parallel execution of parallelizable components.
Therefore, using the sequential execution of all the components
SAE,.t"..,..=0.0+3 .6+4.0+4x3.4+3.4+0.0=7.6+13.6+3.4=24.6 (C.30)
SAE..t",;n= O.0+3.2+3.9+4x 3.2+3.2+0.0=-7.1+12.8+3.2-23.1 (C.31)
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C.2.5 The Decomposition of the Aperiodic Event AEs
The representation of the aperiodic event AEs with the interaction of the computing components
is shown in Fig. C.S.
Figure C.S: The decomposition of the aperiodic event AEs.
The execution paths to serve the aperiodic event AEs is shown by the following equations:
(C.32)
(C.33)
(C.34)
(05)
(C.36)
(C.37)
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The maximum total computation time to serve the event AE, is
SAE,.t = AEs_;.t + c, .t +c,..t + 4 CII.t +max. (c•.t. clJ.t. c,.t) + AE5.0.t (C.38)
for sequential execution of parallelizable components. or
SAE,.t => AElJ"t + C, .t + max.(~.t. 4 cll.t) + max. (c•.t. cll.t. cs.t) + AEs •. t (C.39)
for paraJleI execution of parallelizable components.
Therefore. using the sequential execution of all the components
SAE•. t,.,...=O.0+3.6+4.0+4x3A+max. (3.4. 2.1. 4.0)+O.0=7.6+13.6+4.D-25.2 (CAO)
SAE,.!:",;.= 0.0+3.2+3.9+4x 3.2+max. (3.2. 2.0. 4.0)+0.0=7.1+12.8+4.0=23.9 (CAl)
C.2.6 Tbe Decomposition of tbe Aperiodic Event AE,
The representation of the aperiodic event AE6 with the interaction of the computing components
is shown in Fig. C.6.
Figure C.6: The decomposition of the aperiodic event AE6 .
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The execution paths to serve the aperiodic event AE6 is shown by the following equations:
(C.'2)
(C.'3)
(C.44)
(C.")
(C.46)
The maximum total computation time to serve the event AE6 is
for sequential execution ofparallelizable components, or
for parallel execution ofpara1lelizable components.
Therefore, using the sequential execution orall the components
SAE".1mu =O.0+3.O+max.(4.0, 3.0)+4.0+4.0+3.7+0.0=3.0+4.0+1 t.7=18.7 (C.49)
SAE,.t,..,6 =O.0+2.8+max.(4.0, 2.8)+4.0+3.2+3.5+0.0=2.8+4.0+10.7=17.5 (C.50)
C.2.7 The Decompositioo of tbe Aperiodic Eveot AE7
The representation of the aperiodic event AE, with the interaction of the computing components
is shown in Fig. C.7.
Figure C.7: The decomposition of the aperiodic event AE,.
The execution paths 10 serve the aperiodic evenl AE, is shown by the following equations:
SAE,·PJ=~.;'C;,A.E,-O
The maximum total computation time to serve the event AE, is
for sequential ex~ution ofparalleLizable components, or
SAE.,.t = AE,.;.t + max. (3 cll .t , 2 C;.t )+ AE,.•. t
for parallel execution of parallelizable components.
Therefore, using the sequential execution of all the components
SAE.,.t.n.... =0.0+ 3x3.4+ 2x2.0+0.O=-lO.2+4.0=14.2
SAE•. t".;. -o.0+3x3.2+2xl.8+O.0=9.6+3.6=13.2
(CSl)
(C.52)
(C53)
(C.S4)
(C.SS)
(CS6)
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C.2.S The Decomposition of the Aperiodic Event AEs
The representation of the aperiodic event AE, with the interaction of the computing components
is shown in Fig. C.8.
..•..-....
Pc" f AEa \ Pd
0-+K)
Figure e.8: The decomposition of the aperiodic event AE..
The execution paths to serve the aperiodic event AE1 is shown by the following equations:
The maximum total computation time to serve the event AE, is
SAE•.t= AE.,;.t+C" .t+C6 .t+3 cl.t + AE'.o.t
for sequential execution of parallelizable components, or
SAE••t= AE..;.t +c".t+ max. (c6.t, 3 cl.t)+ AE,.•. t
for parallel execution of parallelizable components.
Therefore, using the sequential execution of all the components
(C.S7)
(C.S8)
(C.59)
(C.OO)
SAE,.t"..,. =0.0+3.4+ 3.0+ 3x2.0+0.0=3.4+3+6.0=12.4 (C.61)
SAE,.t.m, =O.0+3,2+2.8+3xl.8=6.O+S.4=II.4 (C.62)
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C.3 The Optimization of the Execntion Times of the Compnting
Components
For this optimization problem. the minimum service times for the aperiodic processes have been
considered. The specified service times for the aperiodic events, attainable service times
considering minimum and maximum executions aCthe corresponding computing components are
shown in Table C.Z. For this optimization problem. it has been assumed that the parallellizable
components have been executed sequentially on a single processor based computing system.
Table C.2: The minimum service limes of the aperiodic events and the corresponding attainable
service times.
Aperiodic processes Allocated service lime Attainable minimum Attainable maximum
execution times execution times
~I- 12 11.6 12.2
AE; 14· 13.6 14.6
AE, IS 20.3 21.9
AB, 16 23.1 24.6
A?$__ .,: 20 23.9 25.2
AE, 18 17.5 18.7
AE, 12 13.2 14.2
AB, IS 11.4 12.4
The allocated service times for AEI,~ and AE6 are within the range of attainable minimum
and maximum execution times. For these aperiodic processes, the optimization technique as
proposed in section 3.3 will maximize the allocated execution times of the corresponding
computing components. For AEI , the allocated service time is even greater than possible
maximum execution times of the corresponding components. Therefore. optimization technique
will have no effect on allocation time of this event.
The allocated service times of AE.:J. AE4, AEs• and AE1 are even higher than the attainable
minimum execution times. rn this case, it is the job of the designer to bring the allocated service
times of these events within the range of the attainable minimum and maximum execution times.
The designer can change the sensing strategy or redefine the interaction of components to serve
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these events, or can negotiate with the clients to redefine the system requirements. For this
present analysis, it has been assumed that due to the change of the system requirements the
allocated service times of the aperiodic events AEJ • AE4, AEl> and~ are 21, 24, 24 and 14
units respectively. The modified service times are shown in Table C.3.
Table C.3: The modified minimum service times of the aperiodic events and the corresponding
attainable service times
Aperiodic processes Allocated service time Attainable minimum Attainable maximum
execution times execution times
AE I 12 11.6 12.2
~ 14 13.6 14.6
AE] 21 20.3 21.9
AE4 24 23.1 24.6
AEs 24 23.9 25.2
AE6 18 17.5 18.7
AEr 14 l3.2 14.2
AE, 15 11.4 12.4
The equations to calculate the total execution times of the correspondmg computmg components
to serve these aperiodic events are shown in the Table CA.
Table C.4: The aperiodic events and the execution times of their corresponding computing Iraces
to serve them
Aperiodic events The execution times of the traces to serve aperiodic events
Now the execution times of the corresponding computing components should be optimized
according to the proposed technique as explained in Section 3.3.
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From preliminary investigation. the components of the specified set as shown in Table C.l which
do not take part in serving these events can be sorted out as shown in Table C.5.
Table C.S: The aperiodic events and the corresponding computing components.
Events Computing components
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
The components c,. c... c,.. and c,.
did not take part in serving these
eight aperiodic events. Therefore,
the optimization of their values will
not be considered here.
It should be noted that there is maxb
(maximum time of the branches)
operator in the equations to
compute the attainable service times
of the aperiodic events by executing
the corresponding components as
shown in Table C.4. Therefore. the
linear optimization will not work
here. The flow chart of the adopted
optimization algorithm is shown in
Fig. C.9.
Figure C.9: Flow chart for optimization.
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It look 2/ iterations for the optimization of this present problem. After the optimization, the
specified execution times ofthe computing components are shown in Table C.6.
Table C.6: Optimized execution times of the computing components.
Components EXCi::ution times Optimized times
Lower limit Upper limit
C, 3.6 3.6 3.6
C, 3.9 4.0 3.9
C, 3.8 4.0 4.0
c. 3.2 3.4 3.4
C, 4.0 4.0 4.0
c. 2.8 3.0 2.8
C, 1.8 2.0 1.8
Co 3.2 3.6 3.3
Co 3.4 3.8 3.8
Coo 2.1 2.3 2.3
C" 3.2 3.4 3.2
c,: 3.2 4.0 3.2
C" 2.0 2.1 2.0
C" 2.7 3.0 3.0
C" 3.5 3.7 3.5
Coo 2.8 3.0 3.0
The service times of the aperiodic events with these new optimized execution times of the
computing components are shown in Table C.7.
Table C.7: The service times of the aperiodic events after optimization
Aperiodic processes Allocated service lime Attainable service times
after optimization
AE, 12
AI;, 14
AE, 21
AE. 24
AE, 2.
AB, 18
AI;, 14
AB, 15
I\.6
(3.8
20.30
23.40
24.00
17.5
13.2
11.4
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At each iteration, this optimization algorithm selects the temporally most critical component to
maximize the overall reduction of the service times of all aperiodic events. The profile of the
selection of these temporally critical components for this present optimization problem is shown
in Table CS.
Table e.8: The selection of temporally critical component at different interations.
No of iterations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to II 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21
Components C II Cll C, C, C,: c,: c,~ c" c" c,: C" c" c, C. C. c" c" c" c. c. c.
The ratio of the total reduction of the service times of all the aperiodic components at each
iteration to the decrement of execution time of the temporally critical component is shown in
Fig.C.IO.
Noofilerarions
Figure C.IO: The ratio oCthe total reduction of the service times ofall aperiodic events to the
decrement of the execution time of the temporally critical component.
This simulation study has shown the mapping of the DEVR model of the example SFS to
components level specifications in an optimized way.
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Appendix D
_ IThe Architecture of the Embedded Computing
System to Implement the Example SFS
0.1 Introduction
The interactions of the computing components for the service of the aperiodic events to realize
the example sensor fusion system as defined in the Appendix A have been shown in Appendix C.
The decomposition of the execution paths as shown in sections C.2.1 •...•C.2.8 reveals that the
components interact in both sequential and parallel ways. It should be noted that paralleJizable
components can be executed both in sequential and parallel fashion. Depending upon the mode
of execution of parallelizable components the architecture of the underlying computing system
can be based on a single node or multiple nodes (processors).
D.2 The Architecture of the Computing System while Parallelizable
Components are Executed in Sequential Fashion
Table 0.1: The maximum total computation times to serve the aperiodic events for the sequential
execution ofparalleLizable component~.
Aperiodic events
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE,
AE.
AE,
AE.
The maximum computation times
S"E,.t ~.i.t + 3 cll .t + 2 e,.t + AE.,.•.t
S"£,.t AEu t+c".t+c6.t+3e,.t+AE..•. t
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The maximum total computation times to serve the aperiodic events AEI.....AEI for sequential
execution of the parallelizable components are shown in Table D.l. The branching operations
have been shown with max'b operator. These equations also show the maximum computational
complexity to serve the corresponding aperiodic events.
0.2.1 Sensor Fusion System (SFS) Running on Dedicated Single Computing Node
If a dedicated computing node is assigned to execute ,---------...,
these computing components as shown in Fig. 0.1, ~venlSQueue
Computing
the waiting time of each component in the queue is • • • systtm
::~ti:e o;e~::m:~neen:fu:::\:v:v~:·e~~ :: '-F-i-gure-O-.,-,-s,-.ng-le-n-od-e-b-",-ed--'
queue) is equal to the corresponding execution time computing system.
only. In this operational scenario, components arrive in the queue only if the qucue is empty. The
addition of extra computing node will not reduce the service times of the aperiodic events.
Therefore, the computing power of this single computing node should be adequate to guarantee
that Ts :S Te for each computing component. As in Appendix B. the maximum utilization factor
of this computing system will be 27,67% to avoid overlapping in the DEVR model. Moreover,
all the components used to estimate the maximum service time of each aperiodic event will not
always be in operation. They will come in operation only if some specific conditions are met
which depend upon the sensing environment. Therefore, the utilization factor of this computing
system will be lower (may be much lower) than 27.67%.
D.2.2 Multiple SFSs Running on Single Computing Node
To increase the utilization factor. multiple SFS can be implemented on the same computing
system. As explained in section 4.6, DEVR models of multiple SFSs can be interlaced to
increase the utilization factor. For this example problem, it has been shown in section B.6 (to
specify sensing sequence) that there are idle periods in the DEVR model of this example SFS. In
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this operational scenario, interlacing lbe DEVR model of anolber SFS with the DEVR model of
this example SFS can increase the utilization factor. Due to the interlacing of the DEVR models,
the components will not wait in the queue of the computing node to be executed resulting in zero
waiting time. Therefore, the computing power of the single computing node should be adequate
enough to guarantee that Ts S Te for each computing component of both the SFSs. The addition
ofextra computing nodes will not increase the system performance in terms of service time.
Figure 0.2: Multiple nodes serve requests from
the same queue resulting in reduced waiting time.
component in the queue as explained in
All the computing components used to calculate the maximum total execution times to serve
these aperiodic events will only come in operafion if certain operating conditions of the sensing
environment are met. Therefore, even in the busy period of the DEVR model the computing node
will not be always busy. Therefore, , ,
multiple DEVR models can be
implemented on a single node to share the
same busy period. In this scheme, the
service time of each computing
component (i.e., the execution time and
the waiting time) will be random due to
the randomness in the waiting time which '- -===:.J
is a function of the arrival rate of the
Section 4.3. Under this operational scenario, the addition of extra node will decrease the
waiting time resulting in reduced service time. The request of the execution of the components
will come to single queue and multiple nodes will use the same queue as shown in Fig. 0.2. The
task coordination unit will make sure that the components belonging to the same SFS do not go
into execution on both the processors.
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D.3 Tbe Arcbitecture of tbe Computing System wbile Parallelizable
Components are Executed in Parallel FasbioD
The maximum total computation times to serve the aperiodic events AE
"
.,AE. for parallel
executions of the parallelizable components are shown in Table 0.2. The parallel operations have
been shown with max.~ operator.
Table 0.2: The maximwn total computation times to serve the aperiodic events for the parallel
executions ofparaJlelizable components.
Aperiodic The maximum computation times
AE, SAE,.t - ~,;.t + max.p (3 cll .t, 2 c,.t)+ AE,o.t
In these execution sequences to serve the aperiodic .--....,...--------,Queue t
events AE"...,AE.., the maximum level of
para!1elization is 3. Therefore, the underlying
computing system may have three independent nodes
with separate queues to achieve higher temporal
performance as shown in Fig. 0.3. In this
architecture the parallelizable components will be
sent to separate queues. For example, to serve the
aperiodic event AE6 the components c), Cll' and CI~
will be executed simultaneously by the three L--=F:-,g-~:-'D::-."'3."':T:-h'-tM:-,,-p-=:-j:-j,:-j,--J
independent nodes I, 2, and 3 respectively thus independent computing nodes to execute
reducing total computational time. paraJlelizable components parallely.
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The utilization factor of this multi-
node based parallel architecture will be
lower than single-node based
architecture. Because, during the
execution of sequentially executable
components the two of three nodes will
remain idle. If it is assumed that the
execution time of each computing
component is equal, the state of
operations of each these of three
computing nodes to serve the aperiodic
event AE. when all the components
come in operation are shown in Fig.
~
o,<rnM'r ~ ~state of
node)
~
Op=tin'rstale of CfIC,. CO'
node 2
f-- -
o,<rnM'rstate of AE... C. C" AE•.onodel
0 I 3 4
FIgure D.4: The operattng states ofdIfferent nodes to
serve the aperiodic event AE•.
D.4. Here, the node 3 and node 2 remain idle during 66% and 33% of the total service time of
AE. respectively.
Different approaches to enhance the overall utilization factor as explained in the previous section
for the single node based system can be applied here too.
The modem computing processors utilize pipelined architecture to exploit instruction level
parallelism in order to reduce the required clock cycles per instruction (CPD. This attribute of
these modem processors contributes to the randomness to the execution time of an instruction.
The instruction execution time depends not only upon the computational complexity of the
instruction alone, but also upon the instructions already in different stages of executions in the
pipeline [63]. This has been explained in the following sub·section.
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D.4 The Randomness in the Execution Time of a Computing Component on
Pipelined Architecture
To understand this problem a closer look can be taken to the pipeline structure of a particular
class of architecture. Due to the superior perfonnance of reduced instruction set computer
(RISe) over compound instruction set computer (elSe), the effect of pipeline structure of the
I\flPS R4000 processor family on the randomness of the instruction execution times has been
studied here. The R4000 uses a eight-stage pipeline structure and sometimes this is called
superpipeline as shown in Fig. D.5 [63]. The pipe stages are labeled and their detailed functions
arc described in the following text.
IS RF EX DF DS TC WB
Figure 0.5: The eight-stage pipeline structure of the R4000 uses pipelined instruction and data
caches [42].
The function of each stage is as follows:
l. IF: First halfofthe instruction fetch.
2. IS: Second half of instruction fetch.
3. RF: Instruction decode and register fetch.
4. EX: Execution.
5. OF: First half of the data fetch.
6. OS: Second half of the data fetch.
7. TC: Tag check.
8. WB: Write back.
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The dependence of the execution time ofan instruction on other instructions already at different
stages ofexecutions in the pipetine is shown in Fig. 0.6.
Clock number
Instruction number I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
WRI IF IS RF EX DF DS TC WB
U>DR2.RI IF IS RF stall stall EX DS
US RJ,RI IF IS stall ,mU RF EX DF
pRR4.RI IF stall ,mU IS RF EX
FIgure 0.6. The dependence of the executIOn lIme ofan mstnlctlon on the instructions
already in execution in the pipeline [63].
The variations of dock cycles per instruction (CPr) for the 10 SPEC92 benchmarks [63] are
shown in Table 0.3. The variations of these pipelined CPIs in graphical fonn are shown in the
Fig.D.7.
Table D.3: The randomness or total pipe1ined cpr and the contributions of the four major sources
ofstalIs are shown [63]
Benchmark Pipeline cpr Load stalls Branch stalls Floating point FP structural
(FP) result stalls stalls
compress 1.20 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.00
eqntott 1.88 0.27 0.61 0.00 0.00
espresso 1.42 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.00
goo 1.56 0.13 0.43 0.00 0.00
Ii 1.64 0.18 0.46 0.00 0.00
IDteger 1.54 0.16 0.38 0.00 0.00
average(lA)
doduc 2.84 0.01 0.22 1.39 0.22
mdjdp2 2.66 0.01 0.31 1.20 0.15
""
2.17 0.00 0.46 0.59 0.12
hydro2d 253 0.00 0.62 0.75 0.17
su2cor 2.18 0.02 0.07 0.84 0.26
FP average 2,48 om 0.33 0.95 0.18
Overall 2.00 0.10 0.36 0.46 0.09
average(OA)
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The CPI of SPEC92 benchmarks
Figure 0.7 The variations ofthe MIPS R400O's pipeiined cpr ofSPEC92 benchmarks
Table 0.4: The statistics of the variations ofCPI ofSPEC92 benchmarks
Maximwn Minimwn Average Variance (Max.~Min)"100IMin
2.84 1.20 2.00 .21 164%
The statistics of the randomness of the MIPS pipelined CPI of SPEC92 benchmarks is shown in
Table 0.4. In this study, it appears that the maximum clock cycles per instruction (CPO is 164%
higher than the minimum CPI. Therefore, it is not reasonable to depend on the cpr values to
calculate the time required executing a computing component on modem pipelined processing
units. It is recommended to run the computing component on those CPUs to estimate the time
required for its execution. If this point is not considered in the implementation phase of the SFS,
the system may suffer setback to satisfy the temporal specifications of the DEVR and OEVS
models. This setback will result in the development of less reliable sensor fusion system.
Therefore, the consideration of this limitation (from temporal point of view) of modem central
processing units will help us realize reliable sensor fusion system.
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D.S Randomness in Execution Time of a Computing Component on
Hierarchical Memory Arcbitecture
Memory Level Access time
computing components is shown in Fig. 0.9.
Table 0.5: Typical values ofaecess times of
different levels of memory.
fD"kl~
Disk array 5ms
Main Memory 70 os
CPU Registers A few clock cycles
Cache (SRAMs) 25 ns
To understand the eontribution of the hier.uchical ,-------------,
memory architecture of modern computing
system on the randomness of the execution times
of the computing components it can be asswned
that the system has caehe (internal and external),
main memory and disk storage. These four levels
of memory hierarchy with increasing capacity and
decreasing speed as shown in FigD.8 [62). The
data transfers sequence between successive levels
of memory hierarchy during the execution of the I...,=~=.;;;;;;;;::;;;;;;:;:;;;;~
'&U'"
To quantify the effect of the presence of
required data in panicular level of memory 00
the execution time ofan instruction, the typical
values of access times of different levels of
memory are shown in Table 0.5 [62].
Figure 0.9:0a13 transfer between adjacenllevels
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The data access time in disk is 4xl<f times ltigher than that in Cache. Therefore, the availability
of data required for the execution of a particular computing component at different memory
levels will contribute highly to the total execution time of that component.
The memory reference patterns for the execution of the computing components are caused by the
following locality properties [62),[63J:
I. Temporal locality
2. Spatial locality
3: Sequential locality
The spatial and sequential localities depend upon the memory access patterns of a particular
component. The temporal locality not only depends upon the memory access pat1ern of the
particular component, but also upon the data distribution at different levels made by the
executions of the past computing components. Therefore, the memory access time during the
execution ofa particular component not only depends upon the data access pattern ofttle code of
that component alone, but also on the data access pattern of the previously executed components.
The sequence ofexeculion of different computing components 10 serve different aperiodic events
is random due to the randomness of the arrival of aperiodic events. This randomness of data
distribution at different memory levels by the previously executed components will cause
randomness in the execution time of a computing component. To explain the problem, the effect
of different memory reference patterns on the execution times ofa computing component can be
considered as shown in Table D.6.
'"
Table D.6: The effect ofdata distribution on the memory access time
Scenarios Data available Data available Data available Total memory
in Cache in Memory in Disk access time in
40% 30% 20010 ",100 ms
30% 40% 30% ",150ms
20% 50% 30% ",,150ms
60% 40% 0% 4300 os
40% 60% 0% 5200 ns
From the data shown in Table 0.6. it is evident that there is a potential of high degree of
randomness in the execution time ofa computing component due 10 the randomness of the initial
data distribution at different memory levels by the previously execmed components. This
randomness in execution time may result in failure of temporal correctness of the execution of
the computing components to serve different events. As a resull the reliability of the system will
suffer.
One of the solutions of this problem may be achieved by flushing the different levels of memory
at the beginning of the execution of each computing component. This will result in a memory
reference pattern of each computing component independent of data distribution caused by the
previously executed components.
[n this study. the rationale for the embedded computing architecture to implement the example
SFS has been explained. The quantitative measure of the sources of randomness of the
component execution times on modem computing hardware has been provided. This finding will
help ensure temporal correctness in execution time.
Appendix E
_ IImprovement of the Reliability and the Required
Overhead for the Incorporation of Hardware
Fault-Tolerance in the Example SFS
E.l Introduction
The example sensor fusion system has seven sensors and these sensors are sensed sequentially. If
it is assumed that this SFS is implemented on a single processor based system and all the sensors
are sensed using the same analog channel, the high·level hardware configuration is as shown in
Figure E.!: The hardware configuration of the example sensor fusion system.
Block 3
Sensor I
Fig.E.!. This study will focus on the improvement ofreliabiHty and the required overhead for the
incorporation of hardware fault-tolerance. The fault-tolerance examined here only addresses the
issues of the failure of sensors. It has been assumed that other components will function properly.
E.2 Hardware, Energy, and Space Overbead to Incorporate Fault-Tolerance
The required overhead to implement fault*tolerance depends upon the techniques used to detect
fault sensors. The voting and estimation are the most prominent fault detection techniques as
explained in Chapter 4.
E.2.1 Overbead to Incorporate Fault-Tolerance Using Voting Technique
Based Faults Detections
If the sensor fault detection scheme is r--------------,
implemented using majority voting
technique, for triple modular
redundancy (TMR) the system will
require 7x3""'2/ sensors and 7 voters.
The Tl\.1R uses three identical sensors
with a majority voter to detennine the
output as shown in Fig.E.2. All these
sensors should be in operation L..._..",._:;:::=:==--,--,--,-,. .J
Figure E.2: Triple modular redundancy
resulting in at least 2000/0 increase in implementation ofsensor I
power to drive the sensor suit. These extra /4 sensors, 7 voters and the required extra energy
source to keep them operational will also require more space. As a result the material and
operation cost will rise. The nature of the applications and enhancement of system reliability may
justify this cost.
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E.2.2 Overhead to Incorporate Fault-Tolerance Using Estimation Technique
Based Faults Detections
In fault-tolerant sensor system using ...- -,
estimation technique based fault det~tion
scheme as shown in Fig. E.3, it is not
necessary to keep all the redundant sensors
operational. This will reduce the energy
overhead in comparison to hardware based
TMR t~hnique. Triple modular Figure E.J: Estimation technique based triple
redundancy based on estimation technique modular redundant sensor system.
will require the same number of sensors (7x3~21). The hardware based TMR system failed after
the failure ofone sensor as shown in the state diagram as shown in Fig.EA (36], but in estimation
based technique the system will be functioning as long as one fault-free sensor is available. As a
result, it appears that the estimation based technique has the potential to have better reliability
profile than voting based fault detection system.
All three sensors
arefunetiooing
One sensor
failed
Two sensors
failed
Tbreesensors
failed
TMRsensorsystem failed
Figure EA: State diagram using Markov's Model showing possible state transitions for
TMRsystem.
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E.3 Reliability Profile of a Fault Tolerant Sensor System Using Voting Based
Fault Detection Scheme
If Rl(t) is the reliability of the first sensor and the other two sensors to support triple modular
redundancy have same reliability, the reliability of the first TMR sensor system is as follows
(E.l)
In a TMR sensor system, as long as two of i----;=::::;:========:;-l
the three sensors are functioning correctly,
the sensor system will perform correctly.
In the above equation the reliability of the
voter has been ignored. The reliability
profile of TMR sensor system in
comparison to the reliability of a single
sensor is shown in Fig. E.5. From this
figure it is evident that the reliability of the '-F""gure=,CE<10 .. 5"',"'h:=e:::e;::;;m:;;p-:;;",::::,:-:;;n""o.,.;~",~~;.,oo,o;1el"''''''b,r.;'',,"YO'''f";'---'
TMR system will be higher only if the TMRsystem consisting of the tluee identical sensor
reliability of a single sensor is more than modules with the reliabilit of a sin Ie sensor.
'.
!se~rIs~~t;m IRi '1---==c.:p~:-7~-----j
j ..
I··,
[1---+7"-+--+-1-------+-----1
50%. In realistic sense, most of the
sensor's reliability is more than 80"10 for
reasonable lifetime. Therefore, this
approach has the potential to increase
system's reliabilily at the cost of extra
overhead. The use of 4-modular
redundancy instead of triple modular
redundancy will require only one
additional sensor. The reliability of 4- '- --'
Figure E.6: The comparison of the reliability
modular sensor system is as follows profile of 4-modular sensor system with those of
TMR sensor system and single sensor.
(E.2)
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The comparison of the reliability of 4-modular redundancy sensor system with the reliabilities of
TMR and single sensor is shown in Fig. E.6. From lhis graph, it appears that the 4-modular
redundancy has much better reliability profile than that of TMR system at the cost of one
additional sensor.
E.4 Reliability Profile of a Fault Tolerant Sensor System Using Estimation
Based Fault Detection Scheme
A triple modular sensor system as shown in Fig. E.3 will function properly as long as one fault-
free sensor is available. It appears that these three sensors are functioning as independent signal
sources; the signal will be available as long as one source is functioning correctly. The following
relation measures the reliability of such syslem:
(E.3)
I',
I",Io'f---++-+--*,---+-,i g••I--I-!----cli"---!--t--,.,."
I ..
Here. the failure of the multiplexer ,------------------,
has been ignored and it has been
assumed that all the sensors have
the reliability. The
comparison of the reliability
profiles of TMR sensor system
using estimation based fault
detection technique with those of
TMR sensor system using voting
technique 10 detect faults. and the '-;==============;;-'
single sensor is shown in Fig. E.7. Figure E.7: The comparison ofreliabitity profiles offault-
tolerant sensor using voting technique based fault detection
From these reliabilities, it appears technique with those of fault-tolerant sensor using estimation
based fault detection technique, and single sensor.that fault-tolerant system using
estimation based fault detection technique has much better reliability profile than that of sensor
system using voting tectmique based fault detection scheme. Moreover, the reliability of the
TrvrR. sensor system using estimation technique is always higher than that of single sensor.
195
E.5 The Comparisoos of the Reliahility Profiles of Different Fault-
Tolerant Sensor Systems and Single Sensor
The graph shown in Fig. E.8 gives a comparison of the reliability profiles of fault-tolerant
systems having different levels of redundancy using voting and estimation techniques for fault
detection.
12010040 60 80
Single sensor reliability R(t)*100
I 1
;,
~ 0.8 f'>'"",,-"'-r+"--7f-r-:+=-"
"~~ O.6f---++--i-r--fi'-\-;;-cc7=-m1
l
~ 0.4 f----cl-f+--+-+;;S=::+--'-.."
~
~ 0.2 f-ff--:+''-7''---+---+----j---t-----j
Figure E.8: The comparison of reliability profiles of fault-tolerant sensor system having different
levels of redundancy using voting and estimation techniques.
From this graph. it appears that the estimation based technique continues to show bettcr
perfonnance than the voting based technique. It should be noted that unlike voting technique the
estimation based technique does not require separate voter for each sensor module. If the
probability of failure of this voter were brought under consideration, the estimation based fault-
tolerant system would show much better perfonnance than voting based technique.
196
Figure .£.9: The ratios of reliability profile of fault-
tolerant sensor system using estimation and voting
teChniques for fault detection.
For more quantitative comparisons of ,-----------------,
the reliability profiles of fault-tolerant
sensor systems using voting and
estimation techniques, the ratios of
the reliability profiles of TMR and 4-
module sensor systems using
estimation to those of TMR and 4-
modular redundant systems using
voting technique are shown in
Fig.E.9. Forbeuercomparisons in the
region of high reliability values, the
ratio profiles have been shown for the
reliability of more than 30% ofa single sensor.
E.6 The Reliability Profile of the Example Sensor Fusion System at Different
Levels of Fusion
The sensor fusion system specified in appendix A will partially fail due to the failure of any
terminal events (AE I , AE., AEs) as shown in the DEVR model in appendix B.
It is also necessary to quantifY the probability that data will be provided at different levels of
fusion: data fusion, feature fusion, and decision fusion by the supporting sensors. This measure
wilt enable the designer to measure the system performance to extend the functionality of already
designed sensor fusion system. The reliability profiles of the terminals will be first studied in the
following subsections. Then this study will be continued to quantify the reliability profiles of
different levels of fusion. This study is limited to the failure afthe supporting sensors only.
E.6.1 The Reliability Profile of Termioal Event AE I
AE, will
fai[[fboth
=~
fail.
Figure E.IO: Fault tree of AE,
in relation to the failure of the
supporting sensors I and 2.
(£.4)
A fault tree shown in Fig depicts the relationship of the .----------,
failure of the sensors to the failure of AEl. E.IO. The
reliability of the aperiodic event AE l in terms of the
reliabilities of the supporting sensors I and 2 is as foHows:
The reliability profile of the AE, at different levels of
redundancy in the supporting sensor suite is shown in Fig.
E.ll with the assumption that all the sensors have same L...::==~"'::::=:::"'_-J
reliabilities.
~ 'r"T=--+---z~~=-±=-::::=or~~/r---l
! 0.8 f---\-c,f-"L--+"--r'4----".dL---f-----j]
1l.
-8 0.6 f--,I-f-+--f-,+="-+L----+~;,;g::;;;;,,,F=---1
~ ofAE, with
; 0.4 f---!l--+t'--:I-~::---+---",OM"ll-"g~"Iod=o="'&-i-----i
I 0.2 f--#---,.'-I-.¥--I-+--T.~~~---+---f-----j
40 60 80
Single sensor reliability R(t)"1 00
100 120
Figure E.ll: The reliability profile of the aperiodic event AE1
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E.6.2 Tbe Reliability Profile of Terminal Event AEs
The fault-tree of the aperiodic event AEs in
relation to the failure of the supporting sensors is
shown in Fig. E.12. To support data for the service
of AEs, sensors 4 and 5 play redundant role, while
sensors 4 and 5 are complementary to sensors 6
and 7. The reliability of the aperiodic event AEs in
terms of the reliabilities of the supporting sensors
4,5,6, and 2 is as follows:
The reliability profile of AEs is shown in
Fig.E.t3.
40 60 80
Single sensor reliability R(W100
Figure E.I3: The reliability profile of the aperiodic event AEs.
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E.6.3 Tbe Reliability Profile of Terminal Event AE.
The fault-tree of the aperiodic event AE, in relation to the failure of the supporting sensors is
shown in Fig. E.14.
Figure E.14: The fault-tree of the failure ofaperiodic event AE1.
The derivation of the relation to estimate the reliability of the aperiodic event AE, in tenns of the
reliabiJities of the supporting sensors with the asswnption that all the sensors have same
reliabilities is shown below.
RAE/I) = R(tXI_Q2(f». Q(t) is the unreliability (E.6)
R.lE, (I) .. II- Q2(ln {1-Q2(t)}R(ll (E.7)
R,jE,(tj .. {1~Ql(llIR{I)R(r) (E.B)
R,jE.(!) -[1- {l- R(t)(I-Q1UHQ(t)][{l_Ql(tllll-Ql(I)lR(tl] (E.9)
R,j£.(II_[I_{l~Ql(tll{I_Ql(t)}R(t)][I_II_Ql(t)}R(t)R(t)l1 (E.IO)
RAE, .. [l-[l-ll- R(I)(I-Ql(/IIQ(/l][ (1_01(/)1 II - Ol(/lIR(/)1J[1 - [1-11- 0 1(/11 (I-Ol(t)lR(/)J(I-ll- Ql(I)lRCljR(I)lll
(E.Il)
The reliability profile of the AE. at different levels of redundancy in the supporting sensor suite
is shown in Fig. E.15.
~ 1r----j---:;;o?=---±:,...--::o=t=~_:;r-----j
~
~ 0.8 f-"'......~"i'-t'----,L-+-I"'-+'--,C----olL---f------1
'8
l
-5 0.6 f------,ItI.-I'----+/---++"'.
"e
~ 0.4 f---+IP""-I~-+"'+",,,,",=lcc---f------1
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Figure E.15: The reliability profile of the aperiodic event AE,.
E.6.4 The Reliability Profile of the Data Fusion with Event AE2
The data level fusion of data from sensors 2, 4, and 5 is ,--------,
performed by the service of event ~. The faull-tree of
the aperiodic event ~ is shown in Fig.E. 16. The
reliability of providing data from the sensors to generate
the event~ is shown below.
The profile of reliable data supply to the aperiodic event
~ is shown in Fig.E.17.
Fig.E.16: The fault-tree of event AE~.
40 60 80
Single sensor reliability R(t)·100
Figure E.17: The re(iability profile of the aperiodic event AE,.
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E.6.5 The Reliability Profile of tbe Data Fusion with Event AEJ and AE4
The reliability profiles of AE) and that ,-------::==-------,
of sensor 2 are the same, because AE)
is provided data only by that sensor.
The fault-tree of the aperiodic event
AE. is shown in Fig.E.18. The
following relation measures the
readability of the event AE4:
The graph shown in Fig.E.!9 gives the L:::==~=::::~====~==:::J
reliability profile of event AE... Figure E.18: The fault-tree of the event AE•.
100 120
Figure E.l9: The reliability profile of the aperiodic event AE•.
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E.6.6 The Reliability Profile of the Feature Fusion witb Event AE6
Figure E.20: The fault·tree of the
aperiodic event AE6.
R-u:. (t) = (1- (1- RAE, (1»(1- R(t»)RAE•(1) (E.14)
RAEo (t) .. [1- (1- R{t)(l- Q2{t)}Q(I)][{I_ Ql(m {l- Ql(rHR(I)]
(E.15)
The failures of the events AE:z and AE. contribute to the ...-------------.
failure of AE6• The fault-tree of the aperiodic event AE6
is shown in Fig.E.20. The reliability that data will be
provided to AE6 by the sensors is calculated by the
following equations.
The reliability profile of the event AE6 is shown in
Fig.E.21.
Figure E.21: The reliability profile of the aperiodic event AE6•
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E.6.7 The Reliability Profile of the Data Fusion witb Event AE,
The output of the aperiodic events AE4 and AEj are ,--------..,
redundant. The failure of both of these events will result in
failure of the event AE1. The fault-tree of~ in tenns of the
failure of AE. and AEs is shown in Fig.E.22. The reliability
that data will be provided 10~ by the sensors is estimated
by the following equations.
RA£,(tj=l-{l-RA£.(t»(l-R,,£,{t» (£.16) L,-----:--:---,J
RA£, (tj .. [1- {I- Ql(/l} {I- QlUHR(t)j[l- {I- Ql(tHR(t)R(t)J I
(E. 17)
The reliability profile of this aperiodic event is shown in Fig. £.23.
Figure E.23: The reliability profile of the aperiodic event AE,.
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E.7 Temporal Overbead to Manage Redundancy
The temporal overhead to manage redundancy depends upon me technique used for sensors
faults detection.
In voting technique, if fault occurs during the data acquisition time (DAn as explained in section
5.2.1.2, fault should be cleared instantly. The time required to detect and switch the faulty sensor
with a fault-free one will be very negligible. During this fault clearance period data will be lost
and these data may be recovered using parallel sensing technique as explained in chapter 6 and
the time of this recovery will be small in comparison to the total aUocated time for periodic
process as shown in Table A.). In this case, the lower limits of the service times of the periodic
processes should be extended by this data recovery time. If faults occur during TeAD, service
time of the aperiodic events and WT, the data recovery is not required and voter may have the
potential 10 operate autonomously resulting in no temporal overhead on the DEVR model.
Therefore, in this operational scenario, OAT should include enough time to recovery data lost
during fault clearing period when fault occurs during OAT.
In estimation technique, at the end of every data acquisition r---:::===----...,
session estimation algorithm should be run on these acquired
data to make sure that the sensor is fault-free. This sensing
sequence is explained in Fig. E.24. In this sensing scenario, the
total allocated times for periodic processes as shown in Table
A.3 should include enough time for at least acquiescing data
twice and running the estimation algorithm twice to
accommodate at least one failure between two successive
periodic events. This requirement will create tremendous
temporal overheard on the DEVR model. The estimation
technique has the potential to show better reliability profile in
comparison to voting technique, but this is at the cost of extra ""'~~;:=;:=:"::.,,==::-'
temporal overhead on each periodic process.
Appendix F
-
IDetection of Sensor Faults in
Multi-sensori System by Simulation
F.l Introduction
In this simulation study, four test signals have been composed by the combination of different
harmonic components. The Fourier series representation of the rannation of these test signals is
given by
(F.I)
where t being an independent variable represents time, W == ¥ is the first harmonic, n is the
number ofhannonics, and an and bn are the amplitudes afme hannonics n<'tl.
The specification of this simulation is shown in Table F.1. The study of local means and
variances of these lest signals at fault free condition will be followed by the study of these
parameters at different fault conditions. The study will examine the effects of different instances
of occurrence and different frequencies of transient faults on local statistics. The variations of
these local statistics with the variation of window size and location will also be investigated. The
pennanent faults causing +ve and -ve saturation will only be addressed here.
Table F.l: The specifications of the simulating environment.
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F.2.! Tbe Cbaracteristics of tbe First Test Signal
The following relation gives the formation of this test signal:
}i(t) .. S+-2sin(2R"20)t)+2cos(21r20)/) (F.2)
The equivalent physical signal, sensor signal with noise, dynamic local mean and variance of the
sensor signal are shown in Fig. F.t. Fig.F.2. Fig.F.3, and Fig. FA respectively.
,:."",:.',.r : : ~: r:·"
i ; ! ! ;
!: '. ; '.: 1:.':,."j; : , : ~ i: ,
, ! ! !: ,::':
• I : ! ' I ,
• .., .~ .. ....,:;~ o. .., Go t,,, .:.. .. _:.':" ."'" <I.,
FIgure F.l: The first phYSical signal.
.,j.
!.
i.
I:
'.
Figure F.3: The local means orthe first signal.
Figure F.2: The ftrSt sensor signal with noise.
Figure FA: The local variances of the signal.
Table F.2: The statistics aCthe first lest signal.
The domains of the physical signal, ~-S~ign~'l-'-~U~p-p,-,b~o-=~d~~L-ow-'-';"bo-=-d~
sensor signal, local means and variances f--=p;,(;:t)=--+.2c;7;:'.8;:2=+-=~2;:'.1;;7=:....j
of this sensor signal are given in Table g,(t) 8.09 1.85
F.2. I-,Lo-,""."',m"-'C-""'-+-~7~.8~2--+-c-2~.1~8--j
Local variances 0.0517 0.0057
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F.2.2 The Characteristics of the Second Test Signal
The formation oflhe second test signal is given by the following relation
f:(t)cS+sin«1n-l0jt)+l.5cos{(2Jr20)r)+I.5sin{(41r20)tj (F.3)
The equivalent physical signal, sensor signal with noise, the local means and variances of the
sensor signal are shown in Fig. F.5, Fig.F.6. Fig.F.7, and Fig. F.B respectively.
~. , '
i' Ci: /.
\. I i:j: >- I "
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Figure F.5: The second physical signal.
~,
J.
I:
i:
Figure F.7: The variations of the local means.
Figure F.6: The second sensor sIgnal With nOise.
Figure F.B. The vanatlons aflocal vanances.
Local variances 0.1169 0.0065
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F.2.3 The Characteristics of the Third Test Signal
The formation of the third test signal is given by the following relation
!i<t) - S+jsiD(2x2Ot)- LSc:os(2z2Or) + siJl(2K4Ot) + CO$(2x4Ot) +O.$IiD(ZriOt) + O..5eos(2rlOl) (F.4)
The corresponding physical signal, sensor signal with noise, the local means and variances of the
sensor signal are shown in Fig. F.9, Fig.F.lO. Fig.F.ll. and Fig. F.l2 respectively.
Figure F.9: The third physical signal
".
f~ : : [ .
!. : . . :
!: : . . .-
~. .; .~....: .: ...
Figure F.l 0: The third sensor signal with noise.
Figure F.Il: The local means oftbc sensor signal. Figure F.12: The local variances of the signaL
Table FA: The statistics of the third signal
The domains of the physical signal,
sensor signal. local means and
variances are listed in Table F.4.
Signals Maximum Minimum
PJ{t) 7.00 1.80
83(t) 7.24 1.60
Local means 7.01 1.82
Local variances 0.1298 0.0057
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F.2.4 Tbe Cbaracteristics of tbe Fourtb Test Signal
The fourth test signal is fonned by the following relation
f)U)- S+.55in(211"60r) + Icos(2K60I} + 0.5siD(2xl2Ot) + cos(2KI2QI)+ OSsin(2.dSOI)+O.scos(2A'ISOt) (F.5)
The corresponding physical signal, sensor signal with noise, the local means and variances afthe
sensor signal are shown in Fig. F.I3. Fig.F.14. Fig.F.15, and Fig. F.16 respectively.
Figure F.13: The fourth physical Signal
Figure F.15: The local mean profile.
.'
J:
!.
l·
I:
Figure F.14: The fourth sensor signal WIth nOise.
Figure F.16. The local vanance profile.
Table F.5: The statistics of the fourth signal.
The range of values of the physical
signal, sensor signal. local means and
variances are listed in Table F.S.
Signals Maximum
p~(t) 7.918
&(t) 8.09
Local means 7.60
Local variances 1.006
Minimum
3.588
3.40
3.72
0.0092
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F.3 Tbe Analysis of tbe Signature of Transient Faults
The following relation bas simulated the transient signal as a damped sinusoid:
(F.6)
The effect afthe transient on the sensor signal has been modeled by superimposition as shown by
lhe following relation.
((t)_/(t)+ 1,(1 -Io)l(t-,o)
For the initial analysis the specification afthe transient signal is given in Table F.6.
Table F.6: The specification the test transient.
(F.7)
This specified transient and a sinusoidal signal corrupted with this transient are shown in Fig.
F.17(a) and Fig. F.17(b) respectively.
"
Figure F.17(a). A transient signal as damped
sinusoid.
Figure F.l7(b). A smusOId corrupted With the
transient
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F.3.1 Signature of the Transient Fanlt on the First Signal
"
" I'i' I'i: ,:
I' ,.
.-I: ..,/: I'I:
The local statistics ofa IKhz transient fault ofduration Sms at distance 70ms on the first lest
signal are shown in Fig. F.19, Fig. F.lO. Fig. F.2I. and Table-7.
B
Figure F.18. The first physical signal 19ure '. I}I': e first sensor Signa! corrupte<l
with transient fault.
"I' 00
J,
.- -.
i'I'
.'J: '-'
19ure :l. I: I ne DCa vanances ot the c:orruptM
sensor signal at transient fault.figure F.20: The local means of the corrupted
sensor signal al transient faull
Table F.7: The statistics of the first lest signal al transient fault
Signals Maximum value Minimwn value
Absolute Ratio Absolute Ratio
7.82 2.t7
8.103 1.87 1.01
Local means 7.81 2.18
Local variance 2.12 0.005
2IJ
F.3.Z Signature of the Transient Fault on the Second Signal
J.
"
I'i' ;.~,i:
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Figure F.22: The second ph.ysical signal.
Flgun: F.24: The local mean aCthe sensor
signal at transient fault.
Figure .23: The second sensor signa
superimposed with transicnl noise.
~-I-
I-
t"
i ':j::::::;;;:;;;::=+.':;:.:;;.::::t;;;:~.
Figure F.2S. The local vanances of the sensor
signal at transient fault.
Table F.8: The statistics aCthe second test signal at transient fault
Signals Maximum value Minimum value
pit)
Local means
Local variance
Absolute
8.27
8.46
8.20
1.9
Ratio
16
Absolute:
2.90
.69
2.91
.0057
Ratio
0.26
0.87
214
F.3.3 Signature of the Transient Fault on the Third Test Signal
"
Figure F.26. The third physIcal test signal.
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r
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I'll'! ' .'.. ...• :........ :•.•.•....• ' . , I ;~. : ; II.' 'i. ! : Ii. i :i: '
'0 .:.. .~ .. ,_~ .:.. 0.•
Figure F.27. The tlurd sensor signal corrupted
with transient noise.
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!,~.~~~~~j.:I'...i',..
rt.' ••
"
Figure F.28. The local mean profile afthe thud Figure F.29. The local vanance profile afthe
sensor signal at transient fault. third sensor signal at transient fault.
Table F.9: The statistics of the third test signal at transient fault
Signals Maximwn value Minimum value
git)
Local means
Local variance
Absolute Ratio Absolute Ratio
7.00 l.80
9.2 1.27 1.63
7.00 1.84
1.79 13.79 0.006
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F.3.4 Signature of tbe Transient Fault on tbe Fourtb Test Signal
·:11::';
,. :•.' :.. .; :•.I: ' , : :j ~ : i ' i ;
°0 (1.02 o,;:,. ..~ .......
Figure F.30. The fourth physical test signal.
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I.•
i'§""~'..I'i'i:
Figure F.32. The local mean profile of the
fourth test signal at transient fault.
I'j'
.'~..
t:
"i:
19ure t'.J I: I ne ounn les sensor Signa
corrupted with transient noise
Figure F.33: The local vanance profile of the
fourth test signal at transient fault.
Table F.lD: The statistics of the fourth test signal at transient fault
Signals Maximum value Minimum value
Absolute Ratio Absolute Ratio
P.(t) 7.9188 3.588
",(t) 8.24 1.01 l.89 0.55
Local means 7.61 3.75
Local variance 2.122 2.10 0.0091
F.4.1 The Transient Fault at DiffereDt Locations on the First Signal
Figure F.34: The transient fault at the origin. Figure F.35: The variances for the fault at origin.
"I'~:mmf: -"I'
i: I
Figure F.36: The fault at 18 ms from the origin. Figure :;.37: The vanances or au t at 18 ms.
'II'"lit ° i ~ ! !i 7 ! I : II: ' ; : :i· :. : i ,:I: "",I~": : ~.."
0 0 O~' .~ .. .-:::. o~ 0,1
:."
Raliosof
i- 7:"·" •~i "---I- II- I
L i ~l~os!,f :
I i/__.1.
[gure F:JB:TIle ranos onne peaKS 0 ocar 19ure t' ..j'l: I ne ranos or me peaKs 0 oca
means at transient fault with those at no fault. variances at transient fault with those at no fault.
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F.4.2 Transient Fault at Various Locations on the Second Signal
~,
t u
I'il.$~~~~~~~~~~j,; '._.
1"
L
Figure FAO. The transient fault at the ongm on Figure FAt. The vanance profile of the second
the second tcst signal test signal while transient is at the origin
Figure F.42. The transient fault at 18 ms from Figure FA3. The vanance profile of the second lest
the origin on second lest signal. signal while transient is at 18 ms from the origin
Figure F.44: The ratios of the peaks of local Figure FA5: The ratIOs of the peaks of local
means at transient fault with those at no fault. variances at transient fault with those at no fault.
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F.4.3 Transient Fault at Various Locations on the Third Signal
Figure F.46: The transIent ault at the origin on Figure F.4?: The variance profile of the third test
the third test signal signal while transient is at the origin
19ure .40: 1 ne transient au t at 10 ms uum lIIe Figure F.49: The vanance profile 0 t-the third test
origin on third test signal signal while transient is at 18 ms from the origin
~"r----r-r---r-~-Ii"r-----tl-t----t------i
!" I ,~,I ~'~mj:~~
i i/rrnnl""f' I
Figure F.50. The rallos of the peaks of local Figure F.5I. The ranos of the peaks of local
means at transient fault with those at no fault. variances at transient fault with those at no fault.
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F.4.4 Transient Fault at Various Locations on the Fourth Signal
Figure .:U.. : lnc transient au t at me ongm on Figure F.53: The variance profile of the fourth
the fourth test signal test signal while transient is at the origin
rf-----+-----+---+----'-----1
! "I----+---'--'--i--__I
1"1-----!,-:...:-"-~-tor--+----;----Ii ..L--+,'~"""";~"'Tme....,";"~+--I
, I 1.1""''''.
Figure f.56. The rabos of the peaks of local FIgure F.57. The ratlOS of the peaks of local
means at transient fault with those at no fault. variances at transient fault with those at no fault.
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F.5.1 Tbe Effect of Window Size on Local Statistics at Transient
Fault on tbe First Test Signal
,
, ....I"
Fig. F.SS. The transient fault on the First sIgnal. Fig. F.59.The vanances at wmdow wIdth Ams.
_..- _..-
's·
Ig. eratloso e 0 e
means at different window widths.
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F.5.2 Tbe Effect of Window Size on Local Statistics at Transient
Fault on the Second Test Signal
FIg F 64' The transient fault on the 2nd signal FIg F 6S-The vanances at wlOdow width 4ms
Fig. F.66.The vanances at window width 3ms. Fig. F.67.Thevanances at wmdow width IOms.
Ig. .va: tile ratlos Oll-Ue pe<t:<.s 01 IIle oca
means at different window widths.
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F.5.3 Tbe Effect of Window Size on Local Statistics at Transient
Fault on tbe Tbird Test Signal
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Fig. F 71 The vanances at Window WIdth 4ms
Fig F n·ne vanances at WIndow WIdth 3ms
~.
i:
I,
i·j:
Ig. . 4:The ratlos afthe peaks of the oca
means at different window widths.
18. : I lie vanances at wmc10w Wlc1m lurns.
fig. F.7S:The ratios of the peaks aCthe local
variances al different window widths.
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F.5.4 The Effect of Window Size on Local Statistics at Transient
Fault on lbe Fourtb Test Signal
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Fig F.76· The transient fault on the 4th signal
Fig F 78 The vanances at wmdow width 3ms
Fig. F.80.The ratios of the peaks of the local
means at different window widths.
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Ig. : I ne vanances at wmaow wtom ms.
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Fig. F.79.The vanances at wmdow Wldth toms.
19. eratloso epe 0 e oca
variances at different window widths.
F.6.1 The Effect of Window Locations on Local Statistics at
Transient Fault on the First Test Signal
til::;'I I!'I:. !:
f> ',' " , ""j. ! ! !I- ' . ,
"0 .~ o:.:..~-:: .'.. 0.'
Fig. F.82: The transient fault on the 1st signal.
Ig. l' .lS4: 1 ne vanances at wmoow
displacement of 66 ms from the origin
Fig. F.86.The ratios of the peaks of the local
means at different window displacements.
Ig. '.~.): Inc vanances a WUlaow
displacement of 02 ms from £he origin
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i.: : . :
o 0.0> t.O< G." .... "
Ig. '.lS:>:lne vanances at wmaow
displacement of 1.2 ms from tbe origin.
Ig. eranoso cpe 0 e ac
variances at different window displacements.
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F.6.2 The Effect of Window Locations on Local Statistics at
Transient Fault on the Second Test Signal
e transient faul ndsi al. Ig. [" .07: 1 ne vanances a WlnuOWdisplacement of 02 ms from the origin
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Ig. ~.W:lhe vananccs at Wl.J1(1(Iw
djmlacement f.66 ms fTnm the nrieri".
~.
i:
I.
i·i: mulrtOJ"1
Fig. F.92.The ranos oClhe peaks of the local
means at different window displacements.
19. r.Y I; 1ne vanances at WlnuvW
acemen fl.2msfro~.. i
F.6.3 Tbe Effect of Window Locations on Local Statistics at
Transient Fault on the Third Test Signal
Fig. F.94. The transient fault on the 3rd signal.
[g. : inc vanances a WlnOOW
displacement of 66 ms from the origin
Ig• .r.'~: 1 ne ranos or me peaKS 0 ltle oca
means at different window displacements.
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Ig. r .".: e vanances a wrn ow
displacement of 02 ms from the origin
fig. F.97.Thevanances at wmdow
di lacement fl.2msfromtheori on.
Fig. F.99:The ratios 0 the peaks oftbe local
variances at different window displacements.
F.6.4 Tbe Effect of Window Locations on Local Statistics at
Transient Fault on tbe Fourtb Test Signal
i':I11:·:···'!~: : : ! :I . ,! ~
!. : '
j~. .~ .L.J .l ..,
Fig. F. tOO. The ttanslent fault on the 4th signal.
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Ig. .1 U~: I ne vanances at wmoow
displacement of 66 ms from the origin
Ig. .: 1 ne ranos or me peaxs 01 me OC3..1
means at different window displacements.
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FIg. F.I03.The vanances at wmdow
displacement of 1 2 ms from the origin
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F.7.1 The Effect of Transient Faults of Different Frequencies on the
Local Statistics of the First Test Signal
~'!'I" .' '. : :i: ! : ; i!. : i : :i :, J .L ,L ,L ..
Fig. F.106. The 500 Hz transient on 1st signal.
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I',..j,;
.-.. .'"
Fig. to : The vanances at 5 z transient.
Fig. F.1lO.The raMs of the peaks ofthe local
means at different transient frequencies.
Ig. : ine vanances a ~vv nZ transient on
1st test signal.
'"l,:
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Fig. 109: The variances at 10 KHz transient.
Fig. F.III:The ratios of the peaks of the local
variances at different transient frequencies.
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F.7.2 The Effect of Transient Faults of Different Frequencies on the
Local Statistics of tbe Second Test Signal
I"c--+--: +--+~'------1
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Fig. F.112: The 500 Hz transient on 1st signal.
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means at different transient frequencies.
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Fig. tt5. The vanances at 10 KHz transient.
Ig. eraloso ep 0 e oca
variances at different transient frequencies.
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F.7.3 The Effect of Transient Faults of Different Frequencies on the
Local Statistics of the Third Test Signal
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Fig. F.II8: The SOO Hz transient on 3rd signal. Ig. ilY: 1he vanances at ~tHJ Hz transient on
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Fig. 1 0: The vanances at S KHz transient.
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F.7.4 The Effect of Transient Faults of Different Frequencies on the
Local Statistics oftbe Fonrtb Test Signal
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Fig. F.124: The 500 Hz transient on 4th signal.
Fig. 126. The vanances at 5 KHz transient.
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Fig. F.128:The ranos of the peaks of the local
means at different transient frequencies.
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Fig 125' Thevanances at 500 Hz transient
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Fig. 127: The variances at 10 KHz transient.
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FIg. F.129:The ratIOs of the peaks of the local
variances at different transient frequencies.
Appendix G
_ IPerformance of a Fault Tolerant Optical
Sensor Using Triple Modular Redundancy
G.I Introduction
An ex.periment was set up to study the potential of achieving sensor fault tolerance using triple
modular redundancy. This study included the verification of the scheme (0 restore sensor data
lost during fault clearance interval using parallel sensing technique proposed in Chapter 7.
Three photocells of same specifications were used 10 build the triple modular sensor system. The
specifications of these photocells are shown in Table G.!.
Table G.I: The specifications of the optical sensors (photocells)
Each of these photocells was used to
control the gain of an amplifier with
the variation of its resistance due to the
change of illumination level shown in
Fig. G.t. The input voltage is a
reference negative de voltage which is
amplified to the output as function of
illumination
Eq.(G.l).
v.
level as shown in '--:::- ....,..__--, -,----'
Figure G.t: An optical sensor whose output voltage
level is function of illumination level.
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(G.!)
Therefore, the output voltage of the optical sensor shown in Fig. G.t is directly proportional to
the illumination level (or inversely proportional to the value of resistance RI).
G.2 Fault-Tolerant Optical Seusor Usiug Triple Modular
Redundancy
A triple modular optical sensor system was realized connecting three optical sensors having same
specifications to an analog multiplexer as shown in Fig. G.2. A microcontroiler
(MC68HC811E2FN) based single hoard computer was used for the detection of fault sensor and
generation ofcontrol signals for the multiplexer to change the faulty sensor with fault-free one. A
software running on the microcontroUer based single board computer compares the signals from
three sensors with each other, and, based on majority voting technique, detects the faulty sensor.
If the fault channel is on as the multiplexer output, the channel is switched with a fault-free one
by generating an appropriate control signal.
Artificial faults were generated by making a short circuit across the sensor, by disconnecting the
sensor from the circuit, and by creating optical shadow on the sensor. Successful detection and
followed by the switching of faulty channel with fault-free one as the output of the multiplexer
was demonstrated. It should be noted that this triple modular redundancy based fault-tolerant
optical sensor system couldn't detect faulty sensors if more than one sensor fail. It was noticed
that the output signal dipped during fault clearance interval as shown in Fg.G.3. These dips were
created to clear faults caused by artificial shadow on the photocells. The detection of these dips
and the schemes for the minimization of the effect of these dips are explained in the following
subsections.
'3<
Select O"Ch;mnel
B A yVl
L L ...-,(1)
L H x!(f)
H L XJ{I)
H H X
>----J'--::;::~~;::.-.-+-I Multiplexer y(1)
Figure G.2: An optical fault tolerant sensor using triple modular redundancy.
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Samples ofdala acquired over 60 seconds
Figure G.3: The dips caused on the output signal from fault tolerant sensor module during fault
clearance intervals.
G.3 The Detection of Fanlt Clearance Interval
The software nuuting on the microcontroller board detects ilie faulty sensor and switches the
output channel to the fault free sensor by generating control signal for the multiplexer. Therefore,
the change in control signal can be used to detect the fault clearance interval as shown in Fig.
GA. The duration of fault clearance interval will depend upon particular situation. This window
dimension can be calculated by comparing the signal value of the faulty sensor with that from a
freecne.
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Change in
v---V ~~~\~~1
-2
-3
o 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Samples of data acquired over 60 seconds
6000
Figure G.4: The detection of fault clearance instances by monitoring the changes of the control
signal sent to the multiplexer by the microcontroller board.
G.4 Minimization of the Effects of the Dips Caused during Fault
Clearance Intervals
After the detection of fault clearance instances from the change of control signal, the data sample
of faulty sensor around these instances can be compared with those of fault free sensor to
measure the duration of the dips. Then for the duration of the fault clearance interval, data can
be copied from the fault free sensor to replace the corresponding data samples ofilie output data
stream to reduce the effect of these dips. This can be explained by removing the first dip. At the
beginning, the multiplexer outputs the signal from the first sensor. The signals from the first
sensor and the second sensor are shown in Fig. G.5 and G.6 respectively.
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Samples of data acqoired over 60 seconds
Figure G.5: The data stream from the first sensor.
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Samplesofdalaacquiredover60seconds
Figure G.6: The data stream from the second the sensor.
238
The location of the first dip caused on the output signal shown in Fig.G.4 corresponds to Ihe first
dip caused on the first signal as shown in Fig.G.S. At this location there is no dip cauSed on the
second sensor signal. Therefore, if both the second sensor signal and the output signal of the
multiplexer were recorded simultaneously, the first dip couJd have been removed by the scheme
proposed in Chapter 7 as shown in Fig.G.7.
Tbef1l'5ldiphasbeen
«:moved. The «:ll1.lining
effe.:tisd"eIQdissimilar
~"&nalleVCISgeDeratedbY~ 1 different sensors.
.E10 u
-2
-3 o!;------c,o,:,o;no---,2,:,oo'''oc-~3"'0\;;00,--...0;';;ono----.5~00"'Oc-c-.'"'0'00
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Figure 0.7: The processed output signal from a fault tolerant sensor module after removal of the
first dip.
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In the similar way. the remaining dips can be removed and the processed output signal after the
removal of all dips as shown in Fig. G.S.
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Figure G.S: The processed output signal ofa fault tolerant sensor module with reduced effects for
dips caused during fault clearance intervals.
The results of an experiment on fault-lolerant sensor system reported here explain that there is a
potential to detect the faulty sensor and to replace it with fault-free one using triple modular
redundancy. It has also been demonstrated that the effect of the dips caused on the output signal
during fault clearance interval can be reduced by the parallel sensing scheme proposed in
Chapter?
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